2. Upon the selective claim added at the trial, the Plaintiff’s claim is confirmed that with respect to the cargo transport accident (accidents during the sea transport of six buses exported to franchise LTN) occurred on October 23, 2008, the Plaintiff, on behalf of the insurer, has a claim amounting to 685,928,940 won and the amount calculated at the rate of 20% per annum from October 23, 2008 to January 11, 2012, and from the following day to the date of full payment.

3. The plaintiff's remaining claims among the plaintiff's claim for confirmation of this case are dismissed.

4. Of the total litigation costs, 40% is borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder 60% is borne by the Defendant, respectively.

(a) Conclusion of export contracts;

Treatment International Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Treatment International”) entered into an export contract with a franchise (hereinafter “TRNSGY LTD”) of the nationality of Aubane LTN (hereinafter “Ein International”) with the terms and conditions of transportation expenses and insurance premium delivery (CIP) for each bus model (name BS212MA), 9,670 US$670 (total US$1,794,060,060) for each service (hereinafter “instant cargo”) to the Aubane LTD (hereinafter “TN”), with the terms and conditions of transportation expenses and insurance premium delivery (CIP).

B. Conclusion of a transport contract

1) For the implementation of the above export contract, medical personnel requested the Defendant (hereinafter “instant contract”) to transport the instant cargo from the Busan port to the ASEAN for the implementation of the above export contract (hereinafter “the instant contract”). The Defendant, through Drotetex Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “DOGITH COD COD”; the Defendant, via Lroteex Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Droteex”), was a ship agent located in Busan port (hereinafter “LLBAL-KRE LTD Korea”); and the LTD Korea, through the order to transport the instant cargo to the Cheongan Shipping Co., Ltd., Ltd. (hereinafter “Cheongan Shipping”), the owner of the vessel affiliated with the Defendant, and the Cheongan Shipping Co.,, Ltd., Ltd. (hereinafter “Cheongan Shipping”) was on board the instant cargo, and the aforementioned order was issued to the Cheongan Shipping Co., Ltd., Ltd. (hereinafter “Cheongan Shipping”).

2) On October 20, 2008, Cheongan Shipping, the owner of the instant vessel, indicated “DAE Round LIS COMPPPP COE COMTRAL COMOTRAL ACT ACT,” and “Consignee” on the B/L No. 7, which was issued by Cheongan Shipping with respect to the instant cargo, on October 2008. In addition, on the B/L surface, there are the entry “SURERES RENNES RENNESNNES REENNNNES ACTNNNNERNNERY RENERYYYY RENERENERY RENERENERY.” and on the B/L surface.

3) On the 21st of the same month, in the issuer column of House B/L (securities number 2 omitted), A. 2 of House B/L issued in respect of the instant cargo by the master on the basis of the instant master B/L on the basis of the instant master B/L, and in the issuer column of House B/L, “the consignor column is written in the consignee column”.

4) DNA is the defendant's subsidiary where the defendant has a 100% equity interest.

(c) Conclusion of insurance contracts;

On the other hand, on October 20, 2008, medical personnel concluded a cargo insurance contract with the Plaintiff on October 20, 2008, with respect to the instant cargo, with the content of USD 1,973,466 with respect to the amount of insurance coverage for the instant cargo (hereinafter “instant insurance contract”).

(d) Occurrence of insurance accidents;

On October 21, 2008, the Cheongan Shipping, the owner of the instant vessel, arbitrarily loaded six buses (hereinafter “instant accident cargo”) out of the instant cargo on the deck of the instant vessel and let the instant vessel sail to the port of Busan, which is the destination, after departing from the port. On the 23th of the same month, Cheongan Shipping, which was the owner of the instant vessel. On the 20th of the same month, caused an accident where the instant accident cargo loaded on deck is loaded into the sea (hereinafter “instant insurance accident”).

E. Plaintiff’s insurance money payment and Defendant’s claim for damages

1) After the occurrence of the instant insurance accident, the Plaintiff paid USD 657,82 as the insurance money to the medical personal person on February 10, 2009, upon the request of the medical professional delegated all rights related to the instant insurance accident by the franchise, who is the insured.

2) On August 4, 2009, the Plaintiff filed a claim for damages against the Defendant based on subrogation by the insurer for the payment of the above insurance proceeds (see, e.g., Articles 242 and 10 of the record) (see, e., Articles 242 and 10 of the record).

