[2] In a case where Company A, a contractor, claimed that Company B should compensate for the difference between the construction cost that would have been reasonably disbursed if the construction had been performed during the construction period under the contract and the construction cost that would have been incurred due to the increase in price during the delayed period of the commencement of the construction, the case affirming the judgment below rejecting Company A’s assertion on the ground that the damages equivalent to the increase in the total construction cost due to price increase in the construction cost due to the delayed period of the commencement of the construction work constituted special damages because the damages corresponding to the increase in the construction cost due to price increase in Company B were not known or could have known that the damages would have occurred due to price increase in Company

A. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

Article 393(1) of the Civil Act provides that “The compensation for damages caused by nonperformance shall be limited to ordinary damages,” and Article 393(2) provides that “The damages caused by special circumstances shall be liable only when the obligor knew or could have known of the damages.” The ordinary damages referred to in Article 393(1) refer to damages arising from special circumstances, barring special circumstances, in light of the transaction concept of the general society or the empirical rule of the general society, to the extent that the obligor would normally be deemed to have occurred in light of the general society or the general society. damages arising from special circumstances referred to in Article 393(2) refer to damages arising from individual and specific circumstances of the parties (see Supreme Court Decisions 2006Da25745, Dec. 24, 2008; 2009Da24842, Jul. 9, 2009, etc.).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts based on the evidence of employment. The defendant, as a contractor under the contract of this case, is obligated to complete the work belonging to the defendant's responsible area so that the plaintiff, who is the contractor, can actually start the work on March 23, 2006 according to the contract of this case. The defendant's act of making the subcontractor's failure to report the commencement of construction constitutes a default on the contract of this case and thus delayed the commencement of construction work of this case until July 11, 2011.

In addition, the lower court rejected the lower court’s determination that, in light of the following circumstances: (a) as to the Plaintiff’s assertion that, if the construction cost had been reasonably disbursed during the construction period due to the inflation of the period during which the commencement of the instant construction was delayed, and the construction cost of KRW 3,548,474,00, which would have been reasonably disbursed if the construction had been performed during the construction period under the instant contract; (b) the Defendant shall compensate for damages arising from nonperformance; (c) however, it is difficult to conclude that the construction cost or labor cost would have increased due to the lapse of time; (d) in the case of a building expert’s perspective, it is difficult to readily conclude that the construction cost would have increased at all times due to the decline in the cost of the construction site during the delayed period; and (e) damages equivalent to the increase in the total construction cost due to the increase in price, which are deemed to have been naturally caused by the Defendant’s nonperformance; and (d) even if the Plaintiff sought damages due to price increase during the instant construction period, it is difficult to find that the Defendant had known or submitted the price increase.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below is just in rejecting the plaintiff's assertion. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on ordinary damages or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence

B. Ground of appeal No. 3

This part of the ground of appeal is nothing more than an error of the selection of evidence and fact-finding, which is the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, and it cannot be viewed as a legitimate ground of appeal, and it cannot be viewed as an

2. Judgment on the conjunctive claim

The plaintiff filed an appeal on the conjunctive claim in the judgment below, but did not state any objection on the appellate brief or the petition of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Chang-suk (Presiding Justice)