(b) Whether the trademark in actual use is similar to the subject trademark;

(c) The meaning of the subject trademark as the basis for determination of mistake or confusion under Article 45(1)2 of the Trademark Act

D. Criteria for determining whether an intentional act is a subjective requirement under Article 45(1)2 of the Trademark Act

B. It is clear that there is a difference between the trademark in actual use and the subject trademark in its name and in terms of concept and appearance, and therefore, the use of the trademark in actual use is likely to cause mistake and confusion as to the origin of goods between the subject trademark's goods and the subject trademark's goods. Thus, the above trademark in actual use constitutes a similar trademark which is a requirement for cancellation of the registered trademark under Article 45 (1) 2 of the Trademark Act.

C. In determining whether the trademark right holder's use of the trademark in actual use belonging to the similar scope of the registered trademark could cause mistake or confusion of the source of goods between the goods of the subject trademark and the goods of the subject trademark, the subject trademark is sufficient to be valid under the Trademark Act, and it does not necessarily require that it has been registered more than the registered trademark (actually used trademark). However, if the subject trademark falls within the scope of the right of the registered trademark and it is unregistered or registered later than the registered trademark, the trademark should be prohibited from being used as the scope of the right of the registered trademark. Thus, the above mistake and confusion cannot be considered as the subject trademark.

D. A person who continues to use a trademark which is a similar trademark that may cause mistake or confusion as to the goods and the source of goods, knowing the existence of the subject trademark, has intention, which is a subjective element of the registered trademark under Article 45(1)2 of the Trademark Act, and the registered trademark (the actually used trademark) is earlier registered than the subject trademark, and the person having the right to use the trademark claims a confirmation of the scope of the subject trademark, and the intention cannot be ruled out.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the respondent.

With respect to No. 1:

According to Article 45 (1) 2 of the Trademark Act, if an owner of a trademark right intentionally uses a trademark similar to the registered trademark on the designated goods, or if it is likely to cause confusion or confusion as to the origin of goods or the quality of goods by using the registered trademark or a similar trademark on goods similar to the designated goods, the registered trademark shall be cancelled. In determining whether there is similarity between the registered trademark which is one of the requirements for cancellation of the registered trademark and the trademark actually used by the owner of the trademark (hereinafter referred to as the "actually used trademark"), another trademark which is the object of confusion or confusion (hereinafter referred to as the "subject trademark"), or the trademark actually used by the owner of the trademark, the appearance, name, concept, etc. of each trademark shall be observed in an objective and overall manner. The ultimate standard for determining the similarity between the registered trademark and the goods of the subject trademark should ultimately be determined whether there is an objective concern that the confusion or confusion as to the origin of the goods is caused between the goods of the subject trademark and the goods of the subject trademark (see Supreme Court Decision 83Hu70, Nov. 13, 1984).

According to the records, the trademark No. 61424, which is the trademark of this case, and the trademark No. 82526, which is the trademark actually used for the designated goods of the above registered trademark, is examined as the trademark No. 3, which is the trademark of this case, and the trademark No. 82526, which is the trademark of this case, which is the trademark of this case. The trademark of this case is a combination between the trademark of this case and the trademark of this case which is similar to the trademark No. 61424, and the trademark of this case, which is the trademark of this case and the trademark No. 2, which is the trademark of this case, are identical to the trademark of this case, which is the trademark of this case, the trademark of this case, which is the trademark of this case, and the trademark of this case, is likely to be confused with the trademark of this case which is the trademark of this case, which is the trademark of this case, the trademark of this case, which is the trademark of this case, and is not the trademark of this case, the trademark of this case.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and it is merely a ground for the original decision under the premise that the above practical use trademark is identical to the registered trademark or it is not similar to the subject trademark.

The assertion is groundless.

With respect to the second ground:

In determining whether there is a concern that the trademark holder may mislead or confuse the source of goods with the mark goods which belongs to the similar scope of the registered trademark, the subject trademark is sufficient to be valid under the Trademark Act, and it does not necessarily require that it is registered more than the registered trademark. However, if the subject trademark falls under the scope of the right of the registered trademark and is unregistered or registered more than the registered trademark, the trademark should be prohibited from being used as the scope of the right of the registered trademark. Thus, if the subject trademark falls under the scope of the registered trademark, the above mistake and confusion should not be considered as the subject trademark. Thus, it is clear in the record that the subject trademark is registered more than the registered trademark, but the original trial decision is made clearly on the ground of its reasoning that the subject trademark does not fall under the scope of the right of the registered trademark of this case, and it cannot be considered as the object of the determination of mistake or confusion after the registered trademark of this case. Therefore, there is no error of law of omission as pointed out in the original trial decision, and in light of records, the above decision of the court below is correct and acceptable.

In addition, the original decision does not regard the trademark of this case as the subject matter of the above decision due to the expiration of the registration period as to the similarity, mistake, or concern of confusion with the trademark of this case in comparison with the registered trademark of the claimant. Thus, in determining whether the original decision is similar or not, in determining whether there is possibility of mistake or confusion with the registered trademark of this case, the principal decision of this case was not made, or the trademark right of the above other party to the above claim was extinguished in the reason of the nullity decision, and it cannot be said that it was a deviation from the conclusion of the judgment affecting the cancellation decision of this case, or a inconsistency with the reasons between the cancellation decision of this case and the invalidation decision of this case. All of the arguments are groundless.

With respect to the third point:

According to the reasoning of the original decision, based on the facts found by the evidence, the court below judged that the respondent who has continued to use the trademark in actual use, which is a similar trademark that may cause mistake or confusion as to the goods and the source of goods, knowing the existence of the trademark in this case, had an intentional act, which is a subjective element of the registered trademark under Article 45 (1) 2 of the Trademark Act. In light of the records, the judgment of the court below is just and the respondent requested the confirmation of the scope of the right of the trademark in this case, and its intentional act cannot be ruled out (this claim is judged to be not within the scope of the right of the registered trademark in this case, and it is reversed to the appellate court of the Korean Intellectual Property Office because it is judged to be not within the scope of the right of the registered trademark in this case) and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles, incomplete deliberation, or lack of reason as alleged.

With respect to the fourth point:

In light of the reasoning of the original decision, in determining the existence of an interest in the cancellation of the registered trademark of this case by the claimant, the subject trademark of this case did not belong to the scope of the right of the respondent, but the decision does not belong to the scope of the right of the registered trademark of this case. Thus, as long as the subject trademark of this case does not belong to the scope of the right of the registered trademark of this case, the claimant is a claimant and its partner, and as long as the subject trademark of this case does not belong to the scope of the right of the registered trademark of this case, the claimant is clearly a person who has a direct interest in the extinguishment of the registered trademark of this case. Thus, the ground of the original decision to the same purport

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the respondent. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)