3) Meanwhile, on the other hand, the base rate for sale and purchase of won currency per US$ 1 on December 21, 201, which is the date of the closing of argument in the current trial, is KRW 1,147.00.

F. Commencement and termination of rehabilitation procedures against the defendant

1) On July 23, 2009, when the lawsuit of this case was pending in the court of first instance, the decision was made on July 23, 2009 with the Seoul Central District Court 2009Kahap109. On the same day, Nonparty 1 (the representative director of the defendant at that time) was appointed as the administrator of the rehabilitation debtor. On June 8, 2011, when the lawsuit of this case is pending in the appellate court of this case, the decision was made to terminate the rehabilitation procedure for the rehabilitation debtor against the rehabilitation debtor.

2) Meanwhile, according to the rehabilitation plan approved by the debtor on November 8, 2010 by the rehabilitation court, the claims in this case constitute the undetermined indemnity obligations among the rehabilitation claims against the defendant, and the undetermined indemnity obligations constitute 68% conversion into equity (issuance at KRW 61,00 per share of ordinary shares of KRW 5,000 per share) and 32% per share, and the bonds to be repaid in cash shall be repaid in cash. The 15% of the bonds to be repaid in cash shall be repaid in equal installments every three years from 2012 to 2014, and the 14% shall be repaid in equal installments every three years from 2015 and 2016, and the 16% shall be paid in equal installments over the year 2017 and 2018, and the remaining 55% shall be repaid in 2019.

【Ground of recognition】 The fact that there has been no dispute, Gap’s 1 through 13, Eul’s 1, 12, and 14, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination on this safety defense

A. The defendant's assertion

The Defendant asserts that the instant claim asserted by the Plaintiff was a claim prior to the commencement of rehabilitation procedures against the Defendant, and that was decided to commence rehabilitation procedures against the Defendant during the course of the instant trial proceeding, which constitutes rehabilitation claims under the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (hereinafter “Rehabilitation Act”). Under Article 172 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, the Plaintiff, the creditor, pursuant to Article 172 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, should have received a motion to resume the instant lawsuit within one month from October 16, 2009, with respect to the instant claim for which the Plaintiff raised an objection against the Defendant, within one month from the end of the investigation period, after the commencement of rehabilitation procedures against the Defendant. However, the Plaintiff did not make a legitimate request to resume the instant lawsuit within the said period. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s lawsuit of this case is unlawful and dismissed

(b) Fact of recognition;

1) On June 17, 2009, the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the Defendant. On July 23, 2009, the lower court rendered a decision to commence the rehabilitation procedure against the Defendant on July 23, 2009 during the first instance trial.

2) Accordingly, when Nonparty 1, who was appointed as a custodian of the Defendant for rehabilitation, received a notice from the court of first instance of this case on the date of declaration of non-litigation, the Nonparty 1 submitted the written reply and the written application for taking over the lawsuit (hereinafter “written application for taking over the lawsuit of this case”) to the court of first instance on August 26, 2009. The court of first instance sent the written application for taking over the lawsuit of this case to the Plaintiff and received the written application for taking over the lawsuit of this case by the Plaintiff’s attorney on September 1, 2009.

3) On September 4, 2009, the Plaintiff reported the rehabilitation claim regarding three claims against the Defendant including the instant claim to the Seoul Central District Court, and against this, Nonparty 1, the administrator of the Defendant of the Defendant of the rehabilitation debtor, raised an objection to the whole amount of the Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, on October 28, 2009, the said court notified the Plaintiff of the purport that “Inasmuch as there is an objection against the Plaintiff’s reported right prior to October 16, 2009, the end of the inspection period regarding the instant rehabilitation case, the said court failed to file a petition with the court for confirmation of the rehabilitation claim against all of the objectors within one month from the end of the inspection period, or if a lawsuit is already filed with the court, it would be impossible for the obligor (the Defendant of this case) to have the right to claim against all of the objectors within one month from the end of the said inspection period.”

4) However, the Plaintiff filed an application for the final claim inspection judgment with the above court on November 16, 2009 concerning all of the three claims asserted by the Plaintiff, including the instant claims, without filing a separate application for the final claim inspection judgment with respect to the instant lawsuit from October 16, 2009 to November 16, 2009, which is the last day of the said inspection period, and the said court dismissed the application for the final claim inspection judgment on October 18, 2010 on the instant claim inspection judgment (2009Da1014, 1014, since the part on the instant claim was already pending in the instant lawsuit, the instant application for the final claim inspection judgment on October 18, 2010 on the said part is unlawful, and the remaining two claims are dismissed without merit.

