All appeals by the Defendants are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. “D” brokerage office in which the Defendants were erroneous of facts is the Defendants’ brokerage office having duly completed the registration of establishment of Q. Since the Defendants run a business under the explicit or implied permission of Q, the Defendants cannot be deemed to operate the unregistered brokerage office.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court of the first instance which found the Defendants guilty of the violation of the Licensed Real Estate Agent Act concerning the unregistered brokerage business among the facts charged is erroneous by mistake or by misapprehending the legal principles.

B. The judgment of the first instance court on the Defendants’ imposition of unfair sentencing (the fine of KRW 10,000,000) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination:

A. As to the assertion of mistake of facts or misapprehension of legal principles, the Defendants asserted the same purport as the grounds for appeal in the first instance court, and the court of first instance rejected the Defendants’ assertion in the item “determination on the principal claim” and found the Defendants guilty of the relevant facts charged.

In comparison with the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court of first instance, a thorough examination was conducted by the court of first instance. According to the above evidence, since it is recognized that the real estate sales contract that the real estate agent Q with the registration of establishment of "D" brokerage office was mediated in the state of mind without any relation with Q as stated in the facts charged, the above judgment of the court of first instance which deemed the above brokerage act as an unregistered brokerage business is justifiable, and it cannot be deemed that there was an error of misconception of facts or misapprehension of legal principles as alleged by the Defendants.

B. It is reasonable to respect the allegation of unfair sentencing in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015).