[부당해고및부당노동행위구제재심판정취소][공2009상,661]
[1] Method of determining grounds for disciplinary action against workers
[2] Whether the internal problem of a trade union can be a ground for disciplinary action (affirmative with qualification)
[3] The case holding that, in case where a company dismissed the core officers of the above promotion committee due to disputes arising between cabin crew members in relation to the management and use of support payments collected by the airline crew for the establishment of the guest room trade union and the sole labor union, such dismissal was deemed to deviate from the scope of discretion
[1] Whether a worker's act of misconduct constitutes a cause of disciplinary action shall be determined by the disciplinary committee, etc. through specific data, and the cause of disciplinary action shall not be limited only by the grounds for disciplinary action stipulated in the rules of employment or disciplinary action stipulated in the resolution of disciplinary action or disciplinary action.
[2] If a trade union's internal problem causes a company's loss, etc., it may constitute grounds for disciplinary action prescribed in the company's rules of employment.
[3] The case holding that in a case where a company dismissed the core officers of the committee for the establishment of the guest-based trade union on the ground of a dispute between the cabin crew members of the committee for the establishment of the guest-based trade union and the fund-raising, management, and use of the support fund collected by the airline crew for the establishment of a sole labor union, such dismissal is deemed to be beyond the scope of discretionary power because it
[1] Article 23 of the Labor Standards Act / [2] Article 23 of the Labor Standards Act / [3] Article 23 of the Labor Standards Act
[1] Supreme Court Decision 2001Du10455 Decided May 28, 2002 (Gong2002Ha, 1559), Supreme Court Decision 2007Du10174 Decided September 11, 2008 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2001Du10455 Decided May 28, 2002 (Gong2002Ha, 1559)
Plaintiff 1 and one other (Law Firm citizens, Attorneys Kim Ba-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
Intervenor (Law Firm Square, Attorneys Myeong-hee et al., Counsel for the intervenor-appellant)
Seoul High Court Decision 2008Nu5331 decided November 20, 2008
The part of the judgment of the court below on the review of unfair dismissal is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remaining appeal by the plaintiff is dismissed.
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding the scope of grounds for disciplinary action
Whether a worker's act of misconduct is a cause of disciplinary action or not shall be determined by the disciplinary committee, etc. through specific materials. It does not necessarily mean that the cause of disciplinary action is limited only to the grounds for disciplinary action specified in the rules of employment or disciplinary action (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du10174 decided September 11, 2008, etc.).
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles, the court below's determination that the grounds for disciplinary action against the plaintiffs were justified, on September 19, 2003, which caused disputes among cabin crew in relation to the collection, management, and use of the support payment in this case, on the following grounds: (a) the defendant assistant intervenor (hereinafter "participating") knew of the fact at the time of raising the support payment in this case; and (b) the commencement of the disciplinary action against the plaintiffs is due to the receipt of a petition from the plaintiffs to the purport that the plaintiffs would use the support payment in this case and comply with the employees requesting disclosure or return of the funds; and (c) the intervenor becomes aware of the dispute among cabin crew in relation to the support payment in this case; and (d) the court below's determination that the defendant assistant intervenor's first disciplinary action against the plaintiffs was justifiable and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of the grounds for appeal as to the grounds for appeal.
