1. All appeals by the Defendants are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.

Purport of claim and appeal

1.

1. According to the record on the legitimacy of the appeal for subsequent completion, the court of first instance rendered a favorable judgment against the Defendants on December 9, 201, after serving a copy of the complaint and the notice of date for pleading by public notice, and proceeding with the pleadings. The original copy of the judgment also served on the Defendants by public notice. The Defendants, on May 11, 2015, become aware of the fact that the judgment of the first instance was served by public notice, and then filed an appeal for subsequent completion on May 19, 2015. The Defendants were unable to comply with the period of appeal due to any cause not attributable to them, and filed an appeal for subsequent completion within two weeks from the date on which such cause ceases to exist. Thus, the appeal for subsequent completion of appeal of this case is lawful.

(A) The lower court’s judgment on February 6, 2015 and March 17, 2015, based on the judgment of the first instance court, is deemed to have served on each Defendant B the written examination and the written decision of the case in question on the defaulters’ list No. 2015Kao50, the lower court’s judgment on the merits. However, it cannot be deemed that the Defendants knew of the fact that the judgment of the first instance court was served by service by public notice. 2.

A. Facts of recognition 1) The Plaintiff’s Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (amended by Act No. 6969, Aug. 21, 2003; hereinafter “Self-Resolution Act”).

In accordance with Article 37, the Government’s Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Business (hereinafter “Guarantee Business”) as stipulated in Article 26 of the Act.

(2) At around February 22, 2001, Defendant A, on the front side of Seongbuk-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government, was exposed to the left side on the D driver’s vehicle that violated the signal while cutting the crosswalk according to the pedestrian signal.

(hereinafter “instant accident”). At the time, D did not take measures, such as aiding and abetting Defendant A, and went away from the site.

3 With the consent of the wife E, Defendant B owned the instant accident on behalf of the Plaintiff on April 24, 2001 on behalf of the Defendant A who was a minor as of April 24, 2001.