According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below acknowledged the fact that the defendant company was removed from the office of non-party 1 and the non-party 7 as a member of the board of directors on December 1974, 1974, when the defendant company suffered loss due to the proper operation of the board of directors in 1973 and 1974 (in the case of a clerical error in 1972) due to the crisis of the abolition of the board of directors, and decided to reduce the number of officers, close the 1st office of the defendant company as a member of the board of directors, and dismiss the 1st office of the defendant company as a member of the board of directors in the first place without any specific business performance or necessity. Accordingly, it is hard to conclude that the removal of the plaintiff 1 and the non-party 7 members of the board of directors or the burden of pay of external social organizations was merely a temporary and permanent measure to reduce the management status of the defendant company, and it cannot be viewed as a fundamental measure to dismiss the plaintiffs' members of the above labor union branch or the special committee.

In the original judgment, there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles on the plaintiffs' arguments and justifiable reasons, nor in the incomplete hearing, the lack of reason, or the omission of judgment.

The second ground of appeal is examined.

Examining the evidence adopted by the court below in light of the records, it can be recognized that the plaintiffs were unable to broadcast by making an insulting speech to the public officers such as the main moving of the defendant company, or by occupying the broadcasting station's main control room after making a resolution to refuse to produce broadcasting and to produce newspapers at the assembly of the editing bureau on March 12, 1975, and thereby interfering with broadcasting by occupying the broadcasting room, and that it interfered with the production of newspapers in the editing bureau or the public service country, and the fact of recognition can be recognized as the original fact that the production of newspapers was interfered with by the agricultural nature of the editing organization or the public service country. The fact of the preparation of evidence which was conducted in such recognition is legitimate even if it is examined, and it cannot be said that there was any error of misconceptioning the facts against

The issue is that it was returned to the court below's inclusion in the evidence preparation and fact-finding which belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court below and is groundless.

The grounds of appeal No. 3 are examined.

When an employer prepares or amends the rules of employment, if there is a trade union organized by a majority of workers in the workplace, the trade union shall hear the opinion of the representative of the majority of workers in the absence of such trade union, and even if the rules of employment prepared or amended without such consent shall be deemed null and void, the disciplinary action in this case shall not only refuse the production of newspapers and broadcasts, which are life of the defendant company, and obstruct the production of such newspapers and broadcasts, and lead to multiple force, such as the decision of the court below, and if the disciplinary action in this case is taken because the company's safety and respect are faced with the crisis of the disturbance against the company's management order due to the insult of the company's insult and resistance, it shall not be determined by the suspension or invalidity of the rules of employment in so-called, unless the original statement is somewhat insufficient, but it shall not be justified in its conclusion, and it shall not be argued that there is no error

The grounds of appeal No. 4 are examined.

The court below's decision that it is not possible for the defendant to take such procedures in a situation where the majority of the members are opposing the defendant company to take the crypity, etc., because the procedure for the disciplinary action, etc. of the defendant company, unless there is any counter-proof, is a valid requirement. However, since there is no dispute between the parties that the procedure for the disciplinary action of the defendant company, such as the notification of facts of suspicion, the granting of an opportunity for truth-finding, etc., is not stipulated, the procedure for the disciplinary action of the defendant company, and the procedure for the disciplinary action of the defendant company is not stipulated, and it is not possible for the defendant to take such procedure in a situation where the majority of the members are opposing the defendant company to take the crypity, etc., because the procedure for the disciplinary action of the defendant company, the notification of facts of suspicion, the granting of an opportunity for truth-finding, etc., is not stipulated in the rules for

The grounds of appeal No. 5 are examined.

The reasoning of the court below is that the plaintiffs' assertion that the defendant company's refusal to produce and withdrawal-based employees are against the principle of equity or the principle of equal treatment because it is clear by suspect evidence that the defendant company would not be subject to disciplinary action against the members who completed and refuse to return to normal work, and that the defendant company would not be subject to disciplinary action against the members who returned to the defendant company by taking advantage of their intention to refuse to produce. Thus, it is not sufficient to hold that the defendant's disposition is against the principle of equity or the principle of equal treatment, but it does not include the purport that there is no other members who violated the same degree as the plaintiffs. Thus, the conclusion is justified in its conclusