2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Cheong-gu Office

The Defendant’s imposition of corporate tax on the Plaintiff for the business year 2, 2006, including OOOO(including OOOO) for the business year 2007, OOOO(including OOOO) for corporate tax for the business year 2007, OOO(including OOO) for corporate tax for the business year 2008, and OOO(including OOO) for corporate tax for the business year 2008 and the rule of change in the income amount stated in the

A. The Plaintiff is a company established on December 199 and engaged in manufacturing and selling complete medicine, such as BB administration (non- full-time therapy), CCC administration (non- full-time therapy) and DDD EE caps (subvers).

B. In order to promote the sales of drugs and promote the collection of sales proceeds, the Plaintiff claimed that ① cash is paid to doctors, pharmacists, etc. (hereinafter referred to as “cash payment”) or ② payment of gift certificates, etc. (hereinafter referred to as “payment of gift certificates”) or ③ payment of meal expenses, etc. on behalf of the Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as “payment of meal expenses”) (hereinafter referred to as “instant expenses”), as follows, the Plaintiff reported corporate tax for the pertinent business year by appropriating the instant expenses as business expenses, entertainment expenses, sales promotion expenses, public relations expenses, etc. (hereinafter referred to as “instant expenses”).

206

2007

208

Total

Payments in Cash

OOO

OOO

OOO

OOO

Apportionment of Payment of Gift Certificates

OOO

OOO

OOO

OOO

Expenses paid for meal expenses

OOO

OOO

OOO

OOO

Total

OOO

OOO

OOO

OOO

C. On March 2, 2010, the Defendant issued a notice of the change in the amount of income that the Plaintiff disposes of as a representative bonus the amount of cash payment and the total amount of cash payment and merchandise coupon payment (OOOOO(206 reverted to the year 2006, OOOOO(207 reverted to the year 2007, and OOOOO).

D. On April 21, 2010, the Plaintiff filed a request for a trial with the Tax Tribunal. On September 21, 2010, the Tax Tribunal rendered each disposition on September 21, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the "disposition on September 21, 2011") to the effect that the portion of payment of gift certificates was considered as entertainment expenses and that the tax base and tax amount are corrected for each business year, and that the amount in excess of entertainment expense limit should be notified of the change in the amount of income. ② The amount in excess of entertainment expense limit should be notified of the change in the amount of income. ② Accordingly, the Defendant issued a disposition to reduce the corporate tax amount in 2006, corporate tax amount in 207, corporate tax amount in 207, corporate tax amount in 208, corporate tax amount in 208, corporate tax amount in 100 or 207, which included the change in the amount of income for each disposition on March 21, 2010 (the imposition of corporate tax in this case").

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) According to the judgment of the Plaintiff’s materials and related criminal cases, the Plaintiff’s actual payment of cash payment is clearly recognized. Thus, the instant imposition disposition premised on the Plaintiff’s actual payment of cash payment is illegal disposition. Moreover, as long as the Plaintiff actually paid cash payment to the doctor, pharmacist, etc., the cash payment ought to be disposed of as other outflow from the company. As such, the instant notice disposition premised on the premise that it is unclear whether the Plaintiff actually paid cash payment is illegal.

2) Article 19(2) of the Corporate Tax Act provides as the requirements for losses ① Business-related, ordinaryity and profit-related relationship as the requirements for losses, and thus, the expenses recognized as having profit-related relationship is recognized as losses without considering ordinary nature. The instant expenses constitute losses, since profit-related relationship is recognized.

In addition, the purpose of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act is to "establishment of a distribution system of a drug," the purpose of the Fair Trade Act to regulate illegal inducement is to ensure fairness of competition means, and thus, it is not affected by the judgment of inclusion in deductible expenses under the Corporate Tax Act, and in particular, it cannot be deemed that the offering of rebates to doctors, pharmacists, etc. has been done for a considerable period of time in the pharmaceutical industry. ③ The offering of rebates to doctors, pharmacists, etc. before punishing the offering of rebates is also difficult to be considered to be extremely contrary to the social order. ④ In the case of a pharmaceutical that mainly manufactures reproduced drugs, it is inevitable for the Plaintiff to offer rebates in reality because it is impossible to compete with the price or quality. ⑤ The purpose of the Fair Trade Act to regulate rebates is to ensure fairness of competition means. Therefore, the issue of whether rebates is subject to regulation under this Act can be affected by the judgment of inclusion in deductible expenses under the Corporate Tax Act, and in light of the fact that the offering of rebates to doctors, pharmacists, etc. was made for the purpose of facilitating the collection of the sales proceeds in particular cases of rebates to pharmacists.

B. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

1) Whether the Plaintiff actually disbursed the cash payment

(a) data on the calculation and enforcement of costs for proceedings;

The plaintiff submitted Gap evidence Nos. 7 through 11 as "data for calculation of expenses for doctors", but Gap evidence Nos. 7 is merely an internal document concerning the plaintiff's business policy and cannot be viewed as data to verify whether expenses have been executed in accordance with the above policies. Gap evidence Nos. 8 through 11 as data prepared on April 2009, which is not related to calculation of the cash payment amount from April 2006 to 2008," and "the plaintiff submitted evidence for execution of expenses for doctors" as "the plaintiff's data for execution of expenses for doctors", but Gap evidence No. 12 cannot be viewed as data to verify whether the plaintiff's branch head has actually paid the money to pharmacists, etc., and Gap evidence No. 13 is not related to the payment of merchandise coupons, but to the payment of merchandise coupons, etc., Gap evidence No. 14 as data related to the execution of the expenses for pharmacists from April 2009 to 208."

The plaintiff submitted Gap evidence Nos. 16 to 22 as "data for calculation and execution of expenses for pharmaceutical affairs". However, Gap evidence Nos. 16 to 19 cannot be viewed as a material for calculating the amount to be paid to a pharmacist of the FF Contracting State, and it cannot be viewed as a material for verifying whether the expenses have been executed in accordance with the above calculation. Gap evidence Nos. 20 to 22 cannot be viewed as a material for verifying whether the expenses have been executed in accordance with the above calculation."

According to the Plaintiff’s evidence Nos. 24 through 29, the Plaintiff’s statements were made to the effect that “gamblingG, which was the Plaintiff’s Daegu Branch’s employees, issued rebates equivalent to the Plaintiff’s KRW 00 from Jan. 2006 to Dec. 2, 2008.” The Plaintiff’s statement to the effect that “the Plaintiff’s employees were unable to use or take out business activities for the purpose of business.” The Plaintiff’s statement to the effect that “the Plaintiff’s employees were not able to use or take out for the purpose of business activities.” The Plaintiff’s statement to the effect that “the Plaintiff’s employees were not able to pay for the sales of their respective employees.” The Plaintiff’s statement to the effect that “the Plaintiff’s employees were not able to use or take out for the purpose of business activities,” and that the Plaintiff’s statement to the effect that “the Plaintiff’s employees were not able to use or take out for the purpose of business activities.” The Plaintiff’s statement to the effect that the Plaintiff’s statement to the effect that “the Plaintiff’s employees were not 9” written.

D) Statement of doctor or pharmacist

" 갑 제30호증의 기재에 의하면, 약사인 김PP은 검찰에서2006. 3.경부터 2008. 12.경까지 OOO 상품권 등 OOOO원 상당을 받음 것으로 기억이 난다'는 취지로 진술하였으나,리베이트를 주로 OOO 상품권 등으로 받았고 현금으로 받은 사실은 없다'는 취지로 진술하였다. 또한 갑 제31호증의 기재에 의하면 의사인 윤QQ은 검찰에서2006. 1.경부터 금품 등을 제공받았다'는 취지로 진술하였으나 지급 일시 및 장소 지급 금액 지급 방법 및 수단 등에 대해서는 구체적으로 진술하지 않았다.", " 한편, 을 제13호증의 1 내지 6의 각 기재에 의하면, ① 의사인 황RR가 원고에게서 의약품 매입과 관련하여 어떠한 금품 수수 및 향응을 받은 사살아 없음을 확인한다l는 취지의 확인서를 작성한 사실, ② 의사인 조SS이원고와의 의약품 거래시 거래 대가에 상응하는 의약품 리베이트의 수취 사실이 없고 향응 등 일체의 접대 행위가 없었음을 확인한다'는 취지의 확인서를 작성한 사실, ③ 의사인 강TT가원고와의 거래 관련하여 의약품 리베이트를 수취한 사실이 없고 일체의 접대 행위가 없었음을 확인한다'는 취지의 확인서를 작성한 사실, ④ 약사인 조UU이원고로부터 의약품 매입과 관련하여 어떠한 명목으로도 금전, 향응 등을 제공받은 사실이 없음을 확인한다는 취지의 확인서를 작성한 사실, ⑤ 약사인 이VV이어떠한 명목으로든 원고로부터 의약품 매입과 관련하여 금전, 향응 등을 수취하지 않았음을 확인한다'는 취지의 확인서를 작성한 사실, 약사인 조WW이원고로부터 의약품 매입과 관련하여 어떠한 명목으로든 금품이나 향응 등을 제공받은 사실이 없다'는 취지의 확인서를 작성한 사실이 인정된다.", 마) 약사와 직원의 사실확인서

