B. The assertion of the number of parties and Article 323(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act

C. The term of imprisonment and the amount of fine mitigated in an appellate trial, but the term of imprisonment has expired, and the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous change is applicable.

B. Since the assertion of the number of self-denunciations is not a statement of fact that serves as a ground for reduction or exemption of punishment under Article 323(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, so long as the court does not recognize it or recognizes it as mitigation, it is not erroneous even if it did not indicate the judgment

C. The principle of prohibition of disadvantageous change should be considered as a whole. As such, the appellate court’s judgment reduces the amount of a fine imposed by the reduction of the term of imprisonment, which is the main sentence than the judgment of the court of first instance, and the amount of a fine imposed by the concurrent sentence, but the period of custody for the fine is limited, it cannot be deemed that the sentence of the appellate court is more disadvantageous

Defendant 2, 3, and 4 shall be included in the principal sentence in respect of the remaining Defendants, 80 days of detention prior to the imposition of the sentence in this case.

Examining the evidence cited by the original judgment in light of the records, the original judgment that held to the same effect is just, and it cannot be recognized that there is an error of incomplete deliberation or a mistake of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence against the above Defendants in the original judgment, as well as an action against the above Defendants in relation to the concurrent imposition of fines and collection of additional charges against the above Defendants, and there is a significant reason to recognize that the amount of the original judgment against the said Defendants is extremely excessive and unreasonable even in consideration of all the circumstances constituting the conditions for sentencing as indicated in the records.

In addition, in the case of co-principals or co-principals, all of the above defendants are contacted with oplass by oplass, one or more persons who gather at a certain time and place without gathering, and one or more persons among them, and if there were comprehensive or individual communication or awareness of the contents of the crime, all of them shall be deemed to have a public-private partnership relationship. Even if they did not directly participate in the act after the public-private partnership, they shall be deemed to have a public-private partnership relationship. Thus, even if they did not directly participate in the act of implementation after the public-private partnership, they shall be deemed to have a public-private partnership relationship. (See Supreme Court Decision 4290Du380 delivered on June 12, 1959, 67Do1027 delivered on September 19, 1967). In the same purport, the court below's judgment which convicted the above defendants of the facts of the crime, is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the crime of breach of legal principles as to the customs law or the grounds for confiscation.

(2) Among the grounds of appeal by the defendants 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, each of the grounds of appeal by the defense counsel of the said defendants (Provided, That the grounds of appeal by the defense counsel of both the defendants are submitted after the lapse of the statutory period, and thus, it shall be considered to the extent of denying the grounds of appeal submitted within the statutory period): Each of the grounds of appeal by the above defendants and the defense counsel except the defendants 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 19, and 2, 3, 3, and 19 are examined together.

In light of the records and records of the records of the judgment of the first instance cited by the original judgment and the original judgment, it cannot be recognized that the court below erred in incomplete deliberation, and since the facts charged are denied, or that there is misconception of facts in the original judgment is against the rules of evidence, the determination of the cooking of evidence belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of the judge of the court of fact-finding, and even in light of the records, it cannot be recognized that the facts were recognized by the statements of the defendant without admissibility of evidence, such as the false statement by advisers, the non-voluntary statement, etc., or other statements that are not admissible, or that there is other illegality in the rules of evidence violation of the rules of evidence. Accordingly, this is ultimately attributable to the court below's assertion of misunderstanding of facts, and it cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal

In addition, even if the argument that the amount of punishment in the original judgment is excessive, it cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal in this case, and there is no illegality or illegality in the reasoning of the theory on the calculation of the additional collection charge in the original judgment, or in the order of reasoning in the theory of lawsuit

(3) We examine the appeal by Defendant 1’s defense counsel Lee Jae-g and Park Jong-Jin, Defendant 8 and 9’s defense counsel Lee Jong-Jin and Park Jong-Jin, Defendant 20’s defense counsel, Defendant 21’s defense counsel, Defendant 22’s defense counsel, Defendant 4’s defense counsel, Defendant 23’s defense counsel, Defendant 24 and 25’s defense counsel, Defendant 26 defense counsel Lee Jae-Jin, Defendant 15’s defense counsel, Defendant 7’s defense counsel, Defendant 17 defense counsel, Defendant 18’s defense counsel, and Defendant 18’s defense counsel.

(A) Regarding co-principals or co-principals, misunderstanding of the legal principles as to the responsibility principle under the Criminal Code, and misunderstanding of the rate of error:

As for the co-principal or co-principal, there is a contact with the criminal who has been crylateed through one or more persons among the criminal offenders, and if there was comprehensive or individual communication or awareness of the criminal intent, all of them shall be deemed to have a competitive relationship. Even if they did not directly participate in the act of implementation after the conspiracy, they shall be deemed to have a criminal liability for the co-principal's act that he shared by other competitors. Thus, in the same purport of the judgment of the court below, the court below recognized the above defendants as a co-principal for the crime of this case, such as defendant 1, 48, 9, 11, 17, 21, 23, etc., and it is just in the judgment of the court below, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles of co-principal or co-principal's liability under the Criminal Act, the misapprehension of legal principles of the principle of liability under the Criminal Act, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the rate of intention or mistake.

