B. Whether the illegality of double prosecution remains in a case where there was an error of double prosecution at the time of prosecution but a new fact is pending due to changes in indictment after the prosecution (negative)

B. Even if there was an error of double prosecution at the time of prosecution, if the facts charged and the applicable provisions of law are legally changed, and a new fact continues to exist, it cannot be said that there exists an unlawful state in which double prosecution was made.

According to the judgment of the court of first instance, the effect of a public prosecution for habitual thief is identical to that of the case to which the public prosecutor has instituted a public prosecution, and the time limit to which the public prosecution takes effect should be based on the final time of sentencing, which is the most probable time to examine the facts. Thus, the public prosecutor's prosecution for habitual thief until the above time limit to which the public prosecution takes effect after instituting a public prosecution for habitual thief cannot be permitted as it constitutes a double prosecution for the same case where the public prosecution was instituted first, even though it is about thief after the crime of habitual thief who has instituted a public prosecution for which the public prosecution was instituted, it cannot be permitted as it constitutes a double prosecution for the same offense. Since the public prosecutor's indictment prior to the amendment of a public prosecution for this case constitutes 84 high136 high-class 136 high-class 138 high-level 82 high-level 138 high-level 138 high-level 1984 high-level 81.

In light of the facts charged as stated in the indictment and applicable provisions of law, the court shall conduct formal or substantive trials on them based on the facts charged as stated in the indictment or applicable provisions of law at the time of prosecution, not necessarily bound by the facts charged as at the time of prosecution, but at the time of sentencing, which is the final point at which the facts and applicable provisions of law are possible through the proceedings, the specific facts charged and applicable provisions of the case at this time shall be realistic subject to adjudication. Meanwhile, the prosecutor may modify the facts charged or applicable provisions of the case with permission of the court, and the court shall grant permission within the extent not impairing the identity of the case, so it is sufficient for the prosecutor to obtain permission of the court, and there is no limit to change them. In this case, on May 22, 1984, the prosecutor applied for a change of the facts charged as at 84No103, and the court permitted a change in the summary of the first instance trial proceedings against the defendant at the time of the first instance court's first instance trial, and thus, the victim's first instance judgment and the changed facts charged were subject to be excluded from comprehensive charges.

Therefore, although the court of first instance or the court below should have judged substantial deliberation and determination on the changed charges of arranging stolen goods in this case, it constitutes a crime of habitual larceny committed for the first time prior to the amendment of the indictment in this case 84 high-class 103 case, and thus, it constitutes double prosecution in relation to the 84 high-class 136 case, which was charged for the first time prior to the amendment of the indictment, and even if the facts charged were changed to the 84 high-class 103 case, the court below rendered a judgment dismissing public prosecution on the ground that it is also in a state of double prosecution and that the defects of double prosecution are not cured due to the amendment of the indictment are not cured. Thus, it is obvious that the court's subject and scope of the judgment and the legal principles on double prosecution as stipulated in Article 327 of

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below which dismissed the prosecutor's appeal and the part which dismissed the prosecution against the defendant among the judgment of the court of first instance as to the conciliation of stolen goods among the judgment of the court of first instance, shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the Daejeon District Court Panel which is the first instance court pursuant to Article 393 of the Criminal Procedure Act for a new trial and determination

Justices Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Justice)