Drunk Driving Three Strikeout Case

[18-1(B) KCCR 98, 2005Hun-Ba91, May 25, 2006]

In this case, the Constitutional Court declared constitutional Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 14(hereinafter referred to as the "the Instatn Provision") of the Road Traffic Act which compulsorily revokes a driving license in event of three time violations of the ban on drunk driving.

Background of the Case

Petitioner was suspended the driving license after found drunk driving twice, and was revoked the license after found drunk driving one additional time. Petitioner filed a suit to cancel the revocation of the license and requested constitutional review of the Instant Provisions which formed the basis of the revocation. When the request was denied, Petitioner filed this constitutional complaint.

Summary of the Decision

The Constitutional Court upholds the Instant Provisions with a unanimous decision of all Justices for the following reasons:

The Instant Provisions have the legitimate legislative purpose of protecting people's life, limbs, and properties and securing road safety. A person in violation of the ban on drunk driving three time can be deemed deficient in the sense of responsibility toward road traffic regulations and in the awareness of safety required of a traffic participant. Revoking a driving license of such person is appropriate means to accomplish the legislative purpose. On the other hand, the Instant Provisions of the Road Traffic Act were newly enacted in an effort to broaden the scope of compulsory revocation and thereby strengthen traffic order in response to the increasing number of traffic accidents. Once a driving license is revoked by the Instant Provisions, the disqualification period after revocation is a relatively short period of two years compared to the disqualification periods set pursuant to other statutes. Given the space-temporal limits on detecting drunk driving, regardless of time intervals among the violations, three time violations of the drunk driving ban sufficiently indicate the driver's deficiency in the sense of duty toward traffic regulations and the awareness of safety. The compulsory nature of the revocation under the Instant Provisions

and the failure to apply revocation only to the violations falling within certain time intervals do not exceed the necessary minimum in restricting occupational freedom and general freedom of action. Also, we cannot emphasize too much the gravity of public interest in protecting individuals, the society, and the state from enormous damages arising out of drunk driving while the private interest infringed due to compulsory revocation and the indirect damages originating therefrom cannot be compared in gravity to the public interest. The Instant Provisions therefore do not violate the principle of balance among legal interests. Therefore, the Instant Provisions do not violate the ban against excessive restriction in restricting occupational freedom and general freedom of action.

In applying administrative discipline against a driver that has caused a traffic accident deliberately or negligently, it is rational to comprehensively take into account the course and contents of the accident, the extent and type of injuries suffered by the victim, the degree of negligence of the driver, the age and gender of the driver and the victim, the post-accident course of events, and etc., in deciding on whether to suspend or revoke the driver's license. In event of such accident, it is important to identify the responsible party, make the party pay compensation, and thereby provide substantive relief to the victim. Suspending or revoking the driving license of the driver who has caused the injuries on others and did not file a report or otherwise take necessary measures will encourage voluntary reporting by such driver and thereby facilitate the compensation for the victim. Taking this into account, the Instant Provisions permit discretion in deciding on administrative discipline. Therefore, suspending or revoking the driving license of a person who has caused a traffic accident negligently or deliberately or who has caused injuries on others and failed to file a report or take other necessary measures does not depart so far from equity to violate the principle of equality as to an extent that destroys the order governing various reasons for revocations and suspensions.

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Party

Petitioner

Shin ○ Gi

Petitioner's Counsel: Go Suk-Sang

Co-Counsel: Halla Law Firm

Attorney in Charge: Go Suk-Sang and one other

Underlying Case

Jeju District Court 2005Gu-Hap443 Cancellation of revocation of a driving license

Holding

Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 14 of the Road Safety Act(revised partially on December 23, 2004 through Act No. 7247 prior to be wholly amended on May 31, 2005 through Act No. 7545) which provides, 'in event that a person who has violated Article 41 Paragraph 1 twice or more times violates Article 41 Paragraph 1 once again and thereby satisfies the reason for suspending the license', does not violate the Constitution.

Reasoning

1. Introduction of Case and Subject Matter of Review

A. Introduction of the Case

Petitioner was suspended the license for drunk driving on March 27, 2002 and July 22, 2003. On March 8, 2005, Petitioner was again cited for drunk driving with the blood alcohol of 0.071% and revoked the license by Chief of Jeju District Police Agency on March 18.

Petitioner filed a suit in Jeju District Court to cancel revocation of the license(2005Gu-Hap443) and requested constitutional review of Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 14 which provided the basis for the revocation(Jeju District Court 2005Ah22). When the request was denied on October 5, 2005, Petitioner filed this constitutional complaint on November 9 against Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 14 in accordance with Article 68 Paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Act.

B. Subject Matter of Review

Petitioner filed this constitutional complaint against the entire Subparagraph 14 of Article 78 Paragraph 1 of the Road Safety Act,

but in this case Petitioner had violated Article 41 Paragraph 1 twice and by violating once again was suspended the driving license, and therefore the part of Subparagraph 14 of Article 78 Paragraph 1 concerning Article 41 Paragraph 2 is excluded from the subject matter of review. Therefore, the subject matter for review is constitutionality of Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 14 of the Road Safety Act(revised partially by December 23, 2004 through Act No. 7247 prior to be wholly amended on May 31, 2005 through Act No. 7545) which provides, 'in event that a person who has violated Article 41 Paragraph 1 twice or more times violates Article 41 Paragraph 1 once again and thereby satisfies the reason for suspending the license' ("the Instant Provisions"), which are set forth as follows:

The Road Safety Act(revised partially by December 23, 2004 through Act No. 7247 prior to be wholly amended on May 31, 2005 through Act No. 7545)

Article 78(Revocation and Suspension of Driver's License)

(1) When a person who has obtained a driver's license(excluding the driver's practice license; hereafter in this Article, the same shall apply) falls under any of the following subparagraphs, the Commissioner of the Local Police Agency may revoke the driver's license or suspend its validity within the limit of one year, pursuant to the standards as determined by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs: Provided, that he shall revoke such driver's license when the said person falls under Subparagraphs 1, 2, 3(excluding the time when a period of regular aptitude test has been expired), Subparagraphs 5 through 8, 10, 11, 13, and 14:

(i) through (xiii) omitted

(xiv) When the person, who violated the provisions of Article 41 Paragraph 1 or 2 over 2 or more occasions, has come to fall under the causes for suspending his driver's license due to another violation of the provisions of Article 41 Paragraph 1;

(xv) through (xvii) omitted

Article 41(Prohibition of Driving under Influence of Liquor)

(1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle, etc. under the influence of liquor(including the construction machinery other than those referred to in the proviso of Article 26 Paragraph 1 of the Construction Machinery Management Act; the same shall apply hereafter in this Article, and Articles 42, 43 and 107-2)

(2) When a police officer deems it necessary for the traffic safety and the prevention of dangers, or when there exists a

reasonable cause for deeming that a person has driven a motor vehicle, etc. under the influence of liquor in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1, he may take a measurement of whether or not the driver is under the influence of liquor, and the driver shall comply with such measurement.

(3) omitted

(4) Standards for the drunken conditions for which any driving is prohibited under the provisions of Paragraph 1, shall be prescribed by the Presidential Decree.

Article 70(Disqualifications for Driver's License)

(1) omitted

(2) Any person falling under any of the following subparagraphs shall not be entitled to obtain a driver's license unless the period as referred to in each of the relevant subparagraphs has elapsed. In this case, it shall be limited to persons who have been sentenced to the penalty of a fine or heavier ones(including a suspension of execution) in the cases of Subparagraphs 1 through 4:

(i) through (iv) omitted

(v) In case where his driver's license has been cancelled due to his violations of the provisions of Article 41 Paragraph 1 or 2 three time or more, or it has been cancelled due to the causes under Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraphs 2, 5 or 6, two years from the day of having cancelled his driver's license;

(vi) through (vii) omitted

Article 31(Standard of Intoxicated State)

The standard of an intoxicated state as referred to in Article 41 of the Act shall be not less than 0.05 percent ofalcohol concentration in the blood.

Addenda(Act No. 6392, Jan. 26, 2001)

Article 1(Enforcement Date)

This Act shall enter into force on June 30, 2001: proviso omitted

Article 2(Application Example to Prohibition of Driving in Drunken State)

The amendments to Articles 70 Paragraph 2 Subparagraph 5 and 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 14 shall be applicable to the offenses occurred on and after the enforcement of this Act.

2. Petitioner's Arguments, Ordinary Court's Reason for Denying Request for Constitutional Review, and the Opinions of Interested Parties.

A. Petitioner's Arguments

In applying enhanced discipline against a three time offender of the drunk driving ban, the risk posed by the offender shall be measured differently according to the time interval within which the offenses have taken place(e.g., three time within 1 year or within 5 years) and differential disciplines shall be applied. The Instant Provisions, however, do not place any restriction on the time interval within which the three time offenses must take place. Also, a violation of the drunk driving ban differs in its degree of culpability depending on the conduct involved(e.g., whether the offender has refused the blood reading, whether the blood alcohol level is above or below 0.1%, or the drunk driving has caused personal or property damages, etc.). However, the Instant Provisions ignore whether the prior offenses constituted the reasons for suspension or those of revocation and apply indiscriminately compulsory revocation to all three time offender of the drunk driving ban. Therefore, the Instant Provisions violate the ban against excessive restriction.

Also, the Instant Provisions apply enhanced discipline on the basis of criminal punishment and administrative discipline already applied to the prior two drunk driving offenses. Therefore, the Instant Provisions interfere with the stability of law. Also, Subparagraphs 4 and 12 of Article 78 Paragraph 1 of the Road Safety Act concern the conduct more culpable than the Instant Provisions and yet provide for permissive revocation. Therefore, the Instant Provisions also violate the principle of equality.

B. Court's Reasons for Denying Request for Constitutional Review

The Instant Provisions aim to protect people's life, limbs and properties and secure road safety. In providing for administrative discipline against habitual offenders, there is generally a limitation on the period within which the repeated offenses must have taken place to be recognized as a habit. However, such limitation is not mandatory. In light of the Instant Provisions, the related legislative purpose of disciplining habitual drunk drivers, the space-temporal limitation on detection of drunk driving, the enormous social and

economic damages arising out of drunk driving, and the need for administrative discipline, three time violations of the drunk driving ban sufficiently indicate the offender's profound deficiency in the spirit of compliance and the awareness of safety. Drunk driving, whether it constitutes the reason for suspension or revocation of the license, poses not much different risks of danger to people's life, limbs, and properties. Furthermore, while re-applying for the license is prohibited only for two years, we cannot emphasize too much the gravity of the public interest in preventing the enormous damages to individuals, the society, and the state caused by drunk driving. Therefore, the Instant Provisions do not violate the principle against excessive restriction.

C. The Opinions of the Chief of the National Police Agency and the Chief of the Jeju District Police Agency

The opinions are similar to the reasons for denying request for constitutional review and what follows is the part not similar:

The Instant Provisions apply a new administrative discipline of license revocation on the basis of the repeat offender's new additional offense, and therefore do not undermine the stability of law.

3. Review of Merits

A. History and Legislative Purpose of the Instant Provisions

(1) History

The Road Traffic Act, first enacted on December 31, 1961 through Act No. 941, did not have the provisions providing for mandatory revocation but only the provisions providing for permissive suspensions and revocations. As the country developed into an industrial society and the number of cars increased, increasing also the number of traffic accidents, the establishment of traffic order became a fundamental issue of social norms. Through several revisions of the law, mandatory revocation was instituted and its scope broadened. The Instant Provisions mandating license revocation of a three time offender of the drunk driving ban were first included in the law revised on January 26, 2001 through Act No. 6392 and have been maintained since then. On the other hand,

the Addenda enacted on January 26, 2001 through Act No. 6392 enforce the revised law starting on June 30, 2001(Addenda Article 1), and apply the Instant Provisions to the violations, the first of which has taken place before the enforcement date of the revised law(Addenda Article 2).

(2) Legislative Purpose

In our country, rapid economic growth brought about a world-class rate of car ownership while sound automobile culture has not taken roots. The Government has made multi-faceted efforts, including all-out traffic rules enforcement and education, expansion of traffic facilities, various campaigns, and etc., to reduce traffic accidents, and as a result, the number of traffic accidents and deaths involved has gradually decreased each year. However, drunk driving, despite the police's focused enforcement and sustained publicity, has not decreased and its share in all traffic accidents has rather increased.

In light of the reality of our traffic conditions, there is a great need to identify the drivers of unsound driving habits causing traffic accidents or involving habitual traffic offenses, who are likely to cause obstacles in traffic safety and efficient traffic flow, and to prevent them from driving for certain periods, thereby eliminating the risks and dangers to people's life and properties and securing traffic safety. Therefore, the Instant Provisions aim at the legislative purpose of revoking the habitual offenders of the drunk driving ban, thereby protecting people's life, limbs and properties, and securing traffic safety.

B. Constitutionality of the Instant Provisions

(1) Occupational Freedom and General Freedom of Action

The purpose of the Road Traffic Act is to ensure the safe and smooth traffic by preventing or removing all traffic dangers and obstructions occurring on roads(Article 1). If anyone can freely use cars, traffic safety and efficient traffic flow can be threatened. Therefore, driving cars on roads should be generally banned and the administrative authorities lift the ban only for those qualified drivers deemed to cause no danger or obstruction to traffic safety. This is the driver license system(Article 68). Therefore, whenever a risk of interfering with traffic safety is identified on the part of a driver, such license can be revoked pursuant to certain procedure. Revocation of a driver license is applied against an unqualified

driver on the premise that he or she displays such deficient aptitude as to pose a risk of personal or property damages. Revocation of a license previously issued, even if done because of a deficiency in the driver's aptitude, should not constitute an excessive restriction on basic rights. Article 37 Paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides that people's freedom and rights can be restricted by statute if necessary for national security, maintenance of order, or public welfare, but the essence of these liberties and rights should not be infringed upon(17-2 KCCR 378, 387, 2004Hun-Ka28, November 24, 2005).

The Instant Provisions, when applied, compulsorily revoke the license, and may render it impossible for people of those occupations involving driving to maintain their occupations, and restrict them in their methods of performing occupational tasks. Therefore, the Instant Provisions restrict occupational freedom that includes both the narrowly defined freedom of choosing occupations and the freedom of performing occupational tasks. Also, as to people not driving cars for occupational reasons, the Instant Provisions restrict their general freedom of action. Occupational freedom and general freedom of action can be restricted for the reason of national security, maintenance of order, and public welfare in accordance with Article 37 Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, which limits the permitted scope of restriction on basic rights. We hereby review whether the Instant Provisions restrict occupational freedom and general freedom of action in violation of the ban against excessive restriction.

(A) Legitimacy of Legislative Purpose and Appropriateness of Means

As said before, the Instant Provisions revoking the driving license of the habitual violators of the drunk driving ban aim to protect people's life, limbs, and properties and secure traffic safety. Therefore, the legitimacy of the purpose is recognized. Three time violators of the drunk driving ban can be said to be deficient in a sense of responsibility toward compliance with traffic laws and rules and the awareness of safety as traffic participants. If these people are allowed to drive, it is likely that they will cause a grave risk to public traffic safety and people's life, limbs, and properties. The Instant Provisions revoking the license for those people are appropriate means to achieve the legitimate purpose.

(B) Minimum Restriction

Even when the legislative purpose of a statute is legitimate and

the means adopted to achieve the purpose are appropriate, if the legislator can achieve the purpose of the law through optional provisions and yet attempt to use mandatory provisions in disregard of the individuality and uniqueness of the case at hand, such mandatory provisions violate the principle of minimum restriction (17-2 KCCR 378, 388-399, 2004Hun-Ka28, November 24, 2005). We review whether the mandatory aspect of the Instant Provisions violates the principle of minimum restriction.

1) Revocation of license and the post-revocation disqualification period are the means of establishing traffic order. The methods of obtaining compliance to such order and the strength of these methods should vary from country to country in accordance with the volume of traffic, the rate of traffic accidents, the law-abiding readiness, the level of civic consciousness vis-a'-vis traffic order, the cultural background, and etc. Our legislator has considered our traffic conditions, people's awareness of traffic order, culture, and etc., and adopted mandatory revocation as the means of administrative discipline against the three time violator of the drunk driving ban. The Instant Provisions of the Road Traffic Act were newly enacted in an effort to broaden the scope of compulsory revocation and thereby strengthen traffic order in response to the increasing number of traffic accidents. The Instant Provisions aim to prevent and regulate drunk driving and thereby combat and eliminate dangers and obstructions to people's life and safety in relation to the road traffic and secure safe and efficient traffic. Also, once a driving license is revoked by the Instant Provisions, the disqualification period after revocation is a relatively short period of two years compared to the disqualification periods set pursuant to other statutes. Given the space-temporal limits on detecting drunk driving, regardless of time intervals among the violations, three time violations of the drunk driving ban sufficiently indicate the driver's deficiency in the sense of duty toward traffic regulations and the awareness of safety. Therefore, the compulsory nature of the revocation under the Instant Provisions and the failure to leave room for suspension or other ways of maintaining licenses do not exceed the necessary minimum in restricting occupational freedom for reason of traffic order and public welfare.

2) We do not have to mention the need to ban habitual drunk drivers from driving, preventing traffic accidents caused by drunk driving and protecting people's life and limbs. An issue remains as to which method of discipline will be used as the means, and such issue is that of a legislative policy to be decided by the legislature which shall consider the volume of traffic, the law-abiding readiness of citizens vis-a'-vis traffic order, the conduct of the drunk driver

at the time of reading blood alcohol level.

In today's Korea, the number of cars has grown consistently while the risk of accidents has remained hidden. Alcohol paralyzes a person's central nervous system and undermines his or her ability to operate vehicles or respond to unexpected events. Drunk driving, therefore, increases the risk of accidents and thereby poses a severe threat to the driver himself as well as others' life and limbs(17-2 KCCR, 152, 155-156, 2003Hun-Ba94, September 29, 2005). The Government has made multi-faceted efforts, including all-out traffic rules enforcement and education, expansion of traffic facilities, various campaigns, and etc., to reduce traffic accidents, and as a result, the number of traffic accidents and deaths involved has gradually decreased each year. However, drunk driving, despite the police's focused enforcement and sustained publicity, has not decreased and its share in all traffic accidents has rather increased and the instances of enforcement have increased. Especially, the number of three time offenders whose license has been revoked under the Instant Provisions has increased consistently since 2003.

In response, the legislator adopted a strict measure of discipline - the mandatory revocation of the driving license - against three time offenders of the drunk driving ban in order to secure the effectiveness of the drunk driving ban and ultimately extirpate drunk driving, thereby prevent damages to people's life and limbs arising out of traffic accidents involving drunk driving.

3) Petitioner argues that, in applying enhanced discipline against a three time offender of the drunk driving ban, the risk posed by the offender shall be measured differently according to the time interval within which the offenses have taken place(e.g., three time within 1 year or within 5 years) and differential disciplines shall be applied. The Instant Provisions, however, do not place any restriction on the time interval within which the three time offenses must take place.

In providing for administrative discipline against habitual offenders, there is sometimes a limitation on the period within which the repeated offenses must have taken place to be recognized as a habit. However, such limitation is not mandatory. If the violation is grave and calls for administrative discipline, we may not need to place such limitation. In light of the Instant Provisions, the related legislative purpose of disciplining habitual drunk drivers, the space-temporal limitation on detection of drunk driving, the enormous social and economic damages arising out of drunk driving and the need for administrative discipline, three time violations of the drunk driving ban sufficiently indicate the offender's profound deficiency in the spirit of compliance and the awareness of safety.

Therefore, the failure to place a limitation on the period within which three time violations must take place does not violate the principle of minimum restriction.

(C) Balance among Legal Interests

In legislating restrictions on basic rights, the public interest protected by the restriction shall outweigh the private interest infringed by the same.

Driving cars carry the risk of grave damages to people's life, limbs and properties. The state has important interest in formulating various advance or after-the-fact preventive measures to prevent materialization of the risks. The driver falling under the purview of the Instant Provisions, given the repeated violations of important traffic regulations and the dangers associated with such violations, can be said to have betrayed deficiencies in elementary awareness of safety and a sense of responsibility. Permitting such person to continue driving will cause adverse influences on such public interest as public safety and public confidence in traffic participants' compliance with traffic rules.

On the other hand, in event of revocation of a license pursuant to the Instant Provisions, the affected driver cannot apply for a license for two years(Article 70 Paragraph 2 Subparagraph 5 of the Road Traffic Act), thereby taking away occupations from people indispensably driving for occupations. Such result can have the meaning of depriving one of the means of livelihood. Effects on the affected private interest cannot be said to be small.

However, we cannot emphasize too much the gravity of the public interest in preventing enormous damages to individuals, the society, and the state originating from drunk driving. The private interest infringed due to compulsory revocation under the Instant Provisions and the indirect damages originating therefrom cannot be compared in gravity to the public interest. Also, given the gravity of the latent risk of accidents that can be caused by drunk driving, the danger associated with drunk driving is disproportionately greater than minor accidents that take place for other various reasons. If people indispensably driving for occupations are allowed to continue maintaining such occupations even after they fall under the purview of the Instant Provisions, their adverse effects on the public safety shall be greater than those of people of other occupations. Therefore, there is great necessity of and public interest in excluding them from the traffic.

