(b) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act;

(c) Injury;

(d) Violence;

(e) Violation of the Act on Special Cases concerning Regulation and Punishment of Speculative Acts, etc.

(f) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act;

(g) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (joint coercion);

(h) Fraud;

(i) Violation of Emergency Medical Treatment Act;

(j) Interference with business;

(k) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act;

C. Violation of the Military Service Act

D. Violation of the Automobile Management Act

2. A. f. (f) Gaz. B

3. A.k.T.

4. A.k. D

5. (a)(c) E;

6. (a) F

(j) G;

8. A.k. H

9.(a) I

10. A.m. J

11. (a) J.C.K.

12. L. Gaz. L.

13.(a)(b)(j) M

14.(a)(b)(j)(m)(N)

P, Attorney P and Q (for the defendant)

509, 632(Joint Judgment)

Defendant J and N order the above provisional payment of an amount equivalent to the above fine. Of the facts charged against Defendant A, the prosecution against each of the assaults is dismissed. Defendant B, C, D, F, G, H and K. L appeals are all dismissed.

A. Defendants

(1) misunderstanding of facts

Although Defendant C was unable to respond to a call notice while being hospitalized due to arbitrosis and did not intend to evade the duty of military service, the court below found Defendant C guilty of this part of the facts charged. The judgment of the court below is erroneous in misunderstanding of facts.

2) Unreasonable sentencing

The sentencing of the lower court against the Defendants is too unreasonable.

(b) Prosecutors;

The lower court’s sentencing against Defendant A is too uncomfortable.

2. Determination

A. Ex officio determination

1) Defendant A

The judgment on the grounds for appeal by the Defendant A and the Prosecutor is examined ex officio prior to the judgment on the grounds for appeal by the Defendant. Each of the facts charged against the Defendant A is a crime falling under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Act, which cannot be prosecuted against the victim’s express intent under Article 260(3) of the Criminal Act. According to the agreement in the name of Victim EH submitted to the lower court on August 22, 2012, which was prior to the judgment of the lower court, the victim EH withdrawn his/her wish to punish the Defendant, and thus, the prosecution against each of the facts charged against the Defendant A in accordance with Article 327 subparag. 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act was dismissed. However, the lower court determined that the Defendant committed the above violence and all of the remaining facts charged are guilty, and sentenced to a single punishment on the grounds that the part against the Defendant A cannot be exempted from the entire reversal.

2) Defendant J, N

The judgment on the grounds of appeal by Defendant J and N ex officio is examined as follows. The crime of violating the Automobile Management Act by Defendant J and N is committed on October 5, 2011, Article 6 of the Addenda to the Automobile Management Act (amended by Act No. 10721, May 24, 201) and Article 82 Subparag. 1 and Article 10(5) of the former Automobile Management Act (amended by Act No. 10721, May 24, 2011; hereinafter the same shall apply). The statutory punishment is a fine not exceeding one million won, and no imprisonment is imposed. The lower court, in contrast to this, selected imprisonment for the crime of violating the Automobile Management Act by Defendant J and N, and rendered a single sentence by deeming that the remaining crimes and the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act are concurrent crimes, and thus, the part on Defendant J and N cannot be exempted from all destruction of the judgment of the lower court.

B. Judgment on the assertion of mistake of fact

The phrase "justifiable cause" under Article 88 (1) of the Military Service Act, which is a punishment provision for evading enlistment, is, in principle, premised on the existence of abstract military service duty and the acknowledgement of its performance. However, it shall be deemed that there is a reason that can justify the non-performance of the military service specified by the decision of the Commissioner of the Military Manpower Administration, i.e., diseases, etc., the responsibility for the non-performance of the military service (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Do2965, Jul. 15, 2004; 201Do13804, Dec. 22, 201). In light of the following circumstances, the court below's duly adopted and examined the evidence at the meeting of the court below to find out the credibility of the above case, i.e., the period from 10 to 210 days before the date of call-up of the regional military manpower office, and the employees of the court below who did not directly respond to the notice of unfair sentencing by the defendant C16.

1) Considering the fact that Defendants E, I, E, I, I, and M have committed the instant crime even if they had the same criminal records in several times, strict punishment on Defendants E, I, and M is necessary.

However, Defendant E, I, and M are often divided into their own mistakes, and when Defendant E, I, and M were tried to be punished by Defendant E, I, and M by mutual consent with the victim DA and DB. The degree of participation in the instant crime by Defendant E, I, and M, and taking into account the degree of participation in the instant crime by Defendant E, I, and M, and other conditions of sentencing specified in the instant pleadings, such as Defendant E, I, M’s age, character, conduct and environment, motive, means, and consequence of the instant crime, the lower court’s punishment against Defendant E, I, and M is deemed to be too unfair, and thus, Defendant E, I, and M’s above assertion is reasonable.

