[2] The purport of Article 229(2) of the Civil Code, and whether the owner of a water course may be exempted pursuant to the above provision, even in cases where he/she arbitrarily changed the width of the waterway and the water course and caused inundation (negative)

[2] Article 229(2) of the Civil Code provides that "If the land on the water at the waterside belongs to the owner of a water course, the owner may alter the width of the water course and the water course," the right to use the water at the relation between the owner of the water course within the opposite bank. In such a case, the right to use the water at the water course refers to the right to use the water for a household or for agricultural and industrial purposes by changing the width of the water course and the water course. In addition, it cannot be viewed that the right to use the water at the water course should be exempted even if it causes damage to the owner of the water by arbitrarily changing the width of the water course and the water course.

1. As to the Defendants’ grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3

According to the facts established by the court below and records, the site of this case was owned by 5-month 1 and 6-month 10,000 nearby 7-month 20,000,000 nearby 7-month 10,000,000,000 nearby 7-month 20,000,000,000, and the size of the ground of this case was 5-month 1 and 7-month 6-day 2mm, and the Plaintiff was 6-day 7,000,000,000,000 nearby 1-month 7,000,000,000,000 were 6-month 7,000,000,000,000,000,000 were 1-month 6,000,000,000,000,00.

In light of the above facts, the court below is justified in holding that the defendants' act of prohibiting part of the water that flows naturally by reclaiming the existing drainage route of this case and newly installing the existing drainage route of this case with insufficient water circulation capacity is in violation of the provisions of Article 221 (1) of the Civil Code, and also the defendants' act of neglecting the risk of the accident without refusing the request, even though the plaintiff requested repair and extension of the existing drainage system of this case after the occurrence of the first accident of this case, in a situation where the subsequent accident is anticipated to occur after the occurrence of the first accident of this case, the defendants' act of neglecting the risk of the accident is also unlawful. The defendants' unlawful act of this case was caused by the first and second accident of this case.

In addition, Article 226(1) of the Civil Act provides that the owner of notice may pass through water on the lower land to construct a flood area or to ensure the flow of drinking water or for agricultural and industrial purposes, and it cannot be applied to this case where the Defendants buried the existing drainage route of this case where water flows naturally and installed the existing drainage route of this case where water flows naturally, and the water supply capacity is insufficient. Thus, the Defendants cannot assert that there is no negligence based on the above provision.

In addition, Article 229(2) of the Civil Act provides that the owner may change the width of the waterway and the water course when the land on both banks belongs to the owner of the water course. In such a case, the owner of the water course has the right to use the water for a household or for agricultural and industrial purposes by changing the width of the waterway and the water course. In addition, it cannot be deemed that the aforementioned provision provides that the owner of the water has the right to use the water for a household or for agricultural and industrial purposes by using the water in the relation between the owner of the water course and the water course. In addition, it cannot be deemed that the aforementioned provision provides that the owner of the water shall be exempted from liability even if he causes damage to the owner of the water by arbitrarily changing the width of the waterway and the water course. Thus, the defendants cannot assert that there is no negligence based on the above provision.

As alleged in the ground of appeal in the judgment below, there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation and application of Articles 221(1), 223, 226(1), and 229(2) of the Civil Act or in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the breach of duty of care and proximate causal relation in the liability of tort.

The Supreme Court precedents cited as the grounds of final appeal are inappropriate to be invoked in the instant case due to a different case.

2. As to the Defendants’ ground of appeal No. 1

In the reasoning of a written judgment, it is sufficient to indicate the judgment on the party’s allegations and other means of offence and defense to the extent that it can be recognized that the text is fair, and it is not necessary to determine all the parties’ allegations or means of offence and defense (see Article 208(2) of the Civil Procedure Act). Even if no specific and direct judgment on the party’s allegations is indicated in the judgment, it cannot be deemed an omission of judgment if it can be known that the allegations were accepted or rejected in light of the overall purport of the reasons for the judgment, and even if it is obvious that the assertion would be rejected even if the decision was not actually made, there is no error of omission of judgment since it does not affect the conclusion of the judgment (see Supreme Court Decisions 2006Da218, Jul. 10, 2008; 2006Da24872, Feb. 26, 2009).

The court below held that the defendants are liable to compensate for damages equivalent to the expenses incurred in repairing the instant landfill damaged by the accident of this case 1 and 2. Since it is clear that the instant landfill was included in the purport of rejecting the defendants' assertion that there is no liability to compensate for damages equivalent to the expenses incurred in repairing the instant landfill since the IMMMMMtech failed to obtain permission for a waste disposal business, and thus it is anticipated that the instant landfill will be destroyed and demolished, and in light of the relevant statutes and records, it cannot be concluded that the instant landfill was destroyed for the purpose of use and to be removed from the competent authorities. The issue of whether the IMMMMtech is entitled to obtain permission for a waste disposal business from the competent authorities is not likely to affect the plaintiff's claim against the defendants because the plaintiff suffered damages due to the defendants' joint tort while performing construction works for the instant landfill site from the EMMMMtech.

The judgment of the court below shall not contain any error of omission in judgment, contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal.

3. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

The fact-finding or determination of the ratio of comparative negligence in a damage compensation case due to a tort belongs to the exclusive authority of a fact-finding court unless it is deemed that it is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2001Da62251, 6268, Jan. 18, 202; 2010Da79947, Jan. 12, 2012).

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the record, the lower court’s fact-finding or its determination on the grounds for comparative negligence cannot be deemed significantly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity. This part of the grounds of appeal cannot be accepted.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeon Soo-ahn (Presiding Justice)