Then, the Instant Provisions cannot be said to have disregarded a balance between the public interest in establishing traffic order

and providing against dangers to people's life and limbs originating from drunk driving and the basic right of the person driving cars. The Instant Provisions therefore do not violate the principle of balance among legal interests.

(D) Sub-conclusion

Therefore, the Instant Provisions abide by the ban against excessive restriction which sets the limit on legislative restriction on basic rights, and therefore do not infringe on occupational freedom or general freedom of action.

(2) Review of Petitioner's Other Arguments

(A) Petitioner argues that the conduct described in Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 4(In Event of Traffic Accidents Caused by Driving Deliberately or Negligently) and Subparagraph 12(In Event of Failure to Take Necessary Measure or File a Report After Causing Injuries Through Traffic Accidents) is more culpable than the conduct regulated by the Instant Provisions and yet such conduct is regulated by optional revocation, and therefore the principle of equality is violated.

However, in applying administrative discipline against a driver that has caused a traffic accident deliberately or negligently, it is rational to comprehensively take into account the course and contents of the accident, the extent and type of injuries suffered by the victim, the degree of negligence of the driver, the age and gender of the driver and the victim, the post-accident course of events, and etc., in deciding on whether to suspend or revoke the driver's license. Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 4 of the Road Traffic Act suspending or revoking the driving license of a person who has caused a traffic accident negligently or deliberately or who has caused injuries on others and failed to file a report or take other necessary measures does not depart so far from equity to violate the principle of equality as to an extent that destroys the order governing various reasons for revocations and suspensions.

On the other hand, Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 12 of the Road Traffic Act prescribes suspension or revocation of license for those who have caused injuries to others and failed to take necessary measures or file a report pursuant to Article 50 Paragraphs 1 or 2. The culpability of not taking necessary measures or filing a report is no less than that of the conduct covered by the Instant Provisions. However, the Instant Provisions discipline only those who are have the risk of causing traffic

accidents while Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 12 disciplines those who have already caused injuries to others. As important as it is to apply discipline in proportion to the culpability, the Instant Provisions must have reflected the importance of identifying the party at fault and thereby facilitating the compensation for the victim. Taking this into account, the Instant Provisions permit discretion in deciding on administrative discipline and thereby encourage voluntary reporting by the driver at fault, and again facilitate victims' compensation. In addition, as described above, the risks associated with drunk driving and the need to discipline accordingly those found deficient in the law-abiding readiness vis-a'-vis traffic rules and the safety awareness as evidenced by their violation of the Instant Provisions justify Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 12 which apply optionally either suspension or revocation to those who fail to take necessary measures or file a report in accordance with Article 50 Paragraphs 1 or 2 of the Road Traffic Act. Therefore, the Instant Provisions do not depart so far from equity to violate the principle of equality as to an extent that destroys the order governing various reasons for revocations and suspensions.

(B) Petitioner argues that the Instant Provisions apply enhanced discipline on the basis of criminal punishment and administrative discipline already applied to the prior two drunk driving offenses, and therefore that the Instant Provisions interfere with the stability of law.

However, the Instant Provisions provide mandatory revocation for the driver sufficiently deemed deficient in the law-abiding readiness vis-a'-vis traffic rules and the safety awareness since the driver was found drunk driving three time despite the space-temporal limitation on detection of drunk driving and he or she has repeated drunk driving even after disciplined twice for that. Therefore, the Instant Provisions apply mandatory revocation to the unique culpable act of repeating the same violation after being cited twice. In other words, the Instant Provisions discipline both the two previous violations and the third violation at the same time. Their argument is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Article 78 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 14 of the Road Safety Act(revised partially by December 23, 2004 through Act No. 7247 prior to be wholly amended on May 31, 2005 through Act No. 7545) which provides, "in event that a person who has violated Article 41 Paragraph 1 twice or more times violates Article 41 Paragraph 1

once again and thereby falls under the reason for suspending the license", does not violate the Constitution., and therefore the Justices decide unanimously as set forth in the Holding.

Justices Yun Young-chul(Presiding Justice), Kwon Seong, Kim Hyo-jong(Assigned Justice), Kim Kyung-il, Song In-jun, Choo Sun-hoe, Jeon Hyo-sook, Lee Kong-hyun, Cho Dae-hyen