[2] In a case where a customer is fully aware of the content of a standardized contract, whether the business entity is obligated to separately explain the content of the standardized contract (negative), and whether the same applies to the case where the content of the standardized contract is general and common in the transaction because it is sufficiently anticipated without an explanation, or where it is merely a mere explanation of what has already been stipulated by the law (affirmative)

[2] In light of the legislative intent of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions which imposes an obligation on an enterpriser to explain the important contents of the terms and conditions to the customer so that the customer can understand them, it is reasonable to deem that the terms and conditions are the content of the contract and have binding force on the party concerned. This is also true in cases where a business operator does not have to explain the contents of the terms and conditions separately to the customer, since the contents of the terms and conditions are general and common in transactions, so it is sufficiently anticipated that the business operator may not explain them to the customer. This is also true in cases where the business operator does not have to explain the contents of the terms and conditions in general and common, or where it is merely

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. Article 3(3) of the former Housing Lease Protection Act (amended by Act No. 12043, Aug. 13, 2013; hereinafter “former Housing Lease Protection Act”) provides that the assignee of a rental house that has met the requirements for counterclaim under Article 3(1) of the same Act shall be deemed to have succeeded to the status of the lessor. As such, if a rental house is transferred, the assignee shall be deemed to have succeeded to all the rights and obligations under the lease contract of the lessor by combining the ownership of the house with the ownership of the house. As a result, the assignee shall be exempted from the obligation to return the lease deposit, and the transferor shall be exempted from the obligation to return the lease deposit to the lessee by withdrawing from the lease relationship (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Da49523, Jan. 17, 2013). This likewise applies where a lessee establishes a pledge on the deposit to return the lease deposit and the lessor is transferred after the establishment of the pledge after the establishment thereof.

B. The lower court: (a) held that the obligor of the claim for the return of the lease deposit, which was the object of the pledge, and the lessor, the pledgee, were liable to return the deposit established with the pledge; and (b) accepted the Defendant’s claim for the exemption for the following reasons. In other words, Nonparty 1 was the lessee with the opposing power over the instant apartment; (c) Nonparty 2 acquired the ownership of the instant apartment and succeeded to the status of the lessor against Nonparty 1; and (d) thus, the Defendant would be exempted from the obligation to return the lease deposit. There is no basis to view otherwise on the ground that the lessor consented to the establishment of the pledge against the claim

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the foregoing legal doctrine, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the validity of Articles 349(2) and 451(1) of the Civil Act and Article 3(3) of the former Housing Lease Act, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

A. Comprehensively taking account of the legislative purport of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions that imposes an obligation on an enterpriser to explain the important contents of a standardized contract to the customer so that the customer can understand them, it is reasonable to deem that the standardized contract is the content of the contract and is binding on the party concerned. This is also true in the case where a business operator is a general and common transaction of the standardized contract and thus, it is sufficiently anticipated that the contents of the standardized contract may not be provided to the customer. This is also true in the case where the business operator does not have to explain the contents of the standardized contract to the customer, or where it is simply a matter that the business operator does not have to provide any separate explanation or that it has already been provided by the Acts and subordinate statutes. However, the business operator who asserts the standardized contract must prove that there are special circumstances where the business operator does not need to separately explain the contents of the standardized contract to the customer (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 201Da1990, Jul. 15

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, in the “written consent to the establishment of a pledge and a written promise to refund a deposit for lease,” signed by the Defendant, the following facts are revealed: “In the event that the owner (a lessee) of a house is changed due to the sale and purchase of a leased object, you have been treated as a deposit loan at your company, stating the content of the pledge establishment and the fact that it applies to the new owner, and notify you of the content of the terms and conditions.” However, even if examining the record, there is no evidence to support that the terms and conditions of the above contract are general and common in the transaction as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal, and thus, it

Examining these circumstances in light of the aforementioned legal principles, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the duty to specify and explain the terms and conditions, which are important contents of the terms and conditions, and thereby did not adversely affect the conclusion of the judgment, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jung-hwa (Presiding Justice)