갑제1호증의 1, 2, 갑제2호증의 1, 2, 갑제3호증의 1, 2, 갑제5호증의 1, 2, 3, 4, 갑제5호증의 1, 2, 3, 4, 갑제6호증의 1, 2, 갑제8, 11호증, 을제1호증의 1, 2의 각 기재에 변론의 전취지를 종합하면 원고는 1957. 2. 22. ㅇㅇ시 ㅇㅇ구 ㅇㅇ동 98 답 26,380㎡(1989. 6. 23. 위 ㅇㅇ동 98 답 860㎡, 같은 번지의 1 답 376㎡, 같은 번지의 2 답 1402㎡로 분할되었다)를 취득하여 1990. 11. 1. 위 ㅇㅇ동 98답 92㎡를 소외 정ㅇ자에게, 1990. 11. 8. 같은 번지의 2 답 1402㎡(이하 위 2필지의 토지를 이 사건 각 토지라 한다)을 소외 정ㅇ호외 8인에게 각 양도하고 양도차익예정신고를 하면서 장기보유특별공제를 하지 아니하고 세액을 계산하여 양도소득세 금308,337,914원, 방위세 61,667,680원을 자진납부한 사실, 그런데 피고는 1991. 12. 27. 원고가 이 사건 각 토지를 보유한 기간이 10년 이상이라는 이유로 장기보유특별공제를 하여 별지 당초결정란 기재와 같이 양도소득세 금126,824,305원, 방위세 금25,364,861원으로 계산한 다음 기납부한 위 세액에서 이를 공제하여 양도소득세 금181,513,609원과 방위세 36,302,719원을 환급하였다가, 이 사건 각 토지의 지적공부상 지목이 답으로 되어 있으나 ㅇㅇ구청의 90년 개별공시지가 자료인 토지특성조사표상 주거지역내 나대지로 되어 있으므로 소득세법 시행령(1990. 12. 31. 개정되기 이전의 것) 제46조의3의 규정에 의하여 장기보유특별공제가 배제된다는 감사원의 지적이 있다. 1992. 10. 22. 장기보유특별공제를 할 수 없다고 하여 세액을 별지 경정결정란 기재와 같이 양도소득세 215,901,261원, 방위세 금43,180,252원으로 확정하여 원고가 기납부한 양도소득세와 방위세를 공제하고 청구취지 기재와 같이 양도소득세 및 방위세를 추가로 부과, 고지한 사실을 인정할 수 있다.

2. Determination on the legality of the instant disposition

A. The parties' assertion

Unlike the land category on the cadastral law under Article 46-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, where the special deduction for long-term holding is excluded in calculating the transfer income tax, the defendant asserts that the disposition of this case is legitimate because the land category on the cadastral law includes not only the land falling under the larger land but also the de facto site that can be constructed. Accordingly, the plaintiff's land category on the cadastral law refers only to the land whose land category on the cadastral record is the larger land or the land category on the cadastral law is the larger land. Thus, the disposition of this case which did not take the special deduction for long-term holding is unlawful even if the plaintiff acquired each land whose land category on the cadastral record is the land category on the cadastral record and transferred more than 10 years after the transfer. (2) Even if it is not a house, the defendant asserts that even if the land category on the cadastral law under the above Article 46-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act is limited to the case where the land category on the cadastral record is the larger land on the cadastral record, the special deduction for long-term holding of each land was unlawful.

B. Determination

(1) Article 23 (2) of the Income Tax Act (amended by Act No. 4281, Dec. 31, 1990; hereinafter the same) provides that the holding period of assets except the land as determined by the President shall be at least ten years shall be deducted from gains on transfer as the amount of special deduction for long-term holding. Article 46-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13194, Dec. 31, 1990; hereinafter the same shall apply) which was enforced at the time of the said transfer (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13194, Dec. 31, 1990; hereinafter the same shall apply) stipulates that the land excluded from the special deduction for long-term holding is one of the land whose land category is no building (excluding an unauthorized building as determined by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance and Economy) and Article 46-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act was amended on December 31, 1990.

(2) Therefore, Article 44(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, which provides for the scope of land subject to capital gains tax, shall refer to the land falling under the category to be registered in the cadastral record under the Cadastral Act. The land under paragraph (1) shall be de facto land category regardless of the land category in the cadastral record. In a case where the de facto land category is unclear, it shall be determined according to the land category in the cadastral record. Meanwhile, subparagraph 6 of Article 2 of the Cadastral Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 4273, Dec. 31, 1990) provides that the land category shall not be classified, indicated, according to the main purpose of use of the land. Article 3(1) provides that all land shall be classified into the parcel, land category, boundary or coordinates, or the area of the land to be registered in the cadastral record. Article 5(1) provides that the land category of the land shall not be classified into the land to be changed, the land category of the existing site, the land category and boundary, the land category and boundary, the land category and temporary site, the temporary site.

Examining the relevant provisions of the above laws, first of all, since there is no separate category as a site according to the classification of land category under the intellectual law, the land category under the intellectual law under Article 46-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the above Act shall be limited to the land category under the intellectual law, which is the building site. Even if the land category under the cadastral law under Article 46-3 of the above Enforcement Decree is a site without a building, it shall be limited to the land category under the intellectual law, and even if the land category under the cadastral law has been changed to the site later, it shall be deemed that the land

Then, the land category in the cadastral law is a substitute for the registration of the pertinent land on the cadastral record unless there is a procedure for registration conversion or land category change, etc., which is recorded on the cadastral record, unless there is any special circumstance such as that the competent authority misleads the Plaintiff into the main purpose of its use and establishes a land category. However, in full view of the entries in the evidence No. 9 and the testimony of the witness - witness -, each of the instant land in this case has been used as small arable land by the neighboring residents, as well as the land category in the cadastral record since the time the Plaintiff acquired, and in fact, it has been used as small arable land by the neighboring residents prior to the transfer of the Plaintiff. However, at the time of the transfer by the Plaintiff, the land category has been changed by the transferee, etc. on May 30, 1991 and around December 22, 192 after the transfer of the Plaintiff, and each of the above evidence No. 1 and evidence No. 2 cannot be acknowledged otherwise. 1-3.

According to the above facts, each land of this case does not correspond to the land which is the land category under the intellectual law under Article 46-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, and therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the land does not be excluded from the special long-term holding deduction, so the disposition of this case is unlawful.

3. Conclusion

Thus, the defendant's disposition of this case is unlawful, so the plaintiff's claim of this case seeking its revocation is justified, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

October 5, 1994