According to the evidence Nos. 33-1 through 95, the following facts are found: (a) although the pharmacist has made an early settlement of the purchase price of credit to the plaintiff within 95 days; and (b) the pharmacist has received cash, merchandise coupon provision, food, beverage support, etc. from 2006 to 2008, it is found that ① the above fact-finding statement is indicated in the same letter, so that only the originator has personal information, drugs purchased from the plaintiff, the time and amount of support from the plaintiff, etc.; (c) The above fact-finding statement does not specify the date and time and place of payment, payment method, and means; and (d) the number of pharmacists who prepared the above fact-finding statement does not fall short of 1% of the Plaintiff’s customer (16,300 customers); (c) according to each of Gap evidence Nos. 37-1 to 173, the plaintiff’s employee prepared the above fact-finding statement to the effect that it was not distributed to the customer and the person who prepared the above fact-finding document.

The Plaintiff submitted Gap's KRW 40 and 41 card as data for calculating expenses for pharmaceutical affairs. However, Gap's evidence No. 40 and 41 cannot be viewed as data that can verify whether expenses were executed according to the above calculation as data for each branch office." The Plaintiff also submitted Gap's No. 42 and 45 card as data for assessing expenses for each branch office. However, Gap's evidence No. 42 and 45 cannot be viewed as data that can confirm whether expenses were actually executed as above. The Plaintiff's evidence No. 45 card No. 45 was prepared to the effect that since it was not only a new transaction partner or a sales promotion of sales proceeds, etc., the Plaintiff prepared a new document for the purpose that "the above H card No. 40 and 41 were prepared to verify whether the above H card No. 4 were cash-related to the above branch office, but also prepared for the purpose that it could not be seen as data that were prepared for the purpose of the latest issuance of rebates to the extent that it did not correspond to the above list No. 14 and statement.

