(b) The case holding that disciplinary dismissal was a disposition that deviates from the scope of disciplinary authority against a worker who used violence, such as flabing fat, flabing fat, etc., in which company employees and drinking house employees and the worker who flabed the fat in the flab and flab;

C. Subject matter of examination in a request for remedy such as unfair dismissal under Article 27-3(1) of the Labor Standards Act, and whether it is premised on the establishment of unfair labor practices in order to recognize the request for remedy (negative)

B. The case holding that the above disciplinary action is a disposition which deviates from the scope of disciplinary authority due to lack of balance deemed reasonable by social norms between the disciplinary action and disciplinary action and the disciplinary action, and thus, constitutes a disposition of dismissal without justifiable grounds, even though the company took disciplinary action against the worker who did the assault, such as flabbing flabbbbing the flab and tearing the clothes, etc.

C. In the case of an application for remedy such as unfair dismissal under Article 27-3(1) of the Labor Standards Act, the object of review is only whether there is a justifiable reason for disciplinary action such as dismissal of workers. Even though Article 27-3(2) of the Labor Standards Act applies mutatis mutandis to the application for remedy such as unfair dismissal, etc., and the examination procedure, it is obvious that the application is not a " procedure" in which the Labor Relations Commission files an application for remedy with the Labor Relations Commission, and the Labor Relations Commission examines it, and that it is not a "actual requirement" in the act subject to remedy, and therefore, it cannot be said that there is the above applicable provision, which is premised on the establishment of unfair labor practices in order to recognize the application for remedy such as unfair dismissal.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendant joining the Defendant.

(1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the plaintiff's act of violence against the plaintiff 2 and disciplinary action against the non-party 2 was not against the above disciplinary measure against the non-party 9's disciplinary action against the non-party 1 and the non-party 2's disciplinary action against the non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 1's counter-party 2'

(2) In light of the records, the above fact-finding by the court below as to the grounds for disciplinary action against the plaintiff is fully acceptable, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

In addition, Article 27 (1) of the Labor Standards Act provides that an employer shall not take disciplinary action, such as dismissal, without any justifiable reason, to prevent an employer from freely dismissing his/her employee. The "justifiable reason" in this context means that there is an unavoidable reason to the extent that the employment contract can not be continued by social norms, and that there is an inevitable business necessity. Thus, in cases where the employment contract or rules of employment provide for dismissal, etc., the dismissal shall be deemed a dismissal with justifiable reason unless it is null and void because it violates the above Labor Standards Act, and if the rules of employment stipulate that various kinds of disciplinary actions are possible against the same disciplinary reason, it shall be deemed that the decision to choose any disciplinary action belongs to the discretion of the authorized person. However, such discretion does not belong to the arbitrary and convenient discretion of the authorized person having authority to take disciplinary action, and there is a need to maintain balance between the grounds for disciplinary action and the disciplinary action.

The court below recognized the intervenor's right to disciplinary action against the plaintiff while recognizing the intervenor's right to disciplinary action against the plaintiff, and recognized the intervenor's disciplinary action against the plaintiff as an unfair measure deviating from the scope of the right to disciplinary action against the plaintiff, and there is no inconsistency in the reasoning of the judgment or misapprehension of the legal principles as to disciplinary action, and if facts are identical to the judgment of the court below, if the intervenor's disciplinary action against the plaintiff in accordance with the employee's disciplinary action regulations or the reward and punishment regulations were taken against the plaintiff, it is proper to determine that the above disciplinary action is a disposition that deviates from the scope of the right to disciplinary action due to lack of balance recognized as reasonable between the disciplinary action and the disciplinary action, and there

2. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 2.

Article 27-3 (1) of the Labor Standards Act provides that "When an employer has dismissed, laid off, suspended, transferred, reduced wages, or other disciplinary action against a worker without any justifiable reason, the worker concerned may apply for remedy to the Labor Relations Commission." Thus, in applying for remedy such as unfair dismissal, the subject of review is merely whether the disciplinary action, such as dismissal, against the worker, has a justifiable reason, and even if there is an application for remedy such as unfair dismissal, etc. under Article 27-3 (2) of the same Act and procedure for review, it is obvious that the application for remedy is made to the Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Relations Commission does not relate to "actual requirements" of the act subject to remedy, and therefore, it cannot be said that there is no ground to criticize the judgment below to the purport that there is no reason to criticize the above purport.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-dong (Presiding Justice) Kim Sang-ho (Presiding Justice)