[폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반][공1986.7.15.(780),894]
The difference between the co-principal under Article 2 (2) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act and the co-principal under Article 30 of the Criminal Act.
Article 2(2) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act requires that the so-called “two or more persons jointly commit the crime” requires that there exists a so-called co-offender relationship among them. It is required that several persons recognize the same kind of crime at the same place and commit the crime using the same opportunity. The so-called so-called co-principal under Article 30 of the Criminal Act is established in cases where all the accomplices have the intention to commit the crime, that is, where there is a communication among the accomplices, and some of them have been committed with the intent to commit the crime. At this time, all of them have committed the crime as a co-principal, and even if they have not shared the act by themselves, they should be held liable as a co-principal for the whole crime.
Article 2(2) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act and Article 30 of the Criminal Act
Supreme Court Decision 70Do163 delivered on March 10, 1970, 81Do1934 delivered on January 26, 1982, Supreme Court Decision 83Da1942 delivered on October 11, 1983
Defendant
Prosecutor
Attorney Gangwon-won
Jeonju District Court Decision 84No153 delivered on April 25, 1984
The appeal is dismissed.
The prosecutor's grounds of appeal are examined.
Article 2 (2) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act requires that the so-called "two or more co-offenders exist between them." They require that several persons recognize the crimes committed by other persons on the same opportunity at the same time and commit the crimes using them (see Supreme Court Decisions 70Do163, Mar. 10, 1970; 81Do1934, Jan. 26, 1982). Article 30 of the Criminal Act provides that the so-called co-principal under Article 30 of the Criminal Act has the intention to co-processing the crimes between all the accomplices, namely, where there is contact among the accomplices, and some of them have been committed with the criminal, and if they have been committed, they should be held liable for the whole crime (see Supreme Court Decision 70Do163, Jan. 26, 198).
However, based on the duly adopted trial evidence, the court below found that the defendant and the non-indicted 1 (the co-defendant 1) suffered injury on the part of the defendant and the non-indicted 2, etc. as the drinking value from the main point operated by the non-indicted 2, etc., the defendant and the non-indicted 1 (the non-indicted 1) to be an empty beer, the defendant to the end of the trial, the left hand hand, and the defendant damaged the glass of the entrance, and the defendant got out of the door, and the defendant got out, the victim who is the manager of the above main point was the victim of the above main point, and the non-indicted 1 was kid by the victim, and the victim was kidd by the defendant and kids, and caused injury on the right-hand part and the inner part of the main body of the defendant, and it did not err in the rules of evidence or did not examine the facts in violation of the rules of evidence.
Therefore, the judgment of the court below is justified for the reason that violence against the victim was committed by the sole criminal conduct of the non-indicted 1, and the defendant did not jointly commit an act of violence against the victim of the non-indicted 1, and the judgment of the court below which acquitted the victim of this point is not erroneous for misunderstanding the legal principles of the accomplice and thereby affecting the judgment. Thus, the appeal is groundless.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Yoon Yoon-tae (Presiding Justice)