January 20, 2015

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. The defendant's disposition of collection of each medical care benefit cost against the plaintiff on September 23, 2013 shall be revoked.

The reasoning for the court's explanation on this case is as follows: "At the sixth bottom of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, employee is fine"; "At the second part of the second part of the second part of the reasoning of the judgment, Doz."; "At the first part of the 7th part of the 12th part of the 12th part of the 7th part, Doz." "at the second part of the 201th part of the 11th part of the 11th part of the 11th part of the 11th part of the 2013th part of the 201th part of the 201th part of the 2013th part of the 2013th part of the 2013 part of the 11th part of the 2013 part of the 2nd part of the 2013 part of the 2nd part of the 2nd part of the 2nd part of the 2nd part of the judgment.

2. Parts to be determined additionally

A. The Plaintiff entered into an employment contract with Nonparty 2, who is a doctor, and did not know the fact that the instant hospital was the so-called “office-type hospital” established by Nonparty 1. The Plaintiff asserted to the effect that it is very unfair to consider it as the subject of the medical care benefit collection disposition. However, as the first instance court properly held, it is difficult to believe that each of the instant hospital Nos. 14 and 15 was stated, and as the first instance court decided to establish the instant hospital and to employ its employees, Nonparty 1 actually decided to establish the instant hospital, and distributed profits to investors while managing the revenues of the instant hospital. The Plaintiff entered into a contract with Nonparty 1 to receive KRW 12 million monthly and her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her she was aware of the fact that the Plaintiff was not aware of the termination of the employment contract with Nonparty 2 (the Plaintiff’s her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her).

B. In addition, Articles 30(2), 53(1)2, and 69 of the former Medical Service Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8366 of Apr. 11, 2007) limit the qualifications of a medical institution founder, etc. Meanwhile, if a medical person was employed by a person who is unable to establish a medical institution and provides medical services, it strictly prohibits a person who is not qualified to establish a medical institution from establishing a medical institution, such as setting the grounds for suspending license qualifications, etc. Where he/she provided medical services, by providing for criminal punishment, thereby contributing to protecting and promoting national health by providing for the appropriate method of medical care. Also, Article 40(1) of the former National Health Insurance Act (wholly amended by Act No. 9022 of Mar. 28, 2008; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that medical care benefits shall be provided at a “medical institution established under the Medical Service Act” and Article 20(1) of the former Medical Service Act provides that the relevant medical institution shall be recovered in proportion to the amount of medical care benefits in question.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Lee Young-chul (Presiding Judge)

(1) On April 17, 2013, the Plaintiff directly stated the above part of the “name No. 100” in the interrogation protocol of the prosecution by the prosecution on April 17, 2013 and affixed a seal to the hindrance.

2) The Plaintiff also stated the said part of her frier’s flusium in a flusium and affixed a seal to the flusium.

3) The Plaintiff asserted that the content of the Plaintiff’s statement in the interrogation protocol of April 17, 2013, which was written by the Prosecutor’s Office, was not merely a clear confluence of the Plaintiff based on written questions, etc. after the Plaintiff retired from the instant hospital and the instant case was at issue, and that there was no credibility since the Plaintiff was aware at the time of the Plaintiff’s employment in the instant hospital. However, as seen earlier, in light of the fact that the Plaintiff’s statement and the method of expression, etc. indicated in the instant interrogation protocol, are very detailed and detailed, and that the Plaintiff actively added it to the written statement or made partial amendments, it does not appear that the said statement was merely a remote confluence based on written questions or that it was entirely unaware at the time of employment.