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헌재 1998. 5. 28. 선고 96헌가4 97헌가6 97헌가7 95헌바58 영문판례 [자동차손해배상보장법 제3조 단서 제2호 위헌제청]
[영문판례]
본문

Case on the Automobile Driver's No-Fault Liability

[10-1 KCCR 522, 96Hun-Ka4 et al., May 28, 1998]

A. Background of the Case

In this case, the Constitutional Court held as constitutional the provisions of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act requiring the driver to compensate for any injury or death of all passengers including free riders and guests of his or her courtesy, regardless of his or her fault.

The second proviso of Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act stipulates that one who drives an automobile for his or her benefit shall be liable for any injury or death of a passenger arising out of the ride, except when it was caused by the passenger intentionally or in an act of suicide.

The petitioners were either the drivers or their insurance companies in accidents where passenger death or injury occurred. When sued for the loss, they motioned to request constitutional review of the above provision. Some of them were accepted and those denied filed constitutional complaints.

B. Summary of the Decision

The Constitutional Court held that the second proviso of Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act does not violate the Constitution, as follows.

The free-market economic order forms the basis of the Korean Constitution. The Constitution, however, also adopts the principles of a social state. Given this, even when the liabilities for general torts are allocated according to fault, it is within the discretion of the legislators to single out one type of tort and apply the principle of risk liability. Considering the special nature of auto accidents, the mere imposition of no fault liability on the driver for having created the risk in cases of passengers' deaths or injuries does not breach the free-market economic order.

It should be noted that the driver controls the operation of the automobile and benefits from it. He also has abstractly or indirectly consented to the passengers' boarding of the vehicle, thereby bringing them within the danger of direct risk involved with driving the automobile. Holding the driver liable, regardless of his or

her fault, for any damage to all passengers including free riders and guests of his or her courtesy constitutes the minimum rational regulation necessary under the constitutional ideology of a social state. Therefore, the provision does not infringe upon the driver's right to property.

It should be noted that there is a fundamental difference between passengers who have joined in the risk of a car accident and non-passengers, such as pedestrians. On the contrary, there is no fundamental difference between the driver at fault and the driver without fault in their control of the source of danger, the vehicle. Therefore, the above provision, which differentiates between passengers and non-passengers, and applies no-fault liability to both drivers at fault and those without, does not violate the principle of equality.

C. Significance of the Decision

This decision is significant in that the Court upheld a law that modifies the traditional rule of liability for fault and holds the person in control of the source of danger liable for any part of the danger materialized, thereby introducing the principle of risk liability. In modern industrial societies, the principle of risk liability is adopted to realize the ideals of a social state, and the principle has been adopted in various statutes including the Nuclear Liability Act.

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