5) Meanwhile, on April 7, 2010, the Plaintiff submitted an application for modification of the purport and cause of the claim to the court of first instance to the court of first instance. The Plaintiff indicated the Defendant as “non-party 1,” and changed the purport of the claim to “the amount calculated at the rate of 6% per annum from October 23, 2008 to the date of full payment,” and the Defendant’s administrator Nonparty 1 stated the Defendant’s claim to the effect that “non-party 2, as the date of second instance, stated the Defendant’s claim to the effect that “non-party 1, 233, and 182, among the Plaintiff’s rehabilitation claims against the Defendant, were calculated at the rate of 0% per annum from October 23, 2008 to the date of full payment,” and the Plaintiff stated the Defendant’s claim to the effect that “non-party 1, 201, as the date of second instance, the Defendant’s claim to the effect that it was stated on the date of second instance.

6) On June 8, 2011, the trial pending in the trial, the Seoul Central District Court 2009 Ma109, 2009, which rendered a decision to terminate the rehabilitation procedure against the rehabilitation debtor. Accordingly, on June 22, 2011, the administrator of the rehabilitation debtor Nonparty 1 submitted to the trial at the trial the written application for the re-application for the re-application for the re-application for the re-application from the administrator of the treatment-based plastics Co., Ltd. to the “Treatment-based SPS 1” with respect to the Defendant in the instant case, and the said written application for re-application for re-application was stated on the second day of the trial ( July 6, 2011).

【Ground of recognition】 The fact that there has been no dispute, entry of Eul Nos. 1, 3 through 9, and the purport of whole pleading

C. Determination

1) In a case where an ordinary civil procedure is interrupted, the interruption by the party’s request for continuation is resolved and the proceedings are resumed. In this context, the person entitled to apply for takeover can not only the new party of the party against which the cause for interruption occurred but also the other party (Article 241 of the Civil Procedure Act). In a case where a request for takeover of the proceedings is made, the court shall notify the other party thereof (Article 242 of the Civil Procedure Act). Whether the request for resumption is legitimate or not shall be dismissed as a decision where the court ex officio deems that the takeover of the proceedings is not reasonable as a result of an investigation, but may proceed with the proceedings without any need for a separate trial (see Supreme Court Decision 83Meu1409, Jun. 12, 1984, etc.). And, in principle, the effect of the takeover becomes effective at the same time as the applicant’s application is filed, and in relation to the relation with the other party, it shall not be deemed that the content of the written request for resumption of the lawsuit must be stated in the pleading).

In addition, under the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, a custodian or the other party may take over a lawsuit unrelated to a rehabilitation claim, etc. (Article 59(2) of the same Act). However, there is no express provision that a rehabilitation creditor or a rehabilitation secured creditor may take over a lawsuit regarding a rehabilitation claim, which provides that the rehabilitation creditor or the rehabilitation secured creditor shall take over the lawsuit (Article 172(1) of the same Act). However, it is not a provision that does not permit a custodian to take over a rehabilitation claim, and therefore, it is reasonable to deem that a rehabilitation debtor’s custodian can take over a rehabilitation claim pursuant to Article 241 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Meanwhile, Articles 172(1), 172(2) and 170(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act provide that where a lawsuit on claims to which an objection is raised is pending at the time rehabilitation procedures commence, where any rehabilitation creditor or any rehabilitation secured creditor intends to seek the confirmation of such right, all of the objectors shall take over the lawsuit as the other party to the lawsuit. In this case, such request for resumption of the lawsuit shall be made within one month from the end of the inspection period or from the special inspection date. The aforementioned function and purport of the procedure for taking over the lawsuit prescribed under the Debtor Rehabilitation Act (where the parties to the lawsuit in progress are raised as an objection from the debtor and the former status of the lawsuit is taken over and the right is determined by the continuation of the lawsuit. This is also intended to prevent the waste of both the parties to the lawsuit and avoid the spread of the proceedings, but it is not reasonable to view such request for resumption of the lawsuit as the period for taking over the lawsuit or the final date of the procedure to which the rehabilitation secured creditor or the rehabilitation secured creditor is permitted before the inspection date of the lawsuit (the foregoing request for taking over the lawsuit).

