The 90 days of detention days after the appeal against Defendant A two years of age shall be included in the original sentence.

1. We examine Defendant B’s defense counsel’s ground of appeal No. 1 and Defendant E’s defense counsel’s ground of appeal No. 1. The gist of the ground of appeal is that the judgment below erred by misapprehending Article 22(1)(b) of the Agreement under Article 4 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea (hereinafter “Agreement”).

In other words, on October 17, 1972, the Republic of Korea declares the Decree of Emergency Martial Law to be discharged from the Republic of Korea, and the provisions of Article 22(1)(b) of the Agreement are suspended so that the United States authorities have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the members of the United States Armed Forces, and the Republic of Korea authorities lose jurisdiction over the members of the United States Armed Forces. Accordingly, even if the case occurred before the declaration of emergency martial law, such as this case, and exercises jurisdiction over the Republic of Korea, the application of Article 22(1)(b) of the Agreement on Criminal Trials is only suspended immediately and the United States authorities have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction until martial law is rescinded, and the provisions of this Agreement only stipulate that the application is suspended until the declaration of martial law is rescinded, and this belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction jurisdiction of the United States authorities of America, which is pending in the Republic of Korea court. In addition, since there is no provision that the court of the Republic of Korea has jurisdiction over the case under the premise that the court of the Republic of Korea should have jurisdiction over the case.

On August 29, 1972, when the case was prosecuted to the Seoul District Criminal Court, and the case was pending in that court on October 17, 1972, when the Emergency Martial Law was declared to be discharged from the Republic of Korea on December 13, 1972, and the said case was released on December 13, 197, and until the said martial law was declared, the court of the Republic of Korea has jurisdiction or jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea with respect to this case, and in light of Article 22, Paragraph 1 (b) of the Agreed Minutes, first, if the Republic of Korea declared martial law, the application of Article 22, Paragraph 1 (b) of the Agreement has been immediately suspended in all areas of the Republic of Korea under martial law, and second, the United States military authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over the members of the United States Armed Forces in areas under martial law until the martial law was rescinded.

In other words, since the application of the provisions on jurisdiction of the court of the Republic of Korea is suspended in the area where martial law is declared, it is clear that the minutes provide for the issue of which the period of suspension of this Article is what is the time of the period of suspension of the meeting of the United States Armed Forces because of the suspension of the application of the provisions on jurisdiction of the court of the Republic of Korea.

In other words, at the same time, courts of the Republic of Korea cannot immediately exercise jurisdiction at the time when martial law was declared. However, since the moment when martial law was rescinded, it cannot be exercised until martial law was rescinded, the jurisdiction of courts of the Republic of Korea immediately is recognized as a natural interpretation of the provisions of this Agreed Governing minutes, which provide that the jurisdiction of courts of the Republic of Korea shall be returned to the normal state before martial law was declared. In fact, when martial law is declared in the Republic of Korea, the special measure taken that the crimes committed by the members of the United States armed forces of the Republic of Korea shall not be set at the courts of the Republic of Korea, and when the order of the Republic of Korea is operated normally, it shall be understood as natural in light of the purpose of this Agreement between the two countries. Accordingly, once the martial law was rescinded, as in this case, once the court of the Republic of Korea agreed upon and tried after the declaration of martial law, the court of the Republic of Korea does not exercise jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the minutes of this case after the declaration of martial law after the declaration of martial law pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement. There is no error in the court below’s or its reasoning.

2. Of the grounds of appeal by the defense counsel of the defendant et al., the court below examined the grounds of appeal to the effect that there was an error of fact finding, violation of the rules of evidence, or mistake of facts in the process of recognizing the facts charged by each defendant. Even if the records of this case were to be recorded, it is clear that the court below recognized the facts as legitimate evidence by legitimate evidence procedure in the process of recognizing the facts charged in this case, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or

3. Of the grounds of appeal by Defendant D’s defense counsel E and Defendant F’s defense counsel F, we examine whether the lower judgment erred by cruel sentencing.

Article 338 of the Criminal Act, which is a robbery, provides for a statutory punishment for imprisonment with labor for a limited term. The court below, after selecting both the two types of life for the first time, determined that the defendant, etc. committed any contingent crime under the circumstances where the defendant, etc. did not go to mental and physical disorder by taking drinking and interesting at many places on the day of the crime, the character and behavior of the defendants, the age of the defendants are still unasy, and the defendant, etc., as soldiers of the U.S. in the U.S., who were killed in action for the defense of the Republic of Korea, or under the circumstances of those who are currently under such duties, have been sentenced to imprisonment with labor for a limited term of ten years, taking into account the sentence of the punishment, and therefore, it is clear that the argument on this point is without merit.

As shown above, all appeals are dismissed as without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Young-young (Presiding Justice)