2) Defendant B, C, D, F, G, H, K, L B, D, F, G, G, H. H.K and L are divided into all of their mistakes, and Defendant C is divided into some of his mistakes, and Defendant C, D, H, and K agree with the victim BP at the lower court.

However, even if Defendant B, C, D, F, G, H, K, and L had been tried for the same kind of crime, again commits the instant crime despite the fact that the nature of the instant crime is not good, Defendant B, C, D, D, F, G, H, H, K, and L’s participation in the instant crime, and taking into account the degree of participation in the instant crime, Defendant B, C, D, F, G, H, K, and L’s age, character and conduct and environment, motive, means, and consequence of the instant crime, and other conditions of sentencing specified in the pleadings, such as the circumstances after the commission of the crime, etc., the lower court’s sentence against Defendant B, C, D, F, G, H, H, H, K, and L is too unreasonable. Thus, all of the aforementioned arguments are without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, since the appeal by Defendant B, C, D, F, G, H, K, and L is without merit, all of them are dismissed under Article 3644(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the appeal by Defendant E, I, and M is with merit. Since the part on Defendant A, J, and N among the judgment of the court below is reversed ex officio as seen above, the judgment of the court below on the allegation on unfair sentencing by Defendant A, J, and N under Article 364(6) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act is reversed, and the part on Defendant A, E, I, J, M, and N among the judgment of the court below is reversed, and it is again decided as follows after the pleading.

Criminal facts

Defendant A, E, I, J, M, and N's criminal facts are as follows: 6 months of imprisonment with prison labor for 12 years of probation for 6 months of probation, 2 years of probation for 5 months of probation; 3 years of probation for 5 years of probation for 1 year and 6 months of probation for 3 years of probation for 1 year and 6 months of probation, 3 years of probation for 3 years of probation for 3 years of probation for 30 years of probation for 30 years of probation; 5 years of probation for 30 pages and 5) for 30 pages or 9; 5 years of probation for 30 pages or 30 shall be as stated in the corresponding column of the judgment of the court below for 369 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

The summary of the evidence of the criminal facts of Defendant A, E, I, J, M, and N recognized by this Court is the same as the corresponding column of the judgment of the court below, and thus, they are cited in accordance with Article 369 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Application of Statutes

1. Article applicable to criminal facts;

A. Defendant A: Article 4(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (as a whole, referring to the act of a criminal organization), Articles 3(1) and 2(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 257(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act (the act of carrying and injuring dangerous articles on October 5, 201), Articles 3(1) and 2(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Article 257(1) of the Criminal Act (the act of carrying and injuring dangerous articles on June 8, 2010), Article 257(1) of the Criminal Act (the act of causing injury) and Article 30(1)1 of the Act on Special Cases concerning Regulation and Punishment of Speculative Acts, etc. (amended by Act No. 11034, Aug. 4, 2011)

(b) Defendant E: Article 4(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (hereafter collectively referred to as "criminal organization activities"), Articles 3(1) and 2(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 257(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act, and the main sentence of Article 88(1)2 of the Military Service Act;

(c) Defendant I: Article 4(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (hereafter collectively referred to as "criminal organization's activities"), Articles 3(1) and 2(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 257(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act

(d) Defendant J: Article 4(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (as a whole, joining and conducting criminal organizations), Articles 3(1) and 2(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 257(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act, Articles 82 subparag. 1 and 10(5) of the former Automobile Management Act (as a result, concealing the registration license plate);

(e) Defendant M: Article 4(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (hereinafter referred to as "criminal organization's admission and activities"), Articles 3(1) and 2(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 257(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act, Articles 60(1)1 and 12 of the former Emergency Medical Service Act (amended by Act No. 11004, Aug. 4, 201; hereinafter the same shall apply), Articles 314(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act, Articles 30 (1) and 30 (Interference with Duties) of the Criminal Act

(f) Defendant N: Article 4(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (hereinafter referred to as "criminal organization's admission and activities"), Articles 3(1) and 2(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 257(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act, Articles 60(1)1 and 12 of the former Emergency Medical Service Act, Article 30 of the Criminal Act, Articles 314(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act, Articles 347(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act, Articles 82 subparag. 1 and 10(5) of the former Automobile Management Act

1. Commercial competition;

(a) Defendant A: Articles 40 and 50 of the Criminal Act (the composition and activities of an organization, etc.) and each violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the act of causing injury to a group, deadly weapon, etc.) on October 5, 2011, and punishment provided for a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the composition and activities of an organization, etc.) with heavier punishment;

(b) Defendant E, I, and J: Articles 40 and 50 of each Criminal Act (a punishment imposed on a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (Composition and Activities of Organizations, etc.) and a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a collective action, a deadly weapon, etc.), and a punishment imposed on a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. (a

(c) Defendant M. N: The crimes under Articles 40 and 50 of each Criminal Act (organization and activities of organizations, etc.) and the crimes of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (organization, deadly weapons, etc.), the punishment imposed on each of the crimes of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (organization and activities of organizations, etc.), the punishment of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (organization and activities of organizations, etc.), the punishment of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (organization and activities of organizations, etc.), each of the crimes of interference with business, and the punishment imposed on each of the crimes of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc.

