beta
(영문) 서울고법 1991. 3. 15. 선고 90구6035 제4특별부판결 : 상고기각

[법인세등부과처분취소][하집1991(1),565]

Main Issues

Whether the land provided to the sports welfare facilities of the employees of a non-profit religious foundation constitutes the land used directly for the proper purpose of the corporation under Article 59-3(1)17 of the former Corporate Tax Act.

Summary of Judgment

In a case where a non-profit religious corporation established for the purpose of maintaining and operating a school, hospital, etc. for the purpose of disseminating teaching and other edification activities, operates a university-affiliated hospital in part of the adjoining land and uses it as sports welfare facilities for women working at the above hospital by establishing a icec and sccoke, etc., even though a non-profit corporation, it is difficult to view the said land as land directly used for the dissemination of religion or other edification activities, which is the unique purpose of the corporation under Article 59-3 (1) 17 of the former Corporate Tax Act, since it was provided to the welfare facilities for employees engaged in medical business under Article 1 (1) 2 of the Corporate Tax Act, which is subject to corporate tax for income.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 59-3 of the former Corporate Tax Act

Plaintiff

Foundation Foundation Foundation Foundation Foundation Foundation Foundation Foundation Foundation Foundation Foundation Foundation

Defendant

Head of Sungbuk Tax Office

Text

1. The Defendant’s disposition of imposition of corporate tax amounting to KRW 386,871,570 on July 18, 1989 and the defense tax amounting to KRW 59,883,370 on July 18, 1989 that exceeds KRW 91,280,938 and its defense tax amount exceeding KRW 14,129,264 shall be revoked.

2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be four minutes and one of them shall be borne by the plaintiff and the other by the defendant.

Purport of claim

In the imposition of corporate tax of KRW 386,871,080 on July 18, 1989 and the defense tax of KRW 59,883,370 on July 18, 1989, the part exceeding KRW 1,258,080 and the defense tax of KRW 14,129,260 shall be revoked.

The judgment that the lawsuit costs shall be borne by the defendant.

Reasons

3. The above tax base of the non-party 1, Gap 2, Eul 3-2, Gap 4-1, Gap 5-1, Gap 6-1-3, Eul 6-1-2, Eul 9-2, 3-1-7, 4-7, 9-7, 9-1-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, 9-7, and 9-7,

First of all, the defendant asserted that the above taxation disposition was unlawful because the plaintiff did not go through the pre-trial procedure under Article 2 (1) of the Administrative Litigation Act with respect to the transfer of land in the Handong. Thus, considering the above Gap evidence No. 2, Gap evidence No. 3-1 and No. 2, and the whole purport of oral argument as to the above taxation disposition, on July 21, 1989, the plaintiff was delivered a notice of payment notice of the initial tax amount due to the transfer of two parcels of land in the Jungdong-dong and Seodong-dong and Seodong-dong, and raised an objection for the request for examination and appeal procedure, only the ground for the above taxation disposition due to the transfer of land in the above Seodong-dong and Seodong-dong, and the plaintiff did not object to the above taxation disposition. However, the plaintiff did not object to the above taxation disposition without the plaintiff's new grounds for appeal with regard to the total amount of tax in the pre-trial procedure, and the plaintiff did not object to the above taxation disposition without the plaintiff's new grounds for appeal.

Next, the defendant asserts that the taxation disposition in this case is lawful on the ground of the above disposition grounds and applicable provisions of law. The plaintiff, first, since the land in this case was used as a sports welfare facility site for employees of Sungdong Hospital, etc. operated by the plaintiff corporation immediately before the transfer, this constitutes land directly used for its proper purpose. Thus, corporate tax may not be imposed on income accrued from such transfer pursuant to Article 59-1 (1) 17 of the Corporate Tax Act. Second, the plaintiff provided the women belonging to the plaintiff corporation with the above land from the date of donation until 1983 after the donation of the land in this case, the plaintiff provided the cultivation of the above land, such as planting and cultivating the above part of the land without the law and distribution until the above transfer, notwithstanding the provision of Article 53-2 (1) 4 of the Corporate Tax Act, it is not clear that the transfer price of each of the above land should be calculated on the ground that the transfer price of each of the above land in this case should be calculated based on the standard market price of each of the above land.

