1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the Defendants shall be revoked, and all of the Plaintiff’s claims against the aforementioned revocation portion.

1. The reasoning for this court’s judgment on this part of the basic facts is identical to the ground for a “1. Facts recognized” as stated in the second or fourth written judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, citing it as it is in accordance with the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

However, the second '1' of the judgment of the court of first instance

A. The part of the “Defendant E is the doctor of the Defendant Hospital that treated the Plaintiff” in the “party’s relationship” refers to “The Defendant C is the psychosis and doctor of the Defendant Hospital affiliated with the Defendant Hospital that treated the Plaintiff (see, e.g., evidence A 3-2).” On April 17, 2013, the gist of the Plaintiff’s assertion was that the Defendant C neglected to control infection while performing high-frequency heat therapy on the side of the instant medical procedure against the Plaintiff (see, e.g., evidence A-1) (the specific negligence of the Defendant C’s medical practice) and caused the instant disability.

As the employer of Defendant C, the Defendants jointly pay to the Plaintiff damages for delay from April 17, 2013, which is the date of the instant treatment, the sum of KRW 93,874,744, and the amount of damages for delay, which is the date of the instant treatment, to the Plaintiff.

3. Determination as to the assertion on the occurrence of liability for damages

A. The plaintiff's inferred escape certificate is not executed first, and the doctor of the instant procedure, which is a "influence medical act", immediately without any preservation medical treatment, has a considerable discretion to choose the method of medical treatment that is deemed appropriate according to the patient's situation, the level of medical care at the time, and his knowledge and experience. As long as it does not deviate from the reasonable scope, either one of the methods of medical treatment is just and the other is not negligent (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da5867, May 31, 2007).