1. As to the grounds of appeal on whether an act constitutes abuse under the former Child Welfare Act, the lower court found the Defendant guilty of the instant charges on the ground that the Defendant’s act of sending the victim’s chest photographs and videos containing fingers and fingers to the victim’s cellular phone with the victim’s cell phone, and the act of receiving the transmission thereof constitutes “an act of abuse, such as sexual harassment, which causes a sense of sexual humiliation to the child,” as stipulated in Article 17 subparag. 4 of the former Child Welfare Act (amended by Act No. 12361, Jan. 28, 2014; hereinafter “former Child Welfare Act”).

Examining the relevant legal principles and evidence, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the meaning and interpretation of “cruel act” under Article 17 subparag. 4 of the former Child Welfare Act, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal

2. According to Article 383 subparag. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act as to the grounds of appeal on unfair sentencing, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not less than ten years has been imposed. As such, in this case where the Defendant rendered a minor sentence against the Defendant, the argument that the sentencing

3. Article 38(1)1 of the former Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (amended by Act No. 10260, Apr. 15, 2010; Act No. 11572, Dec. 18, 2012); thus, Article 38(1)1 of the same Act (amended by Act No. 11572, Oct. 24, 2013; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2011Hun-Ba106, Oct. 24, 2013) providing that a person who committed sexual assault against a child or juvenile should disclose personal information on the grounds of appeal that the personal information disclosure order system is unconstitutional, does not violate

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.