Attorney in charge C, EA, EB, E, E,

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for two years.

A. Defendant

1) misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal principles

A) The assertion of abuse of public prosecution power

Considering the time when an investigation into the instant case was conducted or the process of instituting a public prosecution was conducted, the instant public prosecution was conducted by abusing the power of prosecution for an extremely unjustifiable purpose.

B) An unspecified assertion in facts charged

The core point and place of delivery of money and valuables of the Defendant, the core of the facts charged in the instant case, are 11 to 13 days, and the time and place of delivery of money and valuables from March 31, 2007 to April 31, 2007, 2007, 2007 to early May 30 of the same year, 2007, 31 to early police officers from August 29 of the same year, 207, 2007, 31 to early police officers from August 13 of the same year, and 2007, 4 were not specified at all, and it was impossible to prove absence at G’s residential area or directly surrounding it. In addition, regarding the timing of delivery of money and valuables for the second and third instances, it was hard to expand it even if it was possible to do so on the basis of the Defendant’s statement. Such unclear indictment is seriously infringing the Defendant’s right of defense, so it cannot be prosecuted.

C) The assertion of innocence

The Defendant did not have any fact of maintaining friendship with G, and there was no fact of receiving various business support from G, and there was no fact of receiving KRW 900 million in total from G for three times. In addition, the Defendant did not have any fact of having received KRW 200 million from G, and there was no fact of demanding K to return KRW 300 million from G via K, and the Defendant did not talk about the fact of granting political funds to Dong fee X and Y and the plans to reverse the Defendant’s prosecutor’s statement. Furthermore, the Defendant did not have provided K with cash, credit card, car, etc. under the pretext of operating expenses and balance preparation expenses for G district. Accordingly, even if the Defendant did not make a false statement contrary to memory, each testimony (hereinafter “each testimony of this case”) recorded in the facts charged of this case in Seoul Central District Court case No. 2010Da1046 (hereinafter “Seoul Central District Court Decision 2010”) which was found guilty of the facts charged of this case and the facts contrary to the rules of evidence.

2) Unreasonable sentencing

The punishment of the first instance court (three years of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

(b) An inspection;

The punishment of the first instance is too unhued and unfair.

2. Judgment on the mistake of facts and misapprehension of legal principles by the defendant

A. As to the assertion of abuse of power to prosecute

With respect to the above argument in the first instance court to the same purport, the first instance court rejected the argument of the defendant and his defense counsel in detail by taking account of the circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by the first instance court under the title of "the abuse of public prosecution right". The first instance court's judgment is just in light of the evidence records and thorough examination of the aforementioned judgment. Accordingly, the defendant's allegation in this part is rejected.

B. The purport of Article 254(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulating the date, time, place, and method of a crime in the description of the facts charged is to limit the scope of the trial to the court and facilitate the exercise of the defense right by specifying the scope of the defense against the defendant. Thus, considering the nature of the crime prosecuted, it is sufficient to specify the facts constituting the cause of the public prosecution by pointing out the time, place, method, and purpose (see Supreme Court Decision 9Do310, Jul. 13, 201).

In the facts charged of this case, the date and time from March 31, 2007 to April 2007, the period from April 30, 2007 to May 2007, 2007, the time and time of the issuance of money and valuables to G is somewhat wide, and there is no room to further specify the date and time of the crime by other objective data such as the defendant's statement. However, it is reasonable to conclude that the defendant's exercise of his right of defense can not be significantly hindered because it is not possible to distinguish other facts from other facts by means of the organization of money, namely, cash, check, or USD, ratio, etc., the date and time of raising funds, other objective data of the defendant, etc. indicated in the records of this case, and thus, it cannot be seen that the defendant's exercise of his right of defense is not significantly hindered (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da141404, Apr. 24, 2002).

C. As to the assertion of innocence

1) Inasmuch as the fact that a criminal judgment already became final and conclusive on the same factual basis is a flexible evidence, the fact that is contrary to the fact cannot be recognized unless there are special circumstances where it is deemed difficult to adopt a factual judgment in the relevant criminal trial (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Do11349, Dec. 24, 2009).

