[손해배상(자)등][공2002.1.15.(146),166]
Whether one of the multiple operators of the same motor vehicles may claim that the other operator is a "other person" as prescribed in Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act in the event that the other operator is damaged by an accident of the relevant motor vehicle (negative with qualification)
The term "other person" under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act refers to a person who operates a motor vehicle for his own sake and a person other than the driver of the motor vehicle in question. Thus, even if one of the multiple operators who exist in the same motor vehicle suffers from the accident of the motor vehicle in question, the operator who suffered the accident cannot claim that the other operator is a third person under Article 3 of the same Act. However, only if it appears that the other party could have easily prevented the occurrence of the accident because it appears to be more led or directly and specifically compared to the operation control and operational profit of the operator who suffered the accident, it can be argued that the other party is a third person.
Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act
Supreme Court Decision 99Da22328 delivered on September 17, 1999 (Gong1999Ha, 2668 delivered on July 25, 1997) Supreme Court Decision 2000Da32840 Delivered on October 6, 2000 (Gong2000Ha, 2293)
Sung-si and two others (Attorney Lee Dong-jin, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)
Dongbu Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Vindication, Attorneys Gyeong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Seoul District Court Decision 2000Na42600 delivered on October 27, 2000
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.
1. "Other person" under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act refers to "the person who operates an automobile for his own sake and the person other than the driver of the automobile in question". Thus, in principle, even if one of several operators who exist in the same automobile sustains damage from the accident in question, the operator of the automobile in question cannot assert that he is another person under Article 3 of the same Act. However, it is only possible to assert that he is another person only when it appears that the other party could have prevented the occurrence of the accident because it appears more leading or directly and specifically than the driver's control and operational profit of the person in question (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Da32840 delivered on October 6, 200).
2. According to the facts acknowledged by the court below, on July 31, 1996, the Sim-si was driving the automobile of this case on its own as of July 31, 1996, and he lent the automobile of this case to the Sim-si's office at the request of the Sim-Seoul High Court. The Sim-won was driving the automobile of this case and let the non-party drive the automobile of this case while he went to the Kim Chang-si's office. The non-party was driving the automobile of this case at around 02:50 on August 1, 1996, and caused the accident of this case and died as a member of the Sim-si on board the Ham-si's operation of this case. In this fact, the court below's judgment on this case's vehicle of this case was more easily controlled the operation of the automobile of this case at the time of this case, and it was not justified than the third party's status as the owner of the accident of this case.
The gist of the grounds of appeal is that, on the premise that the appellate court falls under another person prescribed in Article 3 of the above Act and that the appellate court is liable for damages to the appellate court, the appellate court erred in the judgment of the court below as to this point by asserting that the appellate court is not a person eligible for exemption under the above insurance contract and that the appellate court is not a person eligible for exemption. However, as seen above, the appellate court's liability for damages to the appellate court is not acknowledged, it cannot be said that the appellate court's failure to judge the plaintiffs' assertion on the absence of exemption from exemption from exemption from exemption from liability is not a failure of determination or incomplete hearing.
3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Kim Ji-dam (Presiding Justice)