G) Relevant criminal judgment

" 원고의 대표이사였던 조YY는이JJ을 통하여 2007. 1 경부터 2008. 12.경까지 의사 윤QQ, 약사 김PP에게 각 OOO 상품권, 주유권 등을 수시로 제공함으로써 위 윤QQ에게 OOOO원 상당, 위 김PP에게 OOOO상당의 리베이트 명목의 경제적 이익을 각 제공하였다'는 공소사실로 기소되었다. 갑 제6호증, 을 제8호증의 각 기재에 의하면 위 형사 사건의 제1심(대구지방법원 2010고합208호 판결)과 제2심(대구고등법원 2011노33호 판결)은 모두 이 부분 공소사실에 대하여 유죄를 선고하였는데, 검사가 이 부분 공소사설에서 현금을 제공하였다는 부분을 제외하여 상품권 등을 제공하였다는 부분에 대해서만 판단이 이루어졌다.", " 또한 위 조YY, 위 최NN는① 2007. 1. 1.부터 2007. 12. 31.까지 사실은 OOOO원을 리베이트 제공 자금으로 지출하고도, 지출결의서 혹은 경비청구서 등의 장부를 거짓 기장하거나 허위 증빙자료를 첨부하는 등으로, 위 OOOO원을 손금으로 인정받을 수 있는 비용으로 지출한 것처럼 꾸며, 허위 계상하는 부정한 방법으로 동액 상당의 과세표준을 누락하고, 이를 토대로 법인세 신고를 하여 법인세 OOOO원을 포탈하였으며, ② 2008. 1. 1.부터 2008. 12. 31.까지 사실은 OOOO원을 리베이트 제공 자금으로 지출하고도, 지출결의서 혹은 경비청구서 등의 장부를 거짓 기장하거나 허위 증빙자료를 첨부하는 등으로, 위 OOOO원을 손금으로 인정받을 수 있는 비용으로 지출한 것처럼 꾸며, 허위 계상하는 부정한 방법으로 동액 상당의 과세표준을 누락하고, 이를 토대로 법인세 신고를 하게 하여 법인세 OOOO원을 포탈하였다'는 혐의로도 기소되었다.", " 위 형사 사건의 제1심(대구지방법원 2010고합208호 판결)은 이 부분 공소사실에 대하여 유죄를 선고하였는데, 공소사실에 리베이트 제공 자금으로 지출하였다고 기재되어 있는 비용이 실제로 지출되었는지 여부에 대하여위 조YY와 위 최NN는 리베이트의 구체적 지급 상대방, 지급 일사 등 비용 지출 사실을 확인할 수 있는 정확한 증빙자료는 존재하지 않는다고 하면서 다만 추정치에 근거한 일부 자료들을 새롭게 작성하여 제시하고 있을 뿐이어서 위와 같은 비용 전부가 실제로 지출되었다고 단정하기 어렵다'고 판사하였고,리베이트 비용의 구체적인 집행은 각 지점장 및 영업사원들의 재량에 전적으로 맡겨져 있었고, 자금의 집행에 관한 사후 승인 내지 확언도 거의 이루어지지 않았다'고 판시하였다.", " 반면, 위 형사 사건의 제2심(대구고등법원 2011노33호 판결)은 위 조YY와 위 최NN가사기 기타 부정한 행위'를 한 것으로 볼 수 없다는 이유로 이 부분 공소사실에 대하여 무죄를 선고하였는데, ① 위 형사 사건에서는 2006. 1. 1.부터 2006. 12. 31.까지 리베이트 제공 자금으로 지출한 비용을 손금으로 인정받을 수 있는 비용으로 계상하였다는 부분에 대해서 공소가 제기되지 않은 점, ② 위 형사 사건에서는 현금 지급분, 상품권 지급분, 식사비 대납분을 구분하여 판단이 이루어지지는 않은 것으로 보이는 점, ③ 검사는 위 조YY와 위 최NN가 2007. 1. 1.부터 2007. 12. 31.까지 OOOO원을, 2008. 1. 1.부터 2008. 12. 31.까지 OOOO원을 각 리베이트 제공 자금으로 지출하였다는 사실을 전제로 공소를 제기하였는바, 위와 같은 공소사실의 인정 여부에 대하여 판단하는 위 형사 사건에서는 위와 같은 벼용이 실제로 지출되었는지 여부가 핵심적 쟁점이 되어 이에 대하여 실질적으로 판단이 이루어지지는 않은 것으로 보이는 점 등을 종합하면, 위 형사 사건에서는 법인세법의 관점에서 과세의 요건이 되는 비용의 존재와 액수에 관하여 판단이 이루어졌다고 볼 수 없다.", 아) 소결

Article 85-3 (1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that "one taxpayer shall prepare and keep books and documentary evidence related to all transactions in accordance with the provisions of each Shepher Act." The main sentence of paragraph (2) provides that "the books and documentary evidence under paragraph (1) shall be preserved for five years after the expiry of the statutory due date of return of the national tax for the taxable period in which relevant transactions are made." In addition, the main sentence of Article 112 of the former Corporate Tax Act (amended by Act No. 9267 of Dec. 26, 2008; hereinafter referred to as the "former Corporate Tax Act") provides that "a corporation that has a liability to pay taxes shall keep books and keep important documentary evidence related to such books and records by double entry, and a corporation shall prepare or receive books and documentary evidence related to such transactions for five years from the date on which the statutory due date of return under the provisions of Article 60 of the Income Tax Act is elapsed, and shall also keep the burden of proof and documentary evidence related to the expenses prescribed by Presidential Decree."