2) In light of the above legal principles, comprehensively taking account of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and examined by the health team and the first instance court, it is recognized that the Defendant’s testimony of this case was false facts contrary to memory and that the Defendant had the intent to commit a crime of perjury. Accordingly, the Defendant’s assertion on this part cannot be accepted.

A) The Defendant’s testimony appears to the purport that, in light of its overall contents, the Defendant did not provide G with approximately KRW 900 million in total three times as political funds. However, according to the aforementioned evidence, G was found to have been guilty of having been sentenced to KRW 150 million in cash, which was contained in G’s apartment complex near the apartment complex between March 31, 2007 and April 2007, and KRW 150 million in face value and KRW 100 million in face value, and KRW 50 million in face value, and KRW 130 million in cash and KRW 174 million in cash and KRW 1740 million in travel at the apartment complex between April 30, 207 and early May 2007.

(1) Considering that the Defendant was a close-down relationship, G leased H to G at a lower level than the market price, G provided AK, the Defendant’s meals with the indication of audit and inspection, the Defendant visited G’s house, and the Defendant visited G’s house, which led G to the construction of the house of G. G, on December 20, 2006, G provided L Group Chairperson M, N Construction Chairperson0, and the Defendant with the Defendant. At least on April 6, 2007, G had been trying to arrange for the remaining portion of the Pridge with the Defendant and Pridge SP wood on or around April 6, 2007. According to the fact that G provided the Defendant’s sick proposal, G and the Defendant’s telephone call, the Defendant maintained a considerable business-friendly relationship with G and appears to have maintained convenience.

(2) As the Z accounting division, V consistently stated to the effect that the fund created by the Defendant was known to be granted to G. The above statement is consistent with the B accounting book prepared by V and the list of claims to be collected (such as the above B accounting book and the list of claims to be collected prior to the commencement of the investigation into the instant case, and there are many parts irrelevant to G, and there are no circumstances that the contents are accurate, and there is a special error or error only in the part related to the G. Furthermore, in full view of the statements made by V and the above B accounting book and the list of claims to be collected, the entry of “T” or “U” of the detailed data related to the list of claims to be collected refers to G.

(3) There are funds to be raised and exchanged funds that coincide with the facts charged in the facts charged on the premise that G, and funds to be purchased at a travel room that the Defendant used to transport the funds. (4) The Defendant testified to the effect that the funds to be raised were lent to K in the court of first instance in the premise case, or used the funds to use the funds as expenses for construction contracts, etc., but in light of the following circumstances, the above funds to be raised seems to have been granted to G.

Of KRW 300,00,000, KRW 100,000, which is understood as a part of the ○ political fund, was used by AD, which was the birth of G, and the person who received KRW 100,000 from the Defendant appears to be G (the statement of K and AD that K lent KRW 100,000 to AD received from the Defendant is a space between the previous monetary transactions, and there is no credibility in light of the ordinary forms of monetary transactions).

○ The fact that the Defendant was returned KRW 200 million from K on February 28, 2008 is recognized. However, in light of the fact that the Defendant stated at the prosecutor’s office that he was returned KRW 200 million from G immediately after the first default of the Z’s payment, that in fact, G was delivered KRW 200 million to the Defendant on February 28, 2008 on the day following the day when G was sick, and immediately thereafter exchanged with G on two occasions, and that there is no reason to lend KRW 300 million in cash to K who had no money transaction until the previous time without maturity or interest agreement, the subject that returned KRW 200 million to the Defendant appears to be G and that K is only a mere delivery.

○ denied the fact that R or S received US dollars in relation to the orders of construction works by the Defendant, and the Defendant seems to reverse the statement or evade the examination by prior to the examination of largeness with R and S.

(5) After granting the above political funds to G, the Defendant demanded G to return KRW 300 million to G via K. From May 26, 2009, K appears to the purport that if the Defendant was dismissed on or around May 26, 2009, K would receive KRW 30,000 (30,000) deposit for the H 501 leased by G in the auction procedure, it would be granted to the Defendant’s mother.

