2. In light of the difference between the original court and the appellate court’s method of evaluation of credibility in accordance with the spirit of the principle of substantial direct examination adopted by the Criminal Procedure Act as an element of the trial-oriented principle, the appellate court should not reverse without permission the lower court’s judgment on the sole ground that the lower court’s determination on the credibility of the statement made by the witness was clearly erroneous in light of the contents of the original judgment and the evidence duly examined by the original court, or that it is clearly unreasonable to maintain the original court’s determination on the credibility of the statement made by the witness in light of the results of examination and the evidence duly examined by the original court and the result of additional examination by the time of closing argument in the appellate court, unless there are exceptional circumstances where it is deemed that maintaining the original court’s determination on the credibility of the statement made by the witness in the original instance is clearly unreasonable, and the appellate court should not reverse without permission on the ground that the lower court’s determination on the credibility of the statement made by the witness in the original instance differs from the appellate court’s determination (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2018Do1748).

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Do2714, Jun. 28, 2007; Supreme Court Decision 2010Do14587, Sept. 29, 201). Furthermore, F and E, separately from the intent to agree with the above resolution, are merely general closing members, and they were not subject to attendance at the 9th board of directors, and they were to exercise the same for the purpose of exercising the same even though they were not present.