[2] Whether the sales contract becomes absolutely null and void on the ground that there is no own intent or self-employed intent at the time of conclusion of the farmland sales contract (negative)

[2] The certificate of sale and purchase of farmland is an effective requirement for acquiring ownership of farmland, and regardless of whether the certificate of sale and purchase of farmland is issued, the contractual effect of the sales contract continues to exist. Thus, the intent of self-defensing or self-defensing is more necessary than at the time of acquisition of ownership of farmland than at the time of conclusion of the sales contract for farmland. Even if there is no intention of self-defensing or self-defensing at the time of conclusion of the

B. The Defendant (Counterclaim) shall not interfere with the possession of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) on each real estate listed in the separate sheet.

2. All of the counterclaim claims filed by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) against the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) are dismissed.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) through the principal lawsuit and counterclaim.

Counterclaim Claim: The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant; hereinafter the plaintiff is only the plaintiff) shall implement the procedure for registration of cancellation of provisional registration for the preservation of each transfer of ownership rights, which was completed on June 19, 1989 with the receipt of No. 12443 of the Daejeon District Court on each real estate stated in the separate sheet, to the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff; hereinafter the plaintiff is only the defendant). The plaintiff shall transfer each of the above land to the defendants.

The following facts are without dispute between the parties, or evidence of subparagraph 1-1 through 4, evidence of subparagraph 2-1 through 4, evidence of subparagraph 3-1, evidence of subparagraph 4, evidence of subparagraph 5, evidence of subparagraph 5, evidence of subparagraph 6 (Evidence of subparagraph 21-1, evidence of subparagraph 9, evidence of subparagraph 10, evidence of subparagraph 10, evidence of subparagraph 15, evidence of subparagraph 16-1 through 6, evidence of subparagraph 19, evidence of subparagraph 20, evidence of subparagraph 21, evidence of subparagraph 25, evidence of subparagraph 28 (Evidence of subparagraph 6), evidence of subparagraph 32, evidence of subparagraph 34-1 through 8, evidence of subparagraph 35, evidence of subparagraph 38, evidence of subparagraph 1 to 3, evidence of subparagraph 4-1, evidence of subparagraph 3, evidence of evidence of subparagraph 3-1, evidence of subparagraph 3, evidence of subparagraph 2-1, evidence of subparagraph 3, evidence of subparagraph 4-1, and evidence of subparagraph 3

A. On May 1, 1989, the Plaintiff purchased each real estate listed in the separate sheet owned by Nonparty 1 (hereinafter “instant land”) from Nonparty 1,000,000,000 won on the day, and agreed to pay the down payment of KRW 15,00,000 on the day, and the intermediate payment of KRW 40,000 on the 22th of the same month, the remainder payment of KRW 50,00,000 until June 10 of the same year.

On May 22, 1989, the Plaintiff paid an intermediate payment of KRW 40,00,000 to the above temporary refusal, and with respect to the above residual payment, the Plaintiff agreed to take over KRW 25,200,000 for the obligation to return the principal and interest of the loan to the Non-Party National Forestry Cooperatives Federation, which is an son of the above temporary refusal secured by the above right to collateral security, and pay the difference between the above residual payment and the above remaining payment, instead of cancelling the registration of each establishment of a neighboring mortgage in the name of the Non-Party National Forestry Cooperatives Federation, which was completed in the name of the above temporary refusal as to the land of this case. On September 20, 191, the Plaintiff returned the principal and interest of the loan to the above temporary refusal on June 10 of the same year.

B. At the time of the instant sales contract, the Plaintiff was unable to complete the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Plaintiff with respect to the instant land, because the Plaintiff was unable to obtain the certificate of farmland sale in the office where the land was farmland, and was unable to pay the remaining amount without delay. As such, it would be delayed for the Plaintiff to complete the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Plaintiff between the Plaintiff and the above refusal for a considerable period of time, the Plaintiff agreed to complete the provisional registration in the name of the Plaintiff, and accordingly, the Daejeon District Court, Yangyang registry Office of the Daejeon District Court, the receipt of June 19, 1989, No. 12443 on June 13, 1989, provisional registration was made to preserve the right to claim ownership transfer in the name of

C. On May 24, 1989, the Plaintiff conducted a boundary survey on the instant land on or around June 10 of the same year, and took over the instant land from the above outer rejection on or around July 1990, the Plaintiff laid down the ground by cutting down the brick sculptures, waste, and incombustible materials, etc. of the instant land in part, and continued to start up the 63-16-16th (the first lot number was 68-16, but the second lot number was 40,000,000,000,000 won, and the remaining part of the instant land was 19-1,000,000,000,000 won, and it was 19-1,000,000,000 won, and 19-1,000,000,000 won, and 19-1,000,000 won, 19-1,000,000.

D. On October 14, 1991, the above refusal jointly succeeded to the property of the Defendants, who are the property successors, according to their respective shares in the attached inheritance share sheet.

E. On August 30, 191, the plaintiff was issued with a certificate of farmland purchase and sale, and thereafter the defendants were selected to support the Daejeon District Court on December 2 of the same year, Daejeon District Court on May 1, 1989 with respect to each share in the attached table to the land of this case, and upon the provisional registration completed on May 1, 1989 or on June 19, 1243, the Daejeon District Court, which filed a lawsuit seeking implementation of the procedure for registration of transfer of ownership based on the provisional registration completed on June 19, 1989, the delivery date of the complaint of this case, and sentenced the plaintiff won on February 10, 1993, but the Daejeon District Court, which was the appellate court (Seoul District Court 93Na1556, the Daejeon District Court 93Na156, which had resided on September 8, 1993, which had not been issued with a certificate of farmland transfer to the plaintiff and had not been issued with a certificate of farmland transfer to the plaintiff's domicile for six months or longer.

In addition, as to the plaintiff's appeal against the above appellate judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal on September 13, 1994 on the ground that "the purchaser of farmland who did not have the intention of self-government or self-government under the Farmland Reform Act cannot acquire ownership of farmland regardless of whether the certificate of sale of farmland was issued or whether it was effective as an administrative disposition for certification, and the purchaser who received the certificate of sale of farmland is presumed to have had the intention of self-government or self-government. However, if it is proved by counter-proof that there was no intention of self-government or self-government, the presumption is reversed. Therefore, if the purchaser of farmland is unable to file a claim against the seller for the implementation of the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership, and if the situation where the plaintiff was issued the certificate of sale of farmland as determined by the court below, it is sufficient that the purchaser of farmland had

F. On the other hand, around October 193, the Plaintiff asserted that there was a possessory right on the instant land against the Defendants, and filed an application for provisional disposition against the Daejeon District Court Branch 93Kahap482 to prohibit possession of real estate and farming obstruction on the 23th of the same month, and the Defendants shall not interfere with the Plaintiff’s possession and cultivation of the instant land. The Defendants obtained provisional disposition to the effect that the delivery officer belonging to the Daejeon District Court Branch of the Daejeon District Court delegated by the Plaintiff should publicly notify the said fact in an appropriate manner.

The defendants raised an objection against the above decision of provisional disposition on the ground that their ownership in the land in this case is in their own possession. However, on March 30, 1994, the Daejeon District Court rendered a decision to authorize the above provisional disposition on the ground that "if the plaintiff fully pays the price under the sales contract in this case from the above temporary rejection, and occupies and cultivates the land in this case, the plaintiff has the right to possess the land in this case." On January 26, 1995, the Daejeon High Court, which was the appellate court (Seoul High Court 94Na1973), also dismissed the defendants' appeal on the ground that "the plaintiff was entitled to seek provisional disposition for the prevention of interference because the judgment against the plaintiff was final and conclusive in the lawsuit claiming the transfer registration of ownership in this case as it is separate right from the ownership that is the principal right, the plaintiff can seek provisional disposition for the prevention of interference based on the right to possess the land in this case."

G. On March 3, 1990, the head of Si/Gun, who is the competent authority of the instant land, determined to formulate an urban planning on the part of the Sinsan-gun, Chungcheongnam-do, and ordered the services related to the Sinsan-gun to make a public inspection and announcement of the draft of the Sinsan-gun Urban Planning on November 23, 199, and requested on October 2, 1992 and December 19 of the same year to revise the plan for utilization of the national territory in accordance with the draft of the Sinsan-gun Urban Planning to the Ministry of Construction and Transportation. On March 3, 1993, the Ministry of Chungcheongnam-do, Chungcheongnam-do, additionally designated 7,603,00m2 of the planned planned area for the establishment of the Sinsan-gun Urban Planning among the plans for utilization of the national territory in the area of the area of the Dong-do, Chungcheongnam-do, as an urban area on August 193-58 of the same month.

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 12 of the Urban Planning Act and Article 6 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the Do governor of Chungcheongnam-do has established an Urban Planning Plan for Masan-gun, an area 7,603,000m2 in the above urban area, 1,630,000, 402 commercial area, 46m2, 302, 304m2, 305m2, 1993-195, 1993 to 31st of July 13, 1993, and made it available for the public to view the opinions, etc. at the city of the ASEAN-gun and an area 4m3m2, 1994 to determine the Urban Planning Plan for Masan-gun, Amsan-gun, Amsan-gun, Masan-gun, Masan-gun, Masan-gun, Masan-gun, Masan-gun, 16m2, 1994m2.

