[2] The case holding that where another company in a special relationship on behalf of the ship charter company which bears the duty of accident compensation for seafarers and insurance coverage based on the seafarer labor contract, the above company takes over the duty of accident compensation for the ship charter company concurrently

1. Where a seafarer boarding a ship under the seafarer labor contract suffers from a disaster while getting off at a port during the voyage of the ship and having other crew members and is in possession of a meeting, in view of the special nature of the maritime labor relationship, to recognize such disaster as an official accident, a prior consideration should be given to the existence of a captain’s command and supervision over such a group, and the circumstances such as the organizer, purpose, contents, number of participants and forcedness of the group, method of operation, burden of expenses, etc. should be given in a state under which the overall process of the group is controlled or managed by the captain, etc. representing the shipowner, etc.

The court below acknowledged that the accident of this case occurred in the course of the first class mate and the first class engineer driver first returned to a singing room while the ship of this case was temporarily anchored at a port of Meba in the Philippines, and the captain of this case died with the head of the agency due to traffic accident while the ship of this case was temporarily anchored at a port of Meba, and the captain of this case was under the control and management of the captain at that time. The court below determined that the accident of this case was an accident in the course of the first class mate and the first class engineer, and then the captain of the ship of this case (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") was a traffic accident. The captain of the ship of this case (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") was allowed by social norms to resolve the tension caused by maritime work and restore the ability to work with the captain, and was under the control and management of the captain at that time.

According to the records, the above gathering is not merely a private meeting for promoting friendship, but also a 1st class engineer's "studio" group, which is classified as a high-class seafarer, and all senior seafarers (hereinafter the captain) were present at the meeting. Considering the nature of maritime labor, the above gathering is deemed to have been under the command and supervision of the captain who was present at the beginning until the end of the meeting. In light of the above legal principles, it is reasonable to view that the whole course of the above gathering where the disaster occurred was under the control or management of the captain who was represented by the shipowner, etc., and therefore, the disaster of this case can be recognized as an occupational accident.

Although the above judgment of the court below does not seem to be somewhat inappropriate in its reasoning, it is just, and it does not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to occupational accidents or in the violation of the rules of evidence as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

2. The lower court acknowledged, as indicated in its reasoning, that the deceased was operating the instant vessel by hiring it from the Defendant Syman Syman (hereinafter “Defendant Syman”), and agreed to receive accident compensation insurance pursuant to the provision on accident compensation for overseas employment seafarers (No. 2001-96 of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries’s notification; hereinafter “instant compensation provision”) while entering into an employment contract with the Defendant Syman Shipping as the head of the instant vessel on board the instant vessel. At the time of the said contract, the lower court determined that the Defendants were jointly and severally liable to pay the Defendant Syman’s accident compensation insurance for the deceased, based on the fact that the representative director was identical and was a corporation at the time of the instant accident, and that the Defendant was jointly and severally liable to pay the Defendant Syman’s accident compensation insurance for the deceased, based on Article 17 of the instant compensation provision.

As duly admitted by the court below, although the defendant Lee Purd, who employed the deceased as the crew of the ship of this case, bears the duty of accident compensation for the deceased and insurance coverage therefor based on the labor contract of this case, if, as the owner of the ship of this case, he had been in a special relationship with the defendant Lee Purd, as the owner of the ship of this case, he purchased the insurance for accident compensation instead of the defendant Lee Purd, it is reasonable to view that the defendant Lee Purd had acquired the accident compensation obligation for the deceased of Lee Purd concurrently, unless there are special circumstances.

In this purport, the above judgment of the court below is without merit, but it is just in conclusion, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the duty of accident compensation or joint liability, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)