2) Examining the instant case based on the aforementioned legal principles and relevant provisions, the decision was made on the commencement of the proceedings against the Defendant while the instant lawsuit was pending in the court of first instance. After that, Nonparty 1, the administrator of the Defendant, filed a request for the continuation of proceedings with the court of first instance on August 26, 2009 (in light of the contents, time, circumstance, etc. of the said request, the Defendant’s argument that the said request by the custodian Nonparty 1 is not a request for the continuation of proceedings, but a request for the correction of the indication of the party, or that the Defendant, the debtor, not the custodian, was a request for the correction of the indication of the party, or that the said request was filed by the debtor, not only the applicant, but also the other party (the Plaintiff), upon delivery to the Plaintiff, who is a rehabilitation creditor on September 1, 2009. The above request for the continuation of proceedings was made before January 16, 2009, which satisfies the requirements of Article 17 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act.

Therefore, the Defendant’s defense that the instant lawsuit regarding the instant claim, which is a rehabilitation claim, did not submit a legitimate request for resumption under Article 172 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, is rejected (the Supreme Court’s judgment cited by the Defendant is different from the instant case, and it is not appropriate to invoke the instant case).

3. Judgment on the merits

A. Determination as to whether the Plaintiff’s damage claim based on subrogation (the claim of this case) exists

According to the above facts, the plaintiff has acquired the right to claim damages against the defendant of the franchise in accordance with the insurer subrogation legal principles under Article 682 of the Commercial Act by paying insurance money to the franchise who is the insured (on the basis of the contract of this case, in fact, the franchise is delegated with the right to receive insurance money from the franchise) based on the insurance contract of this case. Thus, the defendant bears the same obligation as the defendant's liability for damages to the franchise within the scope of the insurance money paid by the plaintiff to the plaintiff.

However, the plaintiff asserted the existence of a claim for damages equivalent to the same amount against the defendant on the ground that he paid US$ 657,822 as insurance money. However, according to the invoice (certificate No. 1) as to the freight of this case, it is only recognized that the price per unit of the freight of this case is US$ 9,670 ( US$ 598,020), and further, there is no evidence to prove that the arrival price for the freight of this case is US$ 657,822 as argued by the plaintiff, or that the franchise, the insured, is US$ 657,822.

Therefore, barring any special circumstance, the defendant is within the scope of the above insurance money paid by the plaintiff to the plaintiff, which is equivalent to ordinary damages caused by losses in six of the accident cargo of this case, and the amount equivalent to the export price of the accident of this case [the plaintiff = 598,020 US$ 598,020 X 1,147.00 won [the plaintiff is entitled to the rate of 1408.8 won per US$ 1,208,000 which is the date of occurrence of the accident of this case]. However, if the creditor claims for foreign currency claims which are monetary claims designated in foreign currency conversion into Korean currency, the court shall, if it orders the debtor to perform such claims, calculates the foreign exchange price at the time of the conclusion of the fact-finding trial as the actual situation into Korean currency at the time of the conclusion of the arguments of this case (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 90Da2147, Mar. 12, 191; 201.).

B. Judgment on the defendant's assertion

On the other hand, the defendant asserts that the existence and scope of the debt of this case are discussed in the following order.

1) Parties to the instant transport contract

The defendant is not the defendant but the party who entered into the contract of this case concerning the cargo of this case with medical professional and DNA, and the defendant and DNA are separate legal entities which have different legal personality. The defendant merely merely requested the marine transportation brokerage from DNAex and requested the real transportation of the ship of this case for DNA, and only requested the real transportation of the above marine transportation section. Thus, the defendant's claim that the damage liability due to the loss of the cargo of this case should be borne by DNA, not by the defendant, but by DNA.

Although the above evidences and the above facts revealed as follows, i.e., Cheongan Shipping’s bill of lading issued by Cheongan Shipping, the owner of the freight of this case, i.e., the Defendant (DAE WT LOL COMTRAL COMPOTRAL COMPON) who represented for treatment in the name of the consignor, i.e., the fact that the Defendant’s statement is indicated as the consignor, i., the relationship between the Defendant and Droteex, the process of concluding the contract of this case, i.e., the date of issuance of the instant bill of lading, i., e., the Defendant’s presentation as the party to the contract of this case and the issuer of the instant bill of lading of this case, i.e., the Defendant’s presentation as the party to the contract of this case and the Plaintiff’s ex post facto consultation on the occurrence of the insurance accident of this case and the payment of the insurance proceeds of the Plaintiff’s bill of lading of this case, the Defendant’s presentation of this case’s bill of lading of this case cannot be accepted.