2. The plaintiff and the defendant's assertion

A. The plaintiff's ground for claim

The Plaintiff, inasmuch as the instant land was determined as a general residential area by the urban planning determination and public notice of the Do governor of Chungcheongnam-do on January 28, 1994 and the public notice of the ASEAN-gun on February 16, 1994, and was excluded from the application of the Farmland Reform Act, the Plaintiff performed the procedures for the registration of ownership transfer on the ground of sale on May 1, 1989 and sought the prohibition of interference with the Plaintiff’s possession of the instant land.

B. Grounds for the defendants' assertion and counterclaim

With regard to this, the defendants asserts as follows.

(1) According to Article 6 of the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory, a plan for the designation of a specific use area is to be established as an urban area, quasi-urban area, quasi-urban area, quasi-urban area, and natural environment conservation area in the contents of the plan for the utilization of the national territory. Among them, Article 13-3 (3) of the same Act provides that the determination and public notice of the plan for the utilization of the national territory to be designated as an urban area in accordance with the urban planning under the Urban Planning Act shall be regarded as the determination and public notice of the urban planning area under Articles 2 (1) 2 and 12 (4) of the Urban Planning Act. Meanwhile, Article 87 (1) 3 of the Urban Planning Act provides that the Farmland Reform Act shall not apply to the urban planning area, i.e., in the case of this case, the "urban area" only to the farmland within the green belt area, which is exceptionally applied by the Urban Planning Act in principle, but it shall be excluded from the application of the Act on the Improvement and Management of the National Land, etc.

(2) The buyer of farmland who does not have a self-defens or self-defensive intent under the Farmland Reform Act is unable to acquire the ownership of farmland, absolutely, regardless of whether a certificate of sale and purchase of farmland was issued or whether it was effective as an administrative disposition for such certification. Since the Plaintiff entered into the instant sales contract without a self-defensive or self-defensive intent, the instant sale is absolutely null and void, and the contract cannot be seen as valid due to changes

(3) At the time of the instant sales contract, the Plaintiff agreed to repay the loans to Nonparty National Forestry Cooperatives Federation around June 10, 1991, the remaining payment date agreed to pay the loans to Nonparty National Forestry Cooperatives Federation around and around June 10, 191, and to make a transfer registration of ownership on the instant land, but did not intentionally make notification of his address and contact address and did not make it more than three years, and thus, the Plaintiff did not make the said transfer registration in the future, and the Defendants suffered many damages, such as the above net rejection and the Defendants’ excessive burden of capital gains tax, property tax, medical insurance premium, deprivation of the opportunity for loan use, considerable mental suffering, etc. Accordingly, the Plaintiff shall pay the Defendants the compensation for damages, and the instant transfer registration should be completed at the same time. In addition, the Plaintiff shall not pay the Plaintiff’s agent or the deceased Nonparty, who was the agent or the deceased, to settle the issue of transfer income tax, etc. following the transfer of the instant land at the same time, and to transfer the ownership registration to the instant land, so the Plaintiff shall not pay the said transfer income tax.

(4) Therefore, since the above sales contract was null and void or lawfully cancelled, the Defendants sought to refund KRW 105,00,000 to the Plaintiff on November 1, 1994, but the Defendants refused to receive the purchase price of this case, and deposited the payment to the public official in charge of the deposit in the Seocheon Branch Branch of Daejeon District Court under Article 498 of the 94-year deposit, each of the above claims by the Plaintiff is without merit. Accordingly, each of the above claims by the Plaintiff is without merit, and each of the provisional registrations for preserving the above claim for transfer of ownership, which was made in their name with respect to the instant land

3. Determination

A. Whether it conflicts with res judicata

According to Article 17 of the Modern Urban Planning Act, the Minister of Construction and Transportation (the Enforcement Decree of the same Act is delegated to the Do Governor pursuant to Article 6 of the same Act) may designate a residential area, commercial area, industrial area, and green area as an urban planning zone if deemed necessary. According to Article 87 (1) of the Urban Planning Act, the Farmland Reform Act shall not apply to an urban planning zone, but Article 19 of the same Act shall not apply to farmland within green areas under Article 17 as farmland not necessary

Therefore, in light of the purport of the above provision, although Article 13-3 (3) of the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory is stipulated as the determination and public notice of the urban planning zone under Articles 2 (1) 2 and 12 (4) of the Urban Planning Act to designate an area to be developed as an urban area under the urban planning under the Urban Planning Act, it is not sufficient to simply designate an urban area under Article 6 of the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory, and the urban planning determined by Article 17 of the Urban Planning Act has determined as an area outside a green area, i.e., a residential area, commercial area, or industrial area, or a green area, which is designated as an urban planning project, should be designated as a farmland necessary for the urban planning project. As seen above, the above determination and public notice of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport No. 1993-58 of March 3, 193 and public notice of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport No. 199-14 of the said Act as an area to be newly established and publicly announced No.294 of the said Act.