(B) As to the issue of misapprehension of legal principles as to the timing of the withdrawal of customs duties by each defense counsel of the defendant 1, 4, and 22:

The court below determined that the smuggling vessel passed through the bonded area rather than the completion of the act of evading customs duties when the vessel arrives at the port, and that only the crime of evading customs duties was imposed on Defendant 1, Defendant 4, and Defendant 22 as the crime of evading customs duties. The above action of the court below is legitimate and there is no violation of law by misunderstanding the legal principles on the timing of the crime of this case or by misunderstanding the legal principles as to it.

(C) As to Defendant 1, 4, 20, and 24’s arguments regarding the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the market price calculation of the main tariff evasion item:

The lower court’s determination on the basis of the market price and the assessment of the amount of the duty evasion goods is lawful. In so doing, it cannot be recognized that there was an error of law by misapprehending the legal principles regarding the market price calculation and the amount of the duty, by making the market price calculation not according to the Constitution, law, order or rule, as otherwise stated in the lawsuit. The argument is groundless.

(D) As to the issue of Defendant 7, 8, 15, 21, 22, and 25’s attorney’s error:

The application of the provisions of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes to the above Defendants is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principle in the original judgment.

The issue is groundless.

(E) As to Defendant 4’s assertion of misapprehension of the legal principles as to the reduction or exemption of punishment due to the self-denunciation of counsel:

The reduction or exemption of punishment by self-denunciation is at the discretion of the court, and there is no violation of law even if the court did not recognize it or if it did not recognize it to be mitigated accordingly. (Supreme Court Decision 80Do905 delivered on June 24, 1980) Accordingly, the court below's decision that did not indicate the judgment on the self-denunciation is just and there is no violation of law in the first instance court's decision which did not indicate the judgment on the reduction or exemption of punishment under Article 52 of the Criminal Act, and there is no violation of the Constitution, law, order, or rule like the theory of lawsuit, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principle on the grounds for the reduction or exemption of punishment under Article 52 of the Criminal Act as in the original judgment.

(f) As to Defendant 26’s argument about the misapprehension of the legal principle as to the prohibition of disadvantageous change of counsel:

According to the records, the court of first instance sentenced the above defendant to four years of imprisonment with prison labor and fine of 19,05,000 won, and fine of 76,220 won per day of custody in the workhouse, and the above defendant appealed only by the above defendant, the court below reversed the judgment of the court of first instance, and sentenced the above defendant to imprisonment with prison labor of three years, fine of 16,50,000 won, and fine of 16,500 won per day of custody in the workhouse.

However, in applying the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous change, the whole review should be made to determine whether to apply the principle (see Supreme Court Decision 77Do2114, May 13, 197; 80Do765, May 13, 1980). In comparison with the judgment of the court of first instance and the judgment of the court below against the above defendant, the judgment of the court of first instance is that the amount of a fine that has been reduced by the term of imprisonment in the principal sentence and has been reduced by the amount of a fine that has been imposed concurrently, the period of imprisonment in the principal sentence has been reduced, and only the period of imprisonment in the original sentence has passed. As such, it cannot be said that the sentence of the court of first instance was modified to the above defendant more unfavorable than that of the court of first instance.

The essay is groundless.

(G) As to Defendant 18’s assertion of inconsistency between Defendant 18’s collection and forfeiture and facts charged:

According to the records, the prosecutor withdrawn from the violation of the Customs Act that the court of first instance maintained by the court below with the knowledge that the amount equivalent to KRW 560,00,00 of the above defendant's KRW 560,00 was a duty-free sample. Accordingly, the court below did not recognize the violation of the Customs Act against the above defendant, and it did not recognize the violation of the Customs Act against the above defendant, and it did not recognize that the above defendant violated the Customs Act, and only the violation of the 800g of the damp Drugs Control Act made jointly with the co-defendant 16,17 with the co-defendant 16,00,000 for the purpose of sale, and it did not constitute a case where the amount equivalent to KRW 80,00 per the above amount cannot be confiscated pursuant to Article 42 (1) of the same Act, and it did not constitute an unlawful collection of KRW 560,000 per the above facts charged, or it did not recognize the violation of the Customs Act and the additional collection of KRW 100,0.

In addition, the court below held that the articles confiscated by the judgment of the court of first instance held in custody by the original judgment were in the above defendant's collection, and that the above articles were voluntarily submitted to the above defendants through an apparatus or facility used in the paper mulberry Manufacturing, and that the above articles were confiscated, and that the first instance court's disposition that confiscated the articles by deeming them as an apparatus or reagents used in the paper mulberry Manufacturing and that the above articles were lawful. In light of the records of the case, even if examining the records, it cannot be recognized that the above actions of the court of first instance were illegal, such as the theory of lawsuit, and since the facts charged in violation of the above Customs Act was withdrawn as above and the court below did not recognize them as criminal facts against the defendant, the court below's argument as to the statute of limitations of the right to institute a public prosecution was asserted on the premise that the above articles

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges by applying Article 57 of the Criminal Act to the inclusion of days of pre-trial detention to the defendants except for defendants 2, 3, and 4.

Justices Park Tae-hee (Presiding Justice)