B. Whether the “right to negotiate” under the main sentence of Article 33(1) of the same Act includes the right to conclude a collective agreement (affirmative)

C. Whether the rules of a trade union, which provide that the general assembly shall have the right to vote in the consent to the conclusion of the collective agreement and the agreement and that the representative of a trade union shall enter into the collective agreement after deliberation by the expanded meeting of the union members on the results of collective bargaining and voting for union members, violates the above provisions of the

(b) The term "right to negotiate" of the representative of a trade union, as defined in the main sentence of Article 33(1) of the Trade Union Act, includes the right to conclude a collective agreement according to the results of negotiations, in addition to the right to collective bargaining

C. Article 33(1) of the Trade Union Regulations providing that a trade union shall have voting rights at a general meeting on the consent to the conclusion of the collective agreement and the agreement, and that the representative of the trade union shall conclude the collective agreement through a deliberation by the expanded committee of the collective bargaining outcomes and by vote for and against the union members, shall be deemed to be merely nominal by comprehensively and comprehensively limiting the power to conclude the collective agreement by putting the collective agreement on the authority of the representative or the delegated person to conclude the collective agreement. As such, it violates the purport of

1. On the first ground for appeal

According to the records, the order to revise and supplement the labor union rules of this case issued by the defendant is deemed to be in violation of Articles 20(1)9 and 92 of the Trade Union Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") and Articles 33(1) and 34(1) of the Trade Union Act among the rules of the plaintiff union, and thus, it constitutes an administrative disposition under Article 2(1) of the Administrative Litigation Act, which directly expresses to the plaintiff union, the other party to the order to properly revise and supplement the pertinent provisions of the union rules, by exercising the right to order under Article 16 of the Act, which is a public authority, as a law enforcement with regard to the specific facts.

In the same purport, the court below is just in rejecting the defendant's principal safety defense that the defendant's above corrective order does not fall under an administrative disposition subject to administrative litigation because it does not have the existence, maturity, and direct effectiveness of the above corrective order, and there is no violation of the legal principles like the theory of lawsuit. The argument

2. On the second and third grounds for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, Article 20 (1) 9 of the Rules of the plaintiff trade union provides that the right to vote on the collective agreement and consent to the conclusion of the collective agreement which the representative of the trade union submits at an extended meeting shall be deemed to have been held at the extended meeting, and Article 92 of the same Code provides that the collective bargaining committee shall decide on the union members' pro-con voting after deliberation by the extended meeting after sufficient negotiations, but the agreement and conclusion of the agreement shall not be made without the resolution of the general meeting; however, the above two provisions of the rules of the plaintiff trade union (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules of this case") shall be deemed to have an independent right to vote of the trade union in violation of Article 33 (1) and Article 34 (1) of the Act and shall be deemed to have no dispute over the essential limitations on the right to collective bargaining and the right to conclude the collective agreement held by the representative of the trade union pursuant to Article 33 (1) of the Act, and the right to collective bargaining shall not be interpreted independently from the parties to the collective bargaining agreement or its own authority to the agreement.

However, the main text of Article 33(1) of the Act provides that "the representative of a trade union or a person delegated by a trade union shall have the authority to negotiate on the conclusion of a collective agreement or other matters with an employer or an employer's organization for the trade union or union members." In this context, the term "right to negotiate" shall be interpreted as including the authority to conclude a collective agreement in addition to the authority to negotiate as a factual act and according to the result of negotiations. In addition, it shall be interpreted as including the authority to conclude a collective agreement in addition to the authority to conclude a collective agreement as an act of fact, and it shall be deemed that the representative of the Plaintiff trade union has the right to vote in the collective agreement and the consent to conclude a collective agreement as stated in the agreement of this case, and that the representative of the Plaintiff trade union shall execute a collective agreement after undergoing deliberation on the collective agreement and vote of the union members shall be deemed to have the power to conclude the collective agreement by comprehensively and comprehensively restricting the power to conclude the collective agreement, so it shall not be deemed that it violates the purport of Article 33(1) of the Act stipulating the authority of the representative

Therefore, the defendant's disposition of this case, which ordered the modification or supplementation of the rules, is legitimate, and the decision of the court below which judged that the defendant's disposition of this case is unlawful on the ground that the rules of this case are not unlawful, is erroneous in the misunderstanding of legal principles as to the right to conclude the collective agreement, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, and therefore, the ground for appeal pointing this out has merit.

3. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, we reverse the judgment below and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)