B. Determination as to the allegation of invalidation

According to Article 19(2) of the Farmland Reform Act, farmland shall be traded directly by the parties only after obtaining a certificate of farmland purchase and sale at the seat office. Article 19 of the Farmland Lease Management Act provides that a person who intends to obtain a certificate of farmland purchase and sale shall file an application for the issuance thereof with the head of Si/Gu/Eup/Myeon after obtaining confirmation from two or more members of the Farmland Management Committee having jurisdiction over the seat of the farmland. This is to require a certificate of farmland purchase and sale as a means of verifying his/her own or his/her own intent in order to realize the ideology of freedom of cultivation. Therefore, the certificate of farmland purchase and sale is an effective requirement for acquiring ownership of farmland, and regardless of whether the certificate of farmland purchase and sale is issued, the purchaser may again obtain a certificate of farmland sale and purchase if the certificate of farmland sale issued to king is null and void, and may seek cooperation from the seller who fails to comply with the procedure for the issuance of the certificate of farmland sale and purchase.

Therefore, the intention of self-employed or self-employed will be more necessary at the time of acquiring ownership of farmland than at the time of entering into a sales contract for farmland, and even if there is no own intent or self-employed intent at the time of entering into a sales contract for domestic farmland, the sales contract cannot be deemed null and void as a matter of course, and it is reasonable to view that the defect of the requirements for the validity of the sales contract of this case was cured, since the land of this case became a general residential area on January 28, 1994, and no longer requires the certification of farmland sale. Therefore, the defendants' assertion in this part is without merit.

C. Determination as to the motion for cancellation

On June 10, 191, the Plaintiff agreed that the loan was repaid and completed the registration of ownership transfer with respect to the land in this case at that time on or around June 10, 1991 at the time of the conclusion of the instant sales contract, and there is no evidence to believe that some of the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 30, Gap evidence No. 31, Eul evidence No. 27-2, No. 3, and Eul evidence No. 27-4, and witness double-name testimony in light of the above evidence, and there is no evidence to prove otherwise. Rather, as seen above, it was understood from the above net rejection that the Plaintiff delayed the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer in the Plaintiff’s name for a prolonged period of time. Therefore, it cannot be said that the registration of ownership transfer in this case is in accord with the principle of fairness and good faith when the Plaintiffs delayed the receipt of the obligation under the instant sales contract as above

In addition, with respect to the fact that the Plaintiff agreed to pay the transfer income tax, etc., arising from the instant sales contract to the Defendants to the Defendant on August 1991 prior to the registration of transfer of ownership or at the same time, the Plaintiff’s partial descriptions of the evidence No. 30, No. 31, No. 27-2, No. 3, and No. 4, and the witness’s second-hand testimony in light of the aforementioned evidence, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise.

Therefore, the defendants cannot cancel the sales contract of this case on the grounds that the plaintiff refused to pay the above damages or transfer income tax. Therefore, without examining the remaining arguments of the defendants, the defendants' above assertion is without merit.

D. Sub-committee

Therefore, under the premise that each of the above arguments by the Defendants is well-grounded, the provisional registration of the preservation of each of the above claims for transfer of ownership, which was made on the land of this case, shall be cancelled, and each of the above claims by the Defendants to deliver the land of this case to

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the defendants are obligated to implement the procedure for ownership transfer registration on the grounds of sale on May 1, 1989 with respect to each inheritance share in the land of this case. Thus, in light of the plaintiff's main claim against the defendants who seek performance of the procedure for ownership transfer registration against the plaintiff and the circumstances where the defendants are dissatisfied with the plaintiff's right to possess the land of this case while refusing to implement the procedure for ownership transfer registration against the plaintiff, the plaintiff's right to possess the land of this case may be interfered with the plaintiff's possession. Thus, the plaintiff's main claim against the defendants who seek the prohibition of interference with the plaintiff's possession of the land of this case is justified, and all of the counterclaim claims against the defendants against the plaintiff of this case shall be dismissed as all of them are without merit, and the burden of the lawsuit costs shall be decided as per Disposition by the application of Articles

Judges Noh Young-hee (Presiding Judge)