1. Selection of punishment;

Defendant A’s violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the composition and activity of an organization, etc.), shall be sentenced to limited imprisonment, each injury, each violation of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Regulation and Punishment of Speculative Acts, etc., and each choice of imprisonment for fraud.

1. Aggravation for repeated crimes;

Defendant A: As to the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the composition, activity of an organization, etc.), on June 8, 2010 (the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act), on violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the injury by group, deadly weapons, etc.), on November 5, 2010, and the violation of the Act on Special Cases concerning Regulation and Punishment of Speculative Acts, etc.: Provided, That with respect to the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the organization, activity of an organization, etc.), the proviso to Article 42 of the Criminal Act shall be limited, and with respect to the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the proviso to Article 42 of the former Criminal Act) on June 8, 2010 (the proviso to Article 10259 of the same Act).

1. Aggravation for concurrent crimes;

Defendant A: The punishment provided for in the former part of Article 37, Article 38(1)2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act for a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. (Composition and Activities of Organizations, etc.) with the largest punishment shall be more severe, and the punishment shall be limited to the proviso of Article 42 of the Criminal Act)

(b) Defendant E and M: The punishment provided for in the former part of Article 37, Article 38 (1) 2, and Article 50 of each Criminal Act and the punishment provided for in the Punishment of Violence, etc. Act (a violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violences, etc. (a collective action, a deadly weapon, etc.) against a victim DA, of the largest criminal situation);

(c) Defendant I: the former part of Article 37, Article 38(1)2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act (aggravated Punishment of Violence, etc. (aggravated Punishment, etc. (aggravated Punishment, etc. of Victims with Severe Crimes)

(d) Defendant J: Imprisonment with prison labor for a crime of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc., injury by a deadly weapon, etc.), which is heavier than that of a victim DA, and fines prescribed in the Automobile Management Act, among the crimes of violation of the former part of Article 37, Article 38 (1) 2 and 3, and each subparagraph of Article 50 of the Criminal Act, and fines prescribed in the crime of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc., Act (a

(e) Defendant N: Imprisonment with prison labor and a fine prescribed for a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc., an injury by a deadly weapon, etc.), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the composition and activities of an organization, etc.), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the composition and activities of an organization, etc.), with respect to a crime of fraud, with the heavier criminal penalty against a victim DA, for a concurrent crime resulting from a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. (a group, deadly weapon, etc., an injury by a deadly weapon, etc.)

1. Discretionary mitigation;

(a) Defendant A and M: Articles 53 and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act;

B. Defendant J and N: Articles 53 and 55(1)3 and 6 of the Criminal Code

1. Detention in a workhouse;

Defendant J, N: Articles 70 and 69(2) of each Criminal Code

1. Order of provisional payment;

Defendant J, N: Reasons for sentencing of Article 334(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

1. Defendant A

Considering that Defendant A had the same criminal record at several times, committed part of the crime of this case during the period of repeated crime, and Defendant A acted as the leader of the instant criminal organization, strict punishment against Defendant A is necessary.

However, the fact that Defendant A is divided in depth of his mistake, Defendant A agreed with Victim EH and EN in the original trial, and the victim DA and DB agreed with the victim at the time of the trial, and the above victims did not want to be punished for Defendant A. The degree of participation in the crime of this case, Defendant A’s age, character and conduct and environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime of this case, and other circumstances after the crime were considered in the oral argument of this case and determine punishment as ordered.

2. Defendant J, N

Considering the fact that Defendant J and N committed the instant crime even if they had been tried for the same kind of crime, strict punishment on Defendant J and N is necessary.

However, Defendant J and N divide their own mistake in depth, Defendant N agree with the victim DE and DF at the original trial, Defendant J. N did not want to be punished by Defendant J and N by mutual consent with the victim D and DB, Defendant J. The degree of participation in the instant crime by Defendant J. N, N’s age, character and conduct, environment, motive, means and consequence of the instant crime, etc., and other conditions of sentencing as indicated in the instant argument, such as the circumstances after the crime, etc., shall be determined as the order.

Public Prosecution Rejection Parts

The summary of each assault among the facts charged against Defendant A is about 04:50 on March 1, 201, and around 603, 201, Defendant A assaulted by the victim EH, who was in an internal relationship with Defendant A, by reporting the details of telephone with other males in the Seo-gu office of Busan, Seo-gu, Busan, about 603, when the victim EH was involved in the telegraph of the victim EH, and around June 19, 201, on the ground that the victim EH was in contact with other males, around 301, the victim EH was in contact with the other male. As seen in Article 327 subparagraph 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act, this part of the prosecution is dismissed in accordance with Article 327 subparagraph 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Judges, Senior Superintendent

Judges Cho Jae-il