2) Whether the Commercial Act applies the provisions on the limitation of liability per package (Article 797(1) of the Commercial Act)

A) Even if the Defendant’s liability for the instant insurance accident is recognized as a carrier of the instant transport contract, the Defendant asserts that the limitation of liability per package is applied under Article 797(1) of the Commercial Act, and the Defendant’s liability should be limited to not more than 4,000 SDR (=66.67SDR 66.67SDR 7,780,000). According to the foregoing, the Defendant’s liability for damages arising from the instant insurance accident is in accordance with Articles 794 through 796 of the Commercial Act, barring any special circumstance, the limitation of liability per package under Article 797(1) of the Commercial Act is applicable.

B) As to this, the Plaintiff asserted that the instant insurance accident occurred due to the “act or omission committed with intent of the carrier (the Defendant) or with intent to cause damage,” and that the application of the provision on the limitation of liability per package should be excluded under the proviso of Article 797(1) of the Commercial Act. Thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion is reasonable to deem that the instant insurance accident occurred due to the “act or omission committed with intent of the carrier (the Defendant) or with intent to cause damage,” and the following circumstances, i.e., the process and contents of the conclusion of the instant transport contract, the form and usual method of loading the instant cargo, the instant cargo was loaded on deck without deck agreement, the developments and details of the occurrence of the instant insurance accident, the details of the damage, and all other circumstances indicated in the oral arguments, and therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the instant insurance accident occurred due to the “act or omission committed with intent of the carrier (the Defendant) or with intent to cause damage.” Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion that points this out is reasonable, and therefore, the Defendant’s claim is therefore justified.

C) We examine these issues as follows.

① At the time of the instant transport contract, the Defendant asserted that the so-called on-line agreement was concluded with the purport that “if no kind of cargo is available, regardless of whether it is a container or cargo, it may be loaded under the deck or deck without notice to the owner of the cargo, and in any case such loading does not constitute such an agreement (see Article 13 of the Terms and Conditions on the back of the Cargo Bill (Evidence B No. 11 No. 15)] of the instant cargo loaded on the deck is based on the above deck agreement and is justifiable, and therefore, the instant insurance accident cannot be deemed to have occurred due to the Defendant’s intentional or reckless act.

The statements in Gap evidence Nos. 2 and 7, and Eul evidence No. 11 (the evidence No. 15) are not sufficient to acknowledge the fact that there was a deck agreement on the cargo of this case at the time of the contract of this case (the surface of the cargo of this case does not contain any indication on the deck transport, and in such circumstances, only in such a side-to-face selective terms and conditions include "may carry out deck transport at the carrier's option," but only on the ground that the surface of the bill of this case states "SHIPPS SALEDK" on the surface of the bill of lading of this case, it is difficult to readily conclude that the deck agreement on the cargo of this case was concluded). Thus, the defendant's assertion based on this premise is without merit.

② In addition, even if the Defendant did not reach the deck agreement on the instant cargo, the Defendant did not instruct the actual carrier (the owner of the instant vessel) to load the instant cargo on deck, and the actual carrier did not recognize the fact that the instant cargo was loaded on deck, and the Defendant was not aware of the fact that the instant cargo was loaded on deck. As such, the Defendant did not know of the fact that the instant cargo was loaded on deck, the instant accident was caused by the actual carrier (the owner of the instant vessel)’s act, and cannot be deemed to have occurred by the carrier’s intentional or reckless act.

On the other hand, the above evidence and the following circumstances revealed by the above facts are as follows: in the contract of this case, the agreement on deck was not concluded in relation to the transportation of the cargo involved; on the front side of the bill of lading issued by the actual carrier (the owner of this case), the "SHIPPS SALED/ONDK" is stated as the "DAEWO LIS COMPP.O/BOF COMS COMPP.O/BOFOTRAL ACTOOTRALNNN"; in light of all other circumstances indicated in the pleading, the shipper of this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading in this case's bill of lading, it can not be accepted as the defendant's actual agent's or representative's authority's own decision on deck.