2. As to the legitimacy of the grounds for disciplinary action
Even if a trade union’s internal problem causes a company’s loss, it may constitute grounds for disciplinary action prescribed in the rules of the company’s employment (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du10455, May 28, 2002). Therefore, even if the issue of support payment in this case is an internal issue, if a dispute arises between the intervenor’s employees and the intervenor’s employee and causes a loss to the intervenor, it may constitute grounds for disciplinary action (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du10455, May 28, 2002). Therefore, if a dispute arises between the intervenor’s employees and the intervenor’s employees, it may constitute “where a violation of a written oath or company’s rules or duties or where a violation of a company’s rules or duties is committed,”
The judgment of the court of first instance, cited by the court below, acknowledged the facts as stated in its holding. The plaintiffs did not manage the support payment of this case transparently and paid most of the support payment of this case to be used for establishing a guest room trade union without any transparent management, and caused serious disputes among cabin crew members to the extent that criminal complaints and civil litigation are filed, shall constitute grounds for disciplinary action under Article 5.0.3 (2) and (3) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor. The judgment below is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the legitimacy of the grounds for disciplinary action, such as the grounds for appeal, and the ground for appeal concerning the fact-finding by the court below is with respect to the matters within the exclusive authority of the court below, which is a fact-finding court,
In addition, it cannot be interpreted that the plaintiff's "inception of dispute" under Article 5.0.3 (3) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor means only the cause of dispute in the course of performing his/her duties. In addition, with respect to the collection, management, and use of the support payment in this case by the plaintiffs, the trust among the cabin crew belonging to the intervenor where inception and unity are important due to the nature of his/her duties has been severely damaged, and the judgment of the court below that the "inception in the course of performing duties" under the above Rules of Employment has been justified and acceptable, so this part of the grounds for appeal by the plaintiffs cannot
In addition, even if the collection of the support fund itself is legitimate, the cause of the dispute may be caused by the reason for the disciplinary action. Therefore, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of the reason for the disciplinary action without making the collection of the support fund in this case itself as the reason for the disciplinary action. Accordingly, the ground for appeal disputing this issue cannot be accepted.
3. As to the deviation and abuse of disciplinary discretion
Dismissal shall be justified in cases where there are reasons for an employee’s responsibility to the extent that the employee’s employment relationship cannot be continued by social norms. Whether it is impossible to continue the employee’s employment relationship with the employee should be determined by comprehensively examining various circumstances, including the purpose and nature of the employer’s business, the conditions of the workplace, the status and details of the employee’s duty, the motive and background of the act of misconduct, the impact on the company’s business order such as the risk of disturbing the company’s deceptive order, and the previous attitude of work (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da48069, Nov. 23, 2006).
In light of the above legal principles, it is difficult to accept the lower court’s determination that the Plaintiffs were unable to use the donations for the purpose of the investigation of the Nonparty 1 and the Nonparty 2’s non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party members’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ non-party employees’ consent.
However, as seen earlier, even if the grounds for the disciplinary action against the plaintiffs can be established, it is difficult to raise a complaint or civil procedure against the plaintiffs, and the following circumstances revealed by the facts acknowledged by the first instance court and the lower court, namely, to obtain individual written consent or oral consent from the individual cabin crew who paid the support payment in the use of the support payment in this case, and its use appears to have been conducted within the scope of the written consent or oral consent. Some employees demanding the return of the support payment have returned the support payment, and it appears that the plaintiffs have not used the support payment for their personal purposes. Above all, in the above criminal complaint and civil procedure filed against the plaintiffs 1 and the non-party, it is difficult to find that some of them were acquitted, and that there is no need for the plaintiffs to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff 1 and the non-party to establish the support payment in this case, as seen above, in light of the fact that the plaintiff 1 and the non-party were found to have been dismissed for a prolonged period of time, and that there is no need for dispute over the plaintiff 2's labor union and the non-party.
Therefore, the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to disciplinary discretion, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, since it did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to disciplinary discretion. The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.
4. As to unfair labor practice
Unless there is any other evidence that dismissed on the ground of a disciplinary cause in order to retaliation the remainder of a trade union's activities, the grounds that a disciplinary dismissal was unlawful in the procedure or that the determination of disciplinary action deviates from the scope of discretion cannot be recognized as an unfair labor practice (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu9572 delivered on February 28, 192).
In light of the above legal principles, although the dismissal in this case deviates from the scope of discretion, as seen earlier, the legitimacy of the grounds for disciplinary action itself is recognized, and even after examining the record, it is difficult to view that the intervenor dismissed the plaintiffs in this case on the ground of the above grounds for disciplinary action, such as retaliation against the plaintiffs' activities for dismissal, etc., and the conclusion of the court below's rejection of the plaintiffs' assertion on unfair labor practices is justifiable and therefore, this part of the grounds for appeal by
5. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below on the retrial of unfair dismissal is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The remaining appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)