Therefore, the plaintiff's first place of view provides that corporate tax shall not be imposed on the income falling under any of the following subparagraphs. Since Article 59-3 (1) of the Corporate Tax Act provides that the above first place of view shall be deemed as income generated from the transfer of land, etc. directly used by a corporation established for the purpose of propagating religion or other edification among the above subparagraphs, as to whether the above land falls under the land used directly for the original purpose of the plaintiff corporation under the above provision of the Act, the above evidence No. 4, No. 5-1 through No. 3, No. 5-1, No. 4, No. 5-1, No. 2, and No. 2 (No. 5-2) of the above corporation's transfer of the above land to the above non-profit corporation without any dispute over the establishment of the above Ministry of Health and Welfare, it is difficult to view the above land as part of the above non-profit corporation's new construction of the above land for the purpose of its establishment under the above 1,000 No. 2 as evidence No. 2, and the above new construction of the above land as part of the plaintiff's. 3.

Next, the plaintiff's second ground for the second ground for the above second ground for the transfer of land which was cultivated by the corporation concerned continuously for 8 years or longer from the time of transfer from Article 59-3 (1) 4 of the Corporate Tax Act to the time of transfer of non-taxable income under the above Article 59-3 (1) of the same Act. The above provision aims to reduce the tax burden following the transfer of farmland as part of the land farming policy and to make the owner of the land. Thus, in order for the transfer of a certain land to be subject to non-taxation under the above Article 5, it should be interpreted that the land should be the case where the land is actually used for cultivation as of the transfer date. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret that the plaintiff corporation's own land is the land being used for cultivation as of the date of the transfer. Accordingly, there is no evidence to acknowledge it except for the witness's testimony of the above witness who was rejected due to the lack of a member's trust, and since from the above land from the above 1983 days prior to the transfer date to the above land, it is necessary to the above employees of the above land.

Finally, Article 59-2 (3) of the Corporate Tax Act provides that when the transfer value and acquisition value are unclear in calculating gains on transfer which are the tax base of special surtax, the transfer value and acquisition value under the standard market price prescribed by the Presidential Decree shall be deemed to have been acquired on January 1, 1975, and Article 124-2 (6) of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act provides that the standard market price under Article 59-2 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act shall be deemed to be based on the standard market price under Article 115-2 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, and it is reasonable to interpret that the transfer value and acquisition value are all unclear, and that the transfer value and acquisition value of the land shall not be included in the amount of the above real transaction value calculated on the basis of the standard market price under Article 59-2 (3) of the Income Tax Act, which is calculated on the basis of equity, the transfer value and acquisition value of each of the above two values shall not be deemed to have been calculated on the basis of the standard market price under Article 158 (15) of the above.

Therefore, in full view of the following facts: (a) the corporate tax to be borne by the Plaintiff due to the transfer of each land of this case and its defense tax amount; (b) the Plaintiff acquired the small river land of this case on February 8, 1967; (c) October 24, 1987; and (d) September 3, 199, respectively; and (d) each transfer of land of this case on September 24, 197; and (e) the purport of the pleading is as above; (b) each of the above lands is not located in a specific area publicly notified by the Commissioner of the National Tax Service at the time of its transfer; (c) the total amount of the corporate tax to be borne by the Plaintiff at the time of its acquisition under Article 115(1)1 (b) of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act; (d) the total amount of the land at the time of its acquisition at the time of its acquisition at the time of its acquisition at the time of its acquisition at the time of its acquisition at the time of its acquisition at the same time of its acquisition at the same time; (d) the above No. 973) tax amount per Table No.

Therefore, the part of the Defendant’s taxation of this case, which exceeds the above corporate tax and the defense tax, shall not be exempted from its revocation. Thus, the Plaintiff’s claim of this case is justified within the scope of the above recognition, and the remainder of the claim is dismissed without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by applying Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, Articles 89 and 92 of the Civil Procedure Act to the burden of litigation costs.

Judges Choi Han-ro (Presiding Judge)