As seen earlier, the Plaintiff filed corporate tax by appropriating OOO's cash payments from 2006 to 2008 as items such as business activity expenses, entertainment expenses, sales promotion expenses, and promotion expenses. However, the Plaintiff asserts that the above OOO's payment was made as rebates to doctors or pharmacists. The following circumstances revealed in the above legal principles are acknowledged: ① The Framework Act on National Taxes and the Corporate Tax Act impose an obligation on corporations liable for tax payment to keep books by double entry entry system and to keep and preserve evidentiary documents related thereto; ② The Plaintiff's assertion that it is necessary to strictly comply with the principle under the tax law, i.e., inclusion of expenses in deductible expenses by evidence supporting the relevant evidence; ② the burden of proof as to expenses to be included in deductible expenses lies in the appellate court; ② the Plaintiff's payment of the remainder for 20 years as evidence for lack of specific purpose and the other party to the tax payment; and ③ the Plaintiff's specific portion of the charges should not be included in the calculation for 20 years as evidence for lack of specific purpose and the other party to the tax payment.

A) Relevant legal principles

Article 19(1) of the former Corporate Tax Act provides that "deductible expenses shall be the amount of losses incurred from transactions which reduce the net assets of the relevant corporation, except as otherwise provided for in this Act and other Acts." Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that deductible expenses under paragraph (1) of the same Article shall be losses or expenses incurred in connection with the business of the relevant corporation which are generally accepted or directly related to profits, except as otherwise provided for in this Act and other Acts." Here, the term "ordinary expenses generally accepted" means expenses that are deemed to have been disbursed under the same situation by other corporations operating the same type of business as the person liable to pay taxes. Determination of such expenses shall be objectively determined by comprehensively taking into account the details, purpose, form, amount, effect, etc. of disbursement, and other expenses that are incurred in violation of social order, except in extenuating circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du12422, Nov. 12, 2009).

B) Requirements for losses

The meaning of ‘profit directly related to the above provision' is determined to be reasonable to interpret it as ‘expenses not included in losses or expenses generated or spent in connection with the business of a corporation, which are directly related to the profits of the corporation'. The reasons are as follows. ① Under the former Corporate Tax Act, where a corporation has disbursed expenses due to the need for business execution, it may be treated as losses, but it shall not be recognized as losses if it is not generally accepted even if losses or expenses incurred in connection with the business of the corporation are incurred or spent in connection with the business of the corporation. It is also the position of the Supreme Court that the expenses disbursed in violation of social order cannot be generally accepted as ordinary losses unless there are special circumstances. Moreover, it is the position of the Supreme Court that the total amount of expenses disbursed is not recognized as losses without any restriction, and all items and limits

However, since most of the losses or expenses incurred or spent in connection with the business of a corporation are directly related to profit-making, most of them are not generally accepted as losses or expenses, and if it is recognized as losses because they are directly related to profit-making, it would result in recognizing losses or expenses related to the business as losses regardless of whether most of them are generally accepted as losses (it does not go against social order) regardless of whether they are generally accepted as losses or expenses, and there is no independent meaning of ordinary profit-relatedness or profit-relatedness. This result is not consistent with the purpose of the Corporate Tax Act. (2) Even if it is interpreted as above, it is difficult to view that it goes beyond the limit of literal interpretation in light of the form of the provision of the Corporate Tax Act. Rather, it is close to the natural meaning of the text.

C) Development of discussions

"The key issue cost of this case is short in relation to the plaintiff's business, so it is not a matter of whether the cost is directly related to profit, but it is a matter of whether the cost is generally accepted. It is a matter of whether it is extremely against the social order to determine whether the cost is normal or not. It is a matter of whether or not there is a debate about whether or not the cost is generally accepted. Since the plaintiff claims that the plaintiff paid rebates to doctors, pharmacists, etc. in accordance with the following standards, it is necessary to separately examine the rebates paid by the plaintiff to the doctor (hereinafter referred to as "the portion of the doctor's payment") and the rebates paid to the pharmacist (hereinafter referred

D) Whether the portion paid by a doctor violates social order

However, even if the offer of rebates, as alleged by the Plaintiff, has been harded as a practice of the pharmaceutical industry, etc., the offer of rebates to the doctor is not ordinary to be socially acceptable, but rather it is deemed that the inclusion of rebates in deductible expenses under the Corporate Tax Act, which was paid in violation of the social order, is extremely contrary to the social order. Therefore, the share of intention payment cannot be deemed as deductible expenses.

