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(영문) 대법원 1999. 7. 23. 선고 99다19346 판결

[손해배상(자)][공1999.9.1.(89),1735]

Main Issues

[1] Whether a driver of a motor vehicle who operates a motor vehicle along his/her own lane on an expressway where a yellow-ray median line is installed has a duty of care to expect the driver of the motor vehicle to commit a collision with the median line (negative with qualification)

[2] In a case where a motor vehicle running along a central line is in conflict with a motor vehicle running under speed on the opposite line, whether the driver is negligent (negative with qualification)

Summary of Judgment

[1] Generally, a motor vehicle driver who operates a road along which a median line is marked along his/her own bus line is believed to maintain his/her own bus line. Thus, unless there are special circumstances that could anticipate the abnormal operation of the other motor vehicle, the other motor vehicle does not have the duty of care to drive the other motor vehicle even if the other motor vehicle enters the median line, and even if the motor vehicle is permitted beyond both sides of the road, it is inevitable to extend the median line due to such urgent circumstances as the driver does not take other appropriate measures to avoid obstacles in light of the objective conditions at the time of beyond the median line, or the traffic in the opposite direction goes beyond the median line only in special circumstances, such as where the driver does not take sufficient attention to the traffic of the opposite direction and goes beyond the opposite line, and thus, it is not necessary to exercise the duty of care to drive the motor vehicle on the opposite line of the yellow line, barring special circumstances such as where he/she knew or could have known.

[2] In a case where a motor vehicle running over the median line conflicts with a motor vehicle running under speed on the opposite line, it cannot be caused by negligence on the ground that the driver only driven the motor vehicle in excess of the speed limit, and if the driver did not drive the motor vehicle under speed, it may not be caused by negligence, and if there were circumstances that the driver could immediately avoid collision with the other motor vehicle at the speed of stopping or reduction, it may be deemed that the driver was negligent.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 750 of the Civil Act, Article 13 (2) of the Road Traffic Act, Article 10 (1) [Attachment] 6 of the Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act / [2] Article 750 of the Civil Act, Article 15 of the Road Traffic Act

Reference Cases

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Da9169 delivered on August 9, 1991 (Gong1991, 2319), Supreme Court Decision 94Da18003 delivered on September 9, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2618), Supreme Court Decision 95Da28700 delivered on October 12, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3744), Supreme Court Decision 96Da39158 delivered on January 24, 1997 (Gong197Sang, 638) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 90Do1656 delivered on October 26, 199 (Gong190, 247)

[Judgment of the court below]

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Law Firm Busan Dong-dong, Attorneys Maximum Don-won, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, Appellant and Supplementary Appellee

Defendant 1 and one other (Attorney Choi Byung-hoon, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Busan District Court Decision 98Na3587 delivered on February 19, 1999

Text

The part of the lower judgment against the Defendants is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to Busan District Court Panel Division. All of the Plaintiffs’ supplemental appeals are dismissed, and the costs of incidental appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the Defendants’ grounds of appeal

A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected Defendant 1's fault on April 15, 1995, on the ground that the deceased non-party 1 driven a elart truck (hereinafter referred to as "accident truck") around 05:40 on April 15, 1995, and her wife Non-party 2, her wife, her husband, her husband, her husband, her wife, her husband, her husband, her husband, her wife, her husband, her husband, and her wife 3 at a very rapid speed to board the aircraft departing from Daegu Port of Daegu on the same day 06:30 on the same day, and Defendant 1 was negligent in driving a 11t truck (hereinafter referred to as "accident truck") at the point where the accident occurred on the left-hand side of the driver's right-hand side of the road of this case, and found the accident that occurred on the front-hand side of the driver's right-hand side of the vehicle of this case.

B. However, in general, a motor vehicle driver who operates a road with a median line along his/her own bus line is believed to maintain his/her own bus line. Thus, barring any special circumstance that could anticipate the abnormal operation of the other motor vehicle, the other motor vehicle does not have a duty of care to drive the other motor vehicle even when she intrudes upon the median line (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da9169, Aug. 9, 191; 96Da39158, Jan. 24, 197; 96Da39158, Jan. 24, 197). However, even if a motor vehicle is the median line that is permitted to go beyond both sides of the road, it is inevitable for the driver to take other appropriate measures to avoid obstacles in light of the objective condition at the time of the road crossing, and thus, it is difficult to say that it is beyond the median line, barring special circumstances where it goes beyond the median line with the median line, and thus, it should be permitted.

However, as recognized by the court below, if the vessel’s age at the time of the instant accident did not exceed 50m of visibilitys on the expressway, 50m of the truck (on the premise that the core location is 50m or more, and the speed of the road at the time of the instant accident should be reduced by 50% pursuant to Article 12(2)2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Road Traffic Act. Thus, Defendant 1, at the time of the instant accident, should have continued operation of the vessel at the speed of 80 km per hour, at the time of the instant accident’s initial restriction at the point of 90 km, even if the vessel’s age could not have been 9m or 5m of the accident’s speed. Furthermore, Defendant 1 could not have predicted that the vessel’s speed was 10m or more of the accident’s speed at the time of the instant accident, which would have been 10m more than 5m prior to the instant accident. Furthermore, Defendant 1 would not have been able to have been 5m or more than 5m of the accident’s.

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which made it easy for the defendants to easily dismiss the defense for the exemption of liability.

The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

2. As to the grounds of incidental appeal by the plaintiffs

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts, etc. as stated in its judgment as to the accident of this case after compiling the evidence adopted in its judgment, and assessed that the negligence of the plaintiff competing with the accident of this case was 70%, and as seen above, it is difficult to deem that the accident of this case occurred due to the negligence of the defendant on the ground that the accident of this case was caused due to the negligence of the defendant on the part of the defendant, the argument in the ground of appeal that the defendant should recognize the negligence of the defendant on the premise of the circumstance different from the facts admitted by the court below is without merit, and it is not unreasonable in light of the principle of equity even if the court below's fact-finding is followed.

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendants shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The plaintiffs' incidental appeal shall be dismissed, and the incidental appeal costs shall be assessed against the plaintiffs who have lost, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating

Justices Cho Chang-hoon (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-부산지방법원 1999.2.19.선고 98나3587