The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

(1) On June 16, 1964, the plaintiff asserted to the effect that the plaintiff acquired the real estate from the defendant, and that the plaintiff was owned by the plaintiff through the procedure for ownership transfer registration in the name of the plaintiff. However, in the fourth pleading protocol of the court below (section 88, Chapter 89 of the record), the plaintiff lent the name of the presiding judge to the defendant for a period of 10 months with the amount of KRW 30,000 with the amount of KRW 4% per month with the sale security at 10 months with the amount of KRW 30,000 with the total amount of 10,000 with the name of the defendant as the sale security, but the period was extended to June 16, 1964.

However, the Plaintiff’s statement was made to the effect that the principal and interest was calculated at the time of the registration of transfer of ownership in front of the Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff only passed the registration according to this value according to the purport of the collateral sold in 30,000 won at the beginning without having determined the price of this building. The Plaintiff’s statement is in short, the Plaintiff’s promise to return property in short, and that the Plaintiff passed the registration of transfer of ownership on the building in front of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the lower court asserted that the legal act was not a substitute payment contract of June 16, 1964, and the Plaintiff asserted that it was different from this, and thus, cannot be employed at the appellate court.

(2) The judgment below rejected the Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that even if the Plaintiff’s registration of ownership transfer was made through the registration of ownership transfer against the Defendant under Articles 607 and 608 of the Civil Act by deeming the transaction between the original Defendant and the original Defendant as the reservation for return of substitute goods on November 25, 1962, the Plaintiff cannot assert the ownership of the building on the part of the Defendant. The reasoning of the judgment below is that the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal act as a breach of the unfair legal act under Article 104 of the Civil Act, which led to the Plaintiff’s failure to acquire the ownership of the building on the part of the Plaintiff, and thus, it cannot be adopted.

(3) The argument asserts that the original loan obligation was extinguished since the Plaintiff received the substitute building from the Defendant in the form of a sale and satisfaction in lieu of the compensation liability equivalent to the obligation to return the present loan. However, as seen above, the appellant did not seem to have shown the above facts at the fact-finding court, and rather, the instant transaction is asserted as a promise to return the substitute. In addition, it cannot be deemed that the initial due date for repayment in the promise to return the substitute has expired, and as a matter of course, the legal relationship as a promise to return the substitute is extinguished.

Since the supplemental appellate brief submitted by the plaintiff as of December 26, 1966 is submitted in the rear and rear the prescribed period, it shall not be determined as to the matters mentioned above.

The appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party.

This decision is consistent with the opinions of the involved judges.

The judge of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) shall transfer to the police officer of the Red Circuit;