The reasoning for this Court's explanation concerning this case is that each land listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 2nd 12th 12 of the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter referred to as "each land listed in paragraphs 1 and 4 is subject to participation in the attachment; hereinafter referred to as "each of the above lands listed in paragraphs 1 and 4", "from May 11, 1998 or from May 11, 1998", and "from May 11, 1998 or from May 11, 2008" are used as the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance as described in Paragraph 2, and therefore, it shall be cited as it is in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Parts to be dried;

For this reason, the Plaintiff asserts that in case where the property provisionally registered is seized before the statutory due date of capital gains tax imposed by the Defendant pursuant to the proviso of Article 35(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, extinctive prescription of the right to collect national tax should be calculated from the day after the expiration date of extinctive prescription of the right provisionally registered. Thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion is difficult to accept in light of the following circumstances.

A) The priority of national taxes recognized under Article 35 of the Framework Act on National Taxes refers to the effect of collecting national taxes in preference to other public charges and other claims in the compulsory repayment procedure, such as the compulsory execution, auction, and disposition on default, against a taxpayer’s property (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 96Da17424, Oct. 15, 196). However, the proviso to Article 35(2) of the same Act stipulates that the exception of the priority of national taxes is recognized for the property provisionally registered for the purpose of security prior to the statutory due date (see, e.g., the proviso to Article 35(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes and Article 35(3) of the same Act). Accordingly, it is difficult to deem that the foregoing provision is related to the starting point of calculating the extinctive prescription period of the right to

B) Article 27(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that "the extinctive prescription under paragraph (1) of this Article shall be governed by the Civil Act, except as otherwise provided for in this Act or other tax-related Acts." Article 175 of the Civil Act provides that "the interruption of prescription shall not be effective if a seizure, provisional seizure, or provisional disposition is revoked upon request of the right holder or due to failure to comply with the provisions of Acts." In addition, Article 168(2) of the Civil Act provides that "the period of prescription expires as one of the grounds for interruption of the statute of limitations," and Article 178(1) of the Civil Act provides that "the period of prescription that expires until the interruption of the statute of limitations shall not be included, but shall newly run from the time when the cause for interruption of the statute of limitations expires." In full view of these provisions, it is reasonable to view that the extinctive prescription of the right which was already completed upon the expiration of the statute of limitations under Article 178(1) of the Civil Act cannot be seen as "when the statute of limitations are terminated."

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the plaintiff's claim for confirmation of illegality of omission in the claim of this case is unlawful and dismissed as it is without merit. The judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.