[2] Whether a doctor’s failure to explain the risk, etc. that may arise from the implementation of a king surgery to a woman in childbed who does not need to do so violates the duty to explain the right to self-determination of the woman in violation of the duty to explain (negative)

[3] The case holding that in a case where a newborn baby who performed an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an operation for an

[2] In a case where it is acknowledged that it is necessary to conduct a king surgery because it is likely to cause serious danger to the life, body, etc. of a woman in childbed or fetus, barring special circumstances, a doctor is obligated to explain the anticipated risk when he/she conducts a king surgery only in order to determine whether he/she will undergo a king surgery, the occurrence of a king surgery by alternative delivery method, and the anticipated risk when he/she conducts a king operation. However, if he/she does not conduct a king surgery as above, he/she is only naturally and in principle a king surgery, it cannot be said that a doctor violated the mother's right to self-determination by failing to explain the risk, etc. that may occur when he/she conducts a king surgery only to a woman in childbed.

[3] The case holding that in a case where a newborn baby who performed only the inhaled part of a natural organ was unable to claim compensation for damages on the ground of violation of the doctor's duty of explanation, in the case where the mother et al. claimed compensation for damages due to a violation of the doctor's duty of explanation when the newborn baby died after the delivery of a part of a spathic part of a spathic part of a spathic part of a spathic part of a spathic part, unless there is any evidence to support that there was a need to perform the spathic operation, it cannot be deemed that the doctor had a duty to explain the risks that may occur

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning after compiling the evidence, and stated that "the head of a fetus was exposed to outside the body of a mother)" in the medical records submitted by the defendant (No. 3) was "redelivery de delivery" (hereinafter referred to as "redelivery delivery part") but this part was entirely different from the part of a child's body and gender, time of delivery, etc., so it cannot be deemed that the person who stated other contents of the above medical records was not able to believe it as it is, in light of the fact that the defendant's duty to diversize the divershum's body and dives' body and dives' body and dives' body and dives' body were entirely different from that of the plaintiff's dives body, and that it was hard for the defendant to recognize that the diversian body and dives' body were in a state of diversing the upper body of the plaintiff's body.

However, we cannot accept the above judgment of the court below for the following reasons.

As pointed out by the court below, it is difficult for the court below to find that the part in which the body and gender of the deceased and the time of delivery were written differently from each other among the above medical treatment records submitted by the defendant. However, as the defendant's assertion, it seems sufficient to view that the defendant's use of the body body and weight of the deceased and immediately after delivery was recorded additionally in the explanation of the process after the defendant completed post-treatment for the deceased and the deceased. Furthermore, if the defendant's use of the body and intake of the deceased's body and the deceased's body were not enough to readily conclude that the defendant's body and inhaled the body of the deceased's body and the body of the deceased's body and it was difficult to view that the defendant's use of the body and inhaled the body of the deceased's body and the body of the deceased's body and it was hard to see that the defendant's use of the body and inhaled the body of the deceased's body and the body of the deceased's body and it was also difficult to see that the defendant's body and inhaled the body of the body.

Nevertheless, the court below determined that the part on the inhaled part of the above medical records is not trustable solely on the ground that the letters, etc. of the part on the inhaled part of the above medical records are different from the other parts of the medical records, without examining whether it is true for the defendant as to the grounds for different reasons, and on the ground that there is a difference between other parts of the medical records and the letters, etc., the court below determined that the defendant's negligence in the process of the treatment for inhaled part was presumed to have a causal relationship between the defendant's negligence in the process of the treatment for inhaled part of the medical records and the deceased, and that the causal relationship between the negligence in the process of the treatment for inhaled part of the medical records was presumed to have been caused by the h

2. As to the third ground for appeal

In general, in cases where a doctor performs a medical act, such as surgery, which is highly probable to cause adverse results, or where a doctor performs a medical act, such as death, etc., he/she is obligated to explain matters deemed reasonable in light of the medical level at the time of the medical treatment as to symptoms, treatment method and necessity, foreseeable risk, etc. of a disease, and to allow the patient or his/her legal representative to choose whether to receive such medical act by sufficiently comparing the patient's necessity or risk. If a doctor loses an opportunity to choose whether to receive such medical act because he/she fails to explain, he/she is liable to compensate for damages, such as consolation money, etc., but there is no possibility that a doctor violates his/her duty to explain about matters not relating to his/her own decision. Moreover, since it is probable that only physical harm of a woman or fetus may cause serious danger to the life, etc. of a woman in child or fetus, it is not necessary to give an explanation to the patient or his/her legal representative when he/she becomes aware that he/she has not been able to perform such surgery, unless there is a special circumstance that he/she is expected to perform an surgery.

In light of the circumstances stated in its holding, the lower court: (a) it is reasonable to view that there was an obligation to have the Plaintiff 2, who had an opportunity to explain about how to eliminate the harm caused by the Plaintiff’s act of recycling the fetus in advance, by clearly explaining the present symptoms, the necessity and method of inhaled delivery, and anticipated risks and side effects of the fetus; and (b) it is highly probable that the instant case had an opportunity to explain only the harm caused by the Plaintiff 2’s act of recycling the fetus’s act of recycling it in a way of light of the following: (c) it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff 2 had an opportunity to explain only the harm caused by the Defendant’s act of recycling the fetus, such as an opportunity to explain the harm caused by the Defendant’s act of recycling it; and (d) it is difficult to view that there was no possibility that there was a certain degree of harm caused by the Defendant’s act of recycling the fetus in a way of natural therapy, and that there was no need to explain about the harm caused by the Defendant’s act of recycling it.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the lower judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)