Of the judgment of the first instance, the guilty part, and the acquittal part of the same judgment, the obstruction of performance of official duties on April 4, 2013, and April 19, 2013.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant 1’s assertion (i) On May 10, 2012, 2012, Defendant 1’s assertion on the lower judgment of the first instance court, misunderstanding of facts and misunderstanding of legal principles, and (ii) on May 10, 2012, the Defendant is not the representative of U (U) (hereinafter “U”) who is the organizer of the above assembly, and (iii) was not present at the above U meeting or did not have voting rights at the meeting, and (iv) was not led by the above assembly, such as viewing the society on the day of the above assembly or inciting the above assembly, and thus, the Defendant

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below which convicted the defendant as to the non-reported assembly on the premise that the defendant is the organizer of the above assembly is erroneous by mistake or by misapprehending legal principles.

⑵ 천막 설치로 인한 무허가 도로점용의 점 관련 ㈎ 도로점용허가 대상은 도로법, 도로법 시행령 및 서울시조례 등에서 제한적 열거적으로 규정하고 있는데, 피고인이 P 앞 인도상에 설치한 천막(이하 ‘이 사건 천막’이라고 한다)은 위 법령의 규정 어디에도 해당하지 않으므로 애당초 점용허가 대상이 아니다.

Therefore, even without permission from a road management agency, a tent can be installed on a road and occupied by the road.

㈏ 위 법령들이 도로점용 허가 대상으로 정하고 있지 않은 것까지도 모두 허가를 받아야 한다면, 이 사건 천막의 경우 처음부터 도로점용 허가 대상이 아니어서 피고인이 천막에 대해 도로점용 허가를 받을 수도 없고 도로관리청인 서울특별시 중구청장도 이를 허가할 수 없다는 결론에 이르게 된다.

Therefore, since the defendant's establishment of a branch office with the permission of occupation and use by the head of the Gu in Seoul Special Metropolitan City was impossible under the law, it is reasonable to assume the responsibility because there is no possibility of meeting the requirements

㈐ 그럼에도 무허가 도로점용의 점에 관하여 피고인에게 유죄를...