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(영문) 대법원 2016.3.24.선고 2015다249222 판결

보증금반환등

Cases

2015Da249222 Return, etc. of deposit

Plaintiff, Appellee

A

Defendant Appellant

1. B

2. D;

Defendant

3. C.

The judgment below

Seoul Western District Court Decision 2015Na31890 Decided October 16, 2015

Imposition of Judgment

March 24, 2016

Text

1. The part of the judgment below against Defendant B is reversed, and the part against Defendant B of the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked.

A. Defendant B pays to the Plaintiff 90,000,000 won with 5% interest per annum from April 2, 2015 to April 15, 2015, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

B. The plaintiff's remainder of the main claim against the defendant B and the conjunctive claim claiming the performance of the defendant B-related non-exclusive agent's liability against the defendant D is dismissed.

2. The appeal against Defendant D’s non-exclusive agent’s liability is dismissed.

3. Of the total cost of litigation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant B, the part arising between the Plaintiff and the Defendant B shall be borne by the Defendant, and the part arising between the Plaintiff and the Defendant D shall be borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder by the Defendant D.

Reasons

1. The defendant B's grounds of appeal are examined.

The lower court determined that Defendant B granted the right to representation to Defendant D to enter into a lease agreement on the instant building 403, and that the lessor was liable to pay the lease deposit and delay damages to the Plaintiff.

Examining the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the facts against the rules of evidence in its judgment.

2. Of the grounds of appeal by Defendant D, it is examined as to the assertion that Defendant C erred in the granting of the power of representation and erred in the legal doctrine of expression representation.

The lower court determined that Defendant C did not grant the right of representation to the Defendant D to enter into a lease agreement on the instant building 403, and that Defendant D was liable to compensate the Plaintiff for part of the damages equivalent to the lease deposit, as an unauthorized agent, as the Plaintiff. In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the facts against the rules of evidence, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the expressive agent.

3. As to Defendant B, we examine the assertion that Defendant D erred by misapprehending the legal principles on subjective conjunctive co-litigation in the grounds of appeal.

A subjective and preliminary co-litigation is a form of litigation in which all co-litigants settle the dispute over the same legal relationship in a lump sum without contradiction (Article 70(2) of the Civil Procedure Act), and a judgment shall be rendered on the claims against all co-litigants (Article 70(2) of the Civil Procedure Act). It is not allowed to render a judgment only on some co-litigants or to render

In addition, if one of the main co-litigants or the conjunctive co-litigants files an appeal in a subjective and conjunctive co-litigation, the part of the claim against other co-litigants shall be prevented, and the appeal court shall be subject to adjudication. In such a case, the subject of adjudication on the appeal shall be determined by taking into account the necessity of unity of conclusion between the main and preliminary co-litigants and their parties (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da4355, Feb. 24, 201).

According to the records, on the premise that the instant lease agreement entered into with Defendant B, the agent of Defendant B, was effective against Defendant B, the Plaintiff sought the return of the lease deposit against Defendant B around the first place, and sought the performance of the liability against Defendant B in preparation for the flag that the said lease agreement did not take effect against Defendant B. The court of first instance did not determine this part of the conjunctive claim against Defendant B by citing part of the claim against Defendant B, and the court of first instance dismissed Defendant B’s appeal without cancelling this part of the judgment of first instance.

Examining in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the claim against Defendant B and D is necessarily mutually combined with each other, and it is necessary to confirm the conclusion on a joint date between all the parties. Even if only Defendant B filed an appeal against the judgment of the first instance, the lower court deemed that the conjunctive claim against the Defendant D was also subject to the adjudication at the lower court, which was the appellate court, and thus, deemed that the conjunctive claim against the Defendant B was also subject to the adjudication, and thus, determined only on the claim against all the co-litigants. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal principles on subjective and preliminary co-litigation, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. Meanwhile, the lower court’s judgment is reversed in its entirety, on the grounds that subjective and preliminary co-litigation ought to be rendered a final judgment on all the co-litigants.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, Defendant D’s appeal against Defendant C’s non-exclusive agent’s liability is dismissed, and the part of the judgment below against Defendant B is reversed. Since this part is sufficient for this court to render a judgment, it is decided to see pursuant to Article 437 of the Civil Procedure Act. Defendant B bears the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay damages for delay calculated at the rate of 50% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act from April 2, 2015 to April 15, 2015, which is the day following the delivery date of the building in this case, until April 15, 2015, and 20% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings until the next full payment date. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s primary claim against Defendant B is revoked within the scope of the above recognition, and the Plaintiff’s primary claim against Defendant B is accepted within the scope of the foregoing recognition, and the remainder of the Plaintiff’s primary claim against Defendant B and the Defendant’s conjunctive agent against the Defendant D are assessed against the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s conjunctive.

Judges

Justices Park Jae-young

Justices Park Young-young

Justices Kim In-bok, Counsel for defendant

Justices Kim Jong-il