4) Whether the exercise of the Plaintiff’s right to claim damages against the Defendant based on subrogation by the insurer is legitimate

In addition, in order for the plaintiff to acquire the damage claim of the franchise to the defendant by subrogation of the insurer, the existence of the damage claim of the franchise against the defendant should be presumed. Since the bill of lading of this case was issued in relation to the carriage of the accident cargo of this case, the holder of the cargo of this case acquires the ownership of the cargo (the cargo of this case) or the right to claim damages due to the loss or damage of the cargo, and the transfer of the ownership or the right to claim damages is made by the transfer of the bill of this case and the possession of the bill of lading. Since the franchise does not possess the cargo of this case and the plaintiff does not possess the cargo of this case from the franchise, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to exercise the damage claim against the defendant of the franchise of this case and the plaintiff's right to claim damages due to subrogation against the insurer of the plaintiff. Thus, this paper examines the claim that the right to claim damages against the defendant of the cargo of this case cannot be allowed.

A bill of lading is a securities which proves the receipt of the cargo by a marine carrier and bears the obligation to deliver the cargo to a legitimate holder at the port of unloading. In principle, the possession or delivery of a bill of lading is required in order to exercise or transfer the right on the bill of lading, and the right to claim damages due to the loss or damage of the cargo is also incorporated into a bill of lading, and in principle, the possession or delivery of a bill of lading is required

On the other hand, in the case of this case, the plaintiff is the plaintiff that the plaintiff did not possess the cargo bill of this case until the date of the closing of argument in the trial.

However, in light of the above evidence and the following circumstances revealed by the above facts, namely, the details and details of the issuance of the bill of lading of this case, the relationship between the issuer, consignor and consignees, the cargo of this case, which is the cargo of this case, is 18 buses, and the cargo of this case which is lost due to the insured events of this case, is 6 buses, which are part of the cargo of this case, and the remainder of the cargo of this case, which are delivered to the consignee (or the holder of the bill of this case) and payment related to the cargo of this case, are confirmed as being delivered to the consignee of this case, and the plaintiff's right to the cargo of this case is not yet mentioned in the bill of this case's right to the cargo of this case. The plaintiff's right to the cargo of this case was not mentioned in the bill of this case's right to the cargo of this case as an insurance accident of this case. The plaintiff's right to the cargo of this case was not mentioned in the bill of this case's right to the cargo of this case.

Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff may exercise the above damage claim against the Defendant by subrogation, without holding or repaying the original copy of the cargo bill of this case, which has already lost its function as the distribution securities with respect to the cargo of this case. Accordingly, the Defendant’s above assertion is not acceptable.

4. Conclusion

Thus, the judgment of the court of first instance which dismissed the lawsuit of this case differently from the above conclusion is unfair, and thus, the appeal of the plaintiff is accepted and the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked, and the court of first instance decides to render a judgment on the merits by itself pursuant to the proviso of

In the case of this case, the plaintiff filed a claim for monetary payment in the first instance court, and added it as a selective claim for confirmation at the trial. The defendant should repay the plaintiff's claim that falls under the rehabilitation claim according to the rehabilitation plan as seen earlier. As such, in order to immediately order the defendant to pay the full amount of the above debt, execution judgment may conflict with the above rehabilitation plan against the defendant. The scope of the claim amount in this case, which the plaintiff has against the defendant, is judged the same as the claim amount in this case, the plaintiff's intent as to the execution method of the claim in this case, the plaintiff and the defendant's claim in this case as confirmed during the pleading, and all other circumstances revealed in pleading, are considered, and the part of the plaintiff's claim for confirmation among the selective claims in this case shall be determined separately, and the part of the claim for monetary payment shall not

According to the above review, the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for damages equivalent to 685,928,940 won and the damages for delay calculated by the ratio of 20% per annum under the Commercial Act from October 23, 2008, which is the date of occurrence of the insurance accident in this case, until January 11, 2012, which is the date of the judgment of the court of the first instance, the defendant's decision that it is reasonable to dispute about the existence and scope of the debt in this case, and from January 11, 2012, from the next day to the date of full payment. The defendant is disputing the existence and scope of the above claim, and the defendant has a legal interest to seek confirmation of the existence of the above claim. Thus, the claim for confirmation among the selective claims of the plaintiff in this case is justified within the above recognized limit, and the remainder of the claim should be dismissed as there is no reason.

It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judge Kang Jin-hun (Presiding Judge)