(6) According to the questioning reply regarding the inspection on the use of Goyang-si, G’s apartment was completed at the time of the inspection on September 28, 2006 and the construction of the main building (including outdoor parking lots) and its ancillary facilities (including outdoor parking lots) was processed pursuant to the Housing Act and subordinate statutes, and DS, which was a driving engineer of the Defendant, stated to the effect that the above apartment parking lot was completed, unlike the Defendant’s testimony stated in the facts charged in the instant case, it appears that the above outdoor parking lot was completed at the time when the Defendant delivered cash and US dollars created around March 2007 to G, unlike the Defendant’s testimony stated in the instant facts charged.

(7) In light of the fact that S stated that H 201 office began to be used from May 17, 2007 to May 18, 2007, and that the above statement conforms to the entry in the cash ledger in the development project headquarters and the purchase tax invoice and the transaction statement in relation to 201 of the Z accounting document file, unlike the Defendant’s testimony stated in the facts charged in the instant case, the above office No. 201 office was difficult to work prior to May 17, 2007.

(8) Around April 1, 2010 to September 2, 2010, X and the Defendant appeared in the court room as the Defendant stated that the Defendant appeared in the court room as the Defendant, and actually discussed the fact that X and the Defendant appeared in the court room, including the withdrawal of the Defendant’s appearance in the court room from April 1, 2010 to September 2, 2010, X andY are relatively specific memory of the Defendant’s talks (such as the fact that the Defendant offered money to G, the circumstances leading up to the Defendant’s talk, the Defendant’s appraisal of the Defendant, and various circumstances and measures surrounding the Defendant at the time).

B) According to the evidence duly adopted and examined in the first instance court, the Defendant recognized that K provided K with cash amounting to KRW 95 million and credit cards and automobiles in terms of the operating expenses of G district and Q reserve expenses, etc. In the premise case, the Defendant was convicted of committing the crime of violation of the Political Funds Act, and the Defendant was sentenced to a suspended sentence of two years and the penalty of additional collection was imposed on K for one year. The judgment became final and conclusive as it is.

C) The grounds alleged by the Defendant are mostly asserted in the premise case and most of the judgment was already made. The aforementioned reasons alone do not constitute a false statement or a special circumstance to recognize that it is difficult to adopt a factual judgment of conviction in the instant premise case with G and K.

D) There is no clear evidence that conforms to the Defendant’s assertion has been submitted or newly disclosed after the final judgment of the premised case.

3. Determination on the assertion of unreasonable sentencing by the defendant and prosecutor

We also examine each of the defendant and prosecutor's arguments on unreasonable sentencing.

Perjury is a serious crime that damages the propriety of fair judicial procedure and makes it difficult for the judiciary to find a substantial truth, and requires strict punishment, and considering the fact that the defendant gives perjury over several trial dates on the key issues of the premised case, and that the defendant's perjury affects the conclusion of the trial of the first instance court on the premise that the defendant's perjury has an influence, a sentence of punishment is inevitable.

However, in full view of the following factors: (a) the Defendant’s perjury did not affect the final conclusion, including the appellate court and the court of final appeal; and (b) favorable circumstances that the Defendant had no record of being punished for the same kind of crime; and (c) the Defendant’s age, character, conduct, family relationship, health condition; (d) motive and background of the crime; (e) means and method of the crime; (e) the outcome of the crime; and (e) all of the sentencing conditions specified in the records and arguments of the instant case, including the circumstances after the crime, the sentence sentenced by the first instance court seems to be too unreasonable. Therefore, the Defendant’s assertion of unfair sentencing is accepted

4. Conclusion

Pursuant to Article 364 (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the judgment of the court of first instance shall be reversed, and the following judgment shall be rendered again after pleadings (the appeal by the prosecutor shall be without merit, but the appeal by the prosecutor shall not be dismissed in separate order unless the appeal by the

Criminal facts and summary of evidence in multi-use case>

Since the criminal facts of the defendant recognized by this court and the summary of the evidence are the same as the corresponding columns of the judgment of the court of first instance, they are quoted in accordance with Article 369 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Application of Statutes

1. Article relevant to the facts constituting an offense and the selection of punishment;

Article 152(1) of the Criminal Act (generally, the choice of imprisonment)

Judge Lee Sang-hoon

Judge Span-hee