The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 3 through 7

A. The "unfair collaborative act" prohibited by Article 19 (1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter "Fair Trade Act") is an agreement on an act that unfairly limits competition, and at this time, the "agreement" includes not only the express agreement but also implied agreement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Du1239, Feb. 28, 2003). However, since the essence of this is to communicate with two or more enterprisers, it cannot be deemed that there exists an external form consistent with the "unfair collaborative act" listed in each subparagraph of the above provision, and there should be proof of circumstances to recognize the inter-party relationship, and the burden of proof on such agreement is against the defendant who orders corrective measures, etc. on the ground of such agreement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 201Du17421, Nov. 28, 2013).

In addition, in cases where competition enterprisers exchange information on major competitive factors, such as price, the exchange of such information may serve as a means to facilitate or facilitate collusion by removing uncertainty on the decision-making of price, etc. Thus, it may serve as a valuable material to recognize the reciprocity of communication among the enterprisers. However, even so, it cannot be readily concluded that there exists an agreement on an act of unfairly restricting competition solely based on the fact of exchange of the information. The determination of whether there was an agreement on an act of unfairly restricting competition should be made by comprehensively taking into account all the circumstances, such as the structure and characteristics of the relevant market, the nature and contents of the exchanged information, the subject and timing of the exchange of the information, the purpose and purpose of the exchange of information, the degree of difference between the enterprisers, such as the price and output after the exchange of the information, the process and contents of the decision-making, and other impacts on the market.

B. The lower court determined that: (a) insofar as it was not recognized that the 16 life insurance companies, including the Plaintiff, agreed to jointly determine, maintain, or change the price from 2001 to 2006, it cannot be deemed that there was an unfair collaborative act solely on the ground that there was an exchange of information on future scheduled interest rates and publicly announced interest rates among the 16 life insurance companies, including the Plaintiff, etc.; and (b) there is insufficient evidence to support that there was an agreement among them to jointly determine the scheduled interest rates solely on the ground that the 16 life insurance companies, including the Plaintiff, etc. have determined their respective interest rates from 2001 to 2006; and (c) ultimately, the Defendant’s corrective order and imposition of the penalty surcharge (hereinafter “instant disposition”) premised on the premise that the Plaintiff had committed an unfair collaborative act with another 15 life insurance companies, was unlawful without having to further examine the remaining issues.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, there were some inappropriate parts in the reasoning of the lower judgment, but the lower court’s determination is based on the legal doctrine as seen earlier. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the meaning and requirements for establishment of unfair collaborative acts as stipulated in Article 19(1) of the Fair Trade Act, exchange of information or the relationship between the act of assistance and the act of collaborative act, omitting judgment

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

(1) The lower court determined that the instant disposition on the ground that (1) the Defendant’s act of having agreed to set a specific interest rate or reduce the scheduled interest rate on several occasions from 1998 to 2000 (hereinafter “the first act”) and the act of exchanging information on future scheduled interest rate from 2001 to 2006 and determining the interest rate of each person (hereinafter “second act”) constituted a single collaborative act as a whole; (2) even if the first act constitutes an unfair collaborative act, it did not constitute an unfair collaborative act due to the second act; and (3) even if the first act constitutes an unfair collaborative act, the Defendant’s first act was already terminated at the specified time of the second act, and on December 15, 201, the instant disposition on the first act was made after the lapse of the prescription period, and thus, the instant disposition on the first act was unlawful.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the number and completion period of collaborative acts, and the period of disposal, omitting judgment, failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Sang-hoon

Justices Kim Yong-deok

Justices Kim So-young