1. Administrative laws and regulations, which are the basis for an indivative administrative disposition, must be strictly interpreted and applied, and shall not be excessively expanded or analogically interpreted in the direction unfavorable to the applicable party. However, insofar as the interpretation does not deviate from the ordinary meaning of the language and text, the teleological interpretation that takes into account the legislative intent, purpose, etc. does not exclude (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2006Du11590, Sept. 20, 2007; 2009Do1332, May 13, 2010).

Article 2 subparag. 4 of the former Social Welfare Services Act (amended by Act No. 11239, Jan. 26, 2012; hereinafter the same) provides that “social welfare facilities” shall mean “facilities established for the purpose of providing social welfare services,” and Article 34(1) of the former Social Welfare Services Act provides that “the State or a local government may establish and operate social welfare facilities (hereinafter “facilities”). In addition, Article 40(1) of the former Social Welfare Services Act provides that “The Minister of Health and Welfare, a Mayor/Do Governor, or the head of a Si/Gun/Gu may order the improvement of the facilities, suspension of business, replacement of the head of the facilities, or closure of the facilities, if the facilities fall under any of the following,” and one of the subparagraphs provides that “when accounting fraud, unlawful acts, or other improper acts, etc. are discovered” (Article 4).

In light of the above provisions, language, purport, etc., the term “facilities” in the “improvement of facilities” under Article 40(1) of the former Social Welfare Services Act means the abbreviation of “social welfare facilities” as provided by Article 34(1) of the former Social Welfare Services Act, and it is difficult to deem that the term “physically integrated social welfare facilities” has been limited to “physically organized social welfare facilities” for the purpose of conducting social welfare business. ② As for accounting fraud, illegal acts, or other unlawful acts of social welfare facilities, the term “an excessive error” is also a premise to ensure that the pertinent facilities can be operated smoothly. Thus, the term “improvement” does not deviate from the ordinary meaning of “improvement”; ③ If the meaning of “improvement” is different from that of “an order for improvement”, the amount equivalent to the money in question can not be returned to the pertinent social welfare facilities within the scope of “unlawful or unlawful acts or other unlawful acts,” and the term “an order for improvement of the social welfare facilities can only be seen as an unlawful act or unlawful act in compliance with the legislative purpose of the former Social Welfare Services Act.

2. Nevertheless, the lower court determined that the instant disposition was unlawful on the sole ground that it was not possible to issue an order to re-deposit the amount equivalent to the amount of money arising from the unlawful act, etc. to the account of the instant childcare center, such as the instant disposition, on the ground that the order to improve the facility under Article 40(1) of the former Social Welfare Services Act was issued, without examining and determining whether the reason for the disposition exists, namely, whether the Plaintiff’s act of using childcare fees for purposes other than the operation of the childcare center constitutes “when accounting misconduct, illegal act, or other improper act has been discovered” as provided by Article 40(1)4 of the former Social Welfare Services Act. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the order to improve the facility under Article 40(1) of the former Social Welfare Services Act, and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations as to the existence of the reason for

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Sang-ok (Presiding Justice)