beta
(영문) 대법원 2012. 7. 12. 선고 2012도1474 판결

[특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(도주차량)·도로교통법위반(음주운전)·도로교통법위반(사고후미조치)][미간행]

Main Issues

The meaning of "when a person runs away without taking measures as provided in Article 54 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding a victim," and the standard for determining whether such person falls under such provision or standard

[Reference Provisions]

Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, Article 268 of the Criminal Act, Article 54 (1) of the Road Traffic Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 2005Do4459 Decided September 6, 2007, Supreme Court Decision 2007Do1738 Decided October 11, 2007 (Gong2007Ha, 1784) Supreme Court Decision 2008Do8627 Decided June 11, 2009

Escopics

Defendant

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendant

Judgment of the lower court

Suwon District Court Decision 201No4727 decided January 11, 2012

Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Suwon District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The phrase "when a driver runs away without taking measures under Article 54 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding and abetting the victim" as provided in Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes refers to cases where the driver of an accident deserts the accident site before fulfilling his/her duty under Article 54 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding and abetting the victim although he/she knows that the victim was killed and wounded, causing unaccomparability of who caused the accident. The purpose of Article 54 (1) of the Road Traffic Act is to prevent and eliminate traffic danger and impediments on the road and ensure safe and smooth traffic by ensuring safe and smooth traffic. In such cases, measures to be taken by the driver shall be considered to the extent ordinarily required in light of sound form, including the content and degree of the accident, and to the extent that such measures should be included in the identification of the victim of the accident and the person who is related to the traffic accident, such as the victim's or police officer, in light of the legislative purport of the Road Traffic Act and the victim's danger.

2. The lower court: (a) stated at an investigative agency that the victim Nonindicted Party stated, “I may have left the scene anywhere the victim would have left the scene, and have left the phone accurately in front of the vehicle,” and (b) stated, “I would not know where I would have left the front door of the vehicle of the Defendant because I could not discover the Defendant,” and “I would not come to the scene for about 20 minutes after the Defendant told the Defendant “I would leave the front door of the vehicle of the Defendant because I would not find the Defendant,” and “I would not go to the scene for about 10 minutes after I did not know that I would have been guilty of the Defendant’s violation of the Road Traffic Act, even if I did not take any other measures such as aiding the victims of the accident,” and “I would like to check the surrounding area to find the Defendant at the scene of the traffic accident, but did not look back to the victim’s violation of the Road Traffic Act, even if I did not know that I would not have any other measures such as aiding the victims at the scene of the accident.”

3. However, we cannot accept the above decision of the court below.

The following circumstances revealed through the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence duly admitted: ① the Defendant divided the conversation with the victim Nonindicted Party immediately after the accident; ② the Defendant left the scene of the accident after dividing the victim Nonindicted Party into the victim Nonindicted Party; ② the period of leaving the scene of the accident was about 10 to 15 minutes; and the Defendant was in the vicinity of the accident site (the Defendant stated that the Defendant was using a police officer’s friendship and telephone at a place less than 30 meters away from the accident site and the towing was taking measures by a vehicle). ③ The Nonindicted Party stated that he was not well aware of the Defendant’s escape at the investigative agency; ④ The reason why the Defendant escaped from the accident site appears to be for the Defendant’s phone call in relation to the personal life and accident of the police officer; ⑤ The Defendant stated that the police officer’s phone number was immediately a defect with the police officer, and that the police officer was in front of the accident site; and ④ The Defendant could not be readily concluded to have carried out a net order in light of the circumstances acknowledged within several minutes of the accident site.

Nevertheless, the court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance that found the Defendant guilty of the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes among the facts charged in this case and the violation of the Road Traffic Act due to the non-measures after the accident. In so determining, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (doing Vehicles) and the violation of the Road Traffic Act due to non-measures after the accident. The Defendant’s ground

4. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below on the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes and the part on the violation of the Road Traffic Act due to non-measures after the accident should be reversed. However, since each of the above crimes was sentenced to a single punishment for concurrent crimes between the violation of the Road Traffic Act and the violation of the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, the entire judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)