① 의사 윤QQ은 원고의 영업사원인 이JJ으로부터 원고가 취급하는 의약품을 많이 처방해 달라는 부탁을 받고 이를 수락한 후, 그 대가로 금품을 받았다고 진술하고 있고, 위 조YY, 위 최NN도 의사의 원고 의약품 처방과 리베이트 제공 사이에 대가관계가 있음을 인정하고 있다

In light of the relationship between the offering of rebates and the provision of medical prescriptions, barring any special circumstance, if a doctor or provider provided such rebates to a doctor belonging to a national or public university hospital, such doctor or provider is deemed to constitute the offering of bribe and the offering of bribe, and if a doctor or provider provided such rebates to a doctor belonging to a private university hospital, the doctor or provider is deemed to be unlawful to the extent of being subject to criminal punishment for the crime of taking in

② The amount of rebates offered to a doctor is in proportion to the performance of the Plaintiff’s medicine prescribed by the doctor, and the Plaintiff set the amount of rebates compared to the sales amount. The Plaintiff purchased a bearer pre-paid card, liquor ticket, department store store store store, etc. issued at each point of Korea and paid rebates to the doctor through the purchase of a corporate public card issued at each point of Korea, and paid rebates to the doctor. The method of payment or the method of determining the amount is very direct, affirmative, and explicit.

③ As one of the products whose essential element is the largest, whether a drug is used or its kind is directly connected to the health of the people. On the other hand, prescription drugs cannot be selected by the final consumer, and are selected entirely based on the decision of the doctor. As for the offering of rebates to a doctor who has the right to choose a drug entirely, doctors are subject to the prescription of a drug, the excessive prescription of such drug, and the prescription focused on high-priced drugs, rather than the appropriate prescription.

As above, the offering of rebates to a pharmaceutical market is detrimental to the order of fair trade in the pharmaceutical market, the increase in the price of the pharmaceutical products (or the reduction of the price) and the aggravation of the health insurance finance therefrom, and the burden is transferred to citizens who do not have the right to select the pharmaceutical products. As such, in the case of the pharmaceutical products, the establishment of the distribution order and the need to prevent distortion of the market are larger than other products, so the rebates offered by the pharmaceutical company cannot be assessed the same as

④ The offering of rebates by a pharmaceutical company may cause social waste and ultimately cause damage to consumers. Large pharmaceutical companies maintain their monopoly and dynamic status through the offering of rebates, and may reduce the amount of investment for research and development of new drugs if the profits acquired therefrom are offered as rebates again. The Plaintiff asserts that, in the case of a pharmaceutical company that mainly manufactures reproduced drugs, the only competition is not possible due to the price or quality, and thus, the only competition element is the impossibility of competition. According to such assertion, the Plaintiff’s strong regulation on rebates leads to the outcome of leaving the sensing cycle of the manufacture of reproduced drugs and the offer of rebates accordingly.

⑤ For these problems, the Fair Trade Commission imposes corrective orders and penalty surcharges on the act of unfair wills of a pharmaceutical company and imposes legal sanctions on the practices of rebates. Despite such administrative sanctions, the form of the payment of rebates costs is not eradicated, and the act of the payment of rebates is high, as seen earlier. If it fails to resolve such abolition, the fair trade order in the market, which is the fundamental order of our society, may be seriously threatened and may also threaten the health of the people.

(6) Article 47 of the former Pharmaceutical Affairs Act (amended by Act No. 10324, May 27, 2010; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that "any person who has obtained permission for taking drugs shall observe matters necessary to establish a distribution system of drugs and to maintain order in sales, as prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health and Welfare." Article 62 (1) 5 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs No. 77, Dec. 1, 2008) provides that "the person who has obtained permission for taking drugs shall not provide prizes, such as prize products and gift products, to a person who has established a medical institution for the purpose of promoting the sales of drugs." The above provision of gift vouchers, etc. to a doctor for the purpose of promoting the sales of drugs was prohibited before 2008, while any person who has obtained permission for taking economic benefits from a person who has obtained permission for taking the marketing of drugs for the purpose of promoting the sales of drugs, even if such act was prohibited or provided rebates.

7) Even if the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act regulates rebates in order to establish a distribution system of pharmaceutical products, etc. and maintain sales books, and even if the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act regulates unfair customer inducement in order to promote fair and free competition, to encourage creative business activities, to protect consumer rates, and to promote balanced national economic development, there is no conclusion that the general legal consideration of the tax law is not applied to the expenses paid as rebates from the fact that the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act and the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act regulate rebates according to their unique purposes. Therefore, if it is deemed that the expenses paid as the pretext of rebates are expenses paid in violation of social order, they cannot be deemed as losses.

(8) The funds for rebates shall be executed with non-funds created through window dressing accounting, etc.; non-funds are premised on embezzlement, window dressing accounting, tax evasion, unfair trade, etc.; and if the tax law includes such expenses as deductible expenses and deducts them from taxable income, it would be unlimited to allow the unlawful state.

9) In light of the fact that the Plaintiff has almost no record of funds enforcement, subsidization of expenses, evidence of expenditure, or false account books were distributed to various accounts, and that the Plaintiff stated that the lower NN was instructed by an investigative agency to conceal or destroy the details of rebates, it is reasonable to understand that the average general public’s awareness is also the cost of rebates paid to a doctor who has a medical prescription right, and that it is deemed that the cost of rebates is considered as an unrecoverable voice cost.

E) Whether the portion paid by a pharmacist violates social order

In full view of the following circumstances revealed through the aforementioned evidence and the overall purport of the pleadings, the offering of rebates to a pharmacist is different from the nature of rebates paid to a doctor in that the pharmaceutical’s purchase of medicines is not directly related to the pharmaceutical’s purchase or the price of the rebates is significantly low compared to the doctor’s case. Thus, although the expenditure is illegal in violation of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, it is deemed that the inclusion in deductible expenses in accordance with the Corporate Tax Act is considerably contrary to social order, it is generally acceptable as it is difficult to view that it is extremely contrary to social order.

① Of the Plaintiff’s sales, the proportion of over-the-counter drugs is not significant (in accordance with the classification of grades of products in 2008 and the payment rate of sales promotion expenses, the drugs sold by the Plaintiff are classified into ZZ 20, ZZ 56, ZZ 56, 153, 153, and 15, which are functional health foods, and a large number of non- full-time medicine medicines are classified as over-the-counter drugs), and prescription drugs that can be purchased only when doctor’s prescriptions are required.

In addition, where a pharmacist who received a rebates from the Plaintiff has paid the pharmaceutical price within approximately three months, and the Plaintiff did not reduce the percentage of the rebates or pay the rebates in the event that it pays the price in excess of three months at rarely.

② In light of the following circumstances, even in the case of rebates paid to a pharmacist by the Plaintiff, it appears that the purpose is to maintain smooth trading relationship and promote sales between the Plaintiff and the pharmacist.

③ From the standpoint of the Plaintiff who offered rebates, it seems that the normal relationship between the doctor’s prescription and the pharmaceutical’s purchase of medicines is unlikely to proceed smoothly if the pharmaceutical company did not fully pay rebates to the pharmaceutical company even if the pharmaceutical pharmaceutical business was conducted.

In the case of over-the-counter drugs, pharmacists can affect the choice of drugs, and even if the plaintiff does not occupy a large portion of the sales amount, the plaintiff sells over-the-counter drugs, and there is a possibility of selling new over-the-counter drugs at any time in the future.

According to Article 27 of the former Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, a pharmacist may prepare a drug in place of another drug with the same ingredients, content and dosage in a prescription without a doctor's prior consent in a certain case.

③ Meanwhile, in light of the following circumstances, it cannot be denied that the Plaintiff’s rebates paid to a pharmacist has the nature of the consideration for the settlement (or the settlement within the time limit) of the drug price.

Under the current system where the pharmaceutical pharmaceutical products are operated, the choice of prescription is entirely entrusted to doctors, and so long as a doctor prescribes a specific drug, the pharmacist is bound to purchase and keep the specific drug as prescribed by the doctor, barring special circumstances. The Plaintiff's pharmaceutical products are very large in the proportion of prescription drugs that require doctor's prescription.

○ The rebates paid by the Plaintiff to pharmacists is not calculated on the basis of the pharmaceutical’s purchase volume of medicines, but was calculated on the basis of the pharmaceutical’s purchase amount, and was paid on the condition that the payment is made during a certain

④ Ultimately, it is reasonable to view that the rebates paid by the Plaintiff to a pharmacist has the nature of expenses incurred in maintaining smooth trade relations between the Plaintiff and the pharmacist and promoting the sales of medicines on the other hand, but on the other hand, also has the nature of the consideration for smooth recovery of the drug price

⑤ The revised Pharmaceutical Affairs Act on May 27, 2010 newly established Article 47(3) that "the economic benefits within the scope prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health and Welfare are excluded from the economic benefits prohibited from being provided," which is a discount of expenses according to the terms and conditions of settlement of payments."

Therefore, the portion paid by doctors shall not be deemed as losses, but since the portion paid by pharmacists shall be deemed as losses, the plaintiff's argument related to the portion paid by pharmacists is justified among this part of the plaintiff's assertion.

3) Whether the portion of pharmaceutical expenses paid falls under the sales ancillary expenses

A) Relevant legal principles

Article 25(5) of the former Corporate Tax Act provides that "entertainment expenses" means entertainment expenses, social expenses, recompense, and other expenses of a similar nature regardless of the pretext thereof, which are disbursed by a corporation in connection with its business. Article 42(4) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21302 of Feb. 4, 2009) provides that "the amount of sales incentives, sales allowances, or discounted amounts, etc. which can be recognized as normal transactions in light of sound social norms and commercial practices shall not be deemed entertainment expenses." Article 10 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance No. 66 of Mar. 30, 2009) provides that "the expenses for goods or products sold pursuant to Article 19 subparagraph 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act shall be deemed to be expenses for business within the scope of normal transactions in light of sound social norms and commercial practice." Article 25(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act provides that "the other party is included in business related expenses."

B) Determination

In full view of the following circumstances revealed in addition to the purport of the entire argument as seen earlier, the Plaintiff’s rebates paid to a pharmacist cannot be deemed as a normally required expense in relation to the sale of drugs in light of sound social norms or commercial practice. Rather, the purpose of this is to promote the smooth progress of transactional relations by enhancing friendship with pharmacists, and thus, it is deemed as entertainment expense under the Corporate Tax Act.

① As seen earlier, the rebates paid by the Plaintiff to a pharmacist is characterized by the nature of the consideration for smooth recovery of the price, as well as the maintenance of smooth trade relations, and the promotion of the sale of medicine.

② In a circumstance where there is no objective reason to dispute over the payment for a long time at a pharmacy (if the pharmacist who sold the relevant criminal case claims drug expenses to the Health Insurance Corporation, the Health Insurance Corporation stated that the pharmacist would be aware that the pharmacist would pay the drug expenses within one month, and the health insurance Corporation would be aware that the pharmaceutical company would pay the drug expenses), the main reason is that, if the pharmacist did not receive rebates, it would be the purpose of receiving rebates. In this respect, the offering of rebates to the pharmacist seems to have been partly affected by the past practice prior to the distribution of pharmaceutical products.

③ The citizens’ burden of medical expenses is increased if the price of medicines increases due to the offering of rebates or the health insurance finance worsens as a result thereof. Therefore, the fact that a pharmacy receives rebates at an early stage of 01 is erroneous practice that leads to the citizens’ burden, even though there is no objective reason to delay payment at the pharmacy.

④ In light of the fact that the Plaintiff unilaterally suspended the payment of rebates, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff was obligated to pay rebates to pharmacists. Moreover, if the Plaintiff recognizes the rebates paid to pharmacists as legitimate costs for facilitating the collection of sales proceeds, the actual transaction would result in the Plaintiff’s act of violating the redemption scheme.

(5) The funds for rebates shall be executed with the funds created through the window dressing accounting Dong. Non-funds are premised on embezzlement, window dressing accounting, tax evasion, unfair trade, etc.; and if the tax law includes such expenses in deductible expenses and deducts them from taxable income, it would be unlimited to allow the unlawful state.

6) In light of the fact that the Plaintiff did not almost keep materials related to the execution of funds and the disbursement of expenses, did not provide evidence of the disbursement, or did not provide false evidence of the disbursement, and that the account books were distributed to various accounts, and that the Plaintiff stated that the lower NN instructed the investigative agency to conceal or destroy the details of the rebates, it appears that the Plaintiff itself is also considered to have judged that the cost of rebates was a voice cost.

C) Sub-decision

Therefore, since the portion paid by pharmacist is not a sales unit cost under the Corporate Tax Act, but a entertainment expense, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit (as seen above, since the portion of intent to pay is not a loss, it is not determined as to whether it constitutes a sales unit cost).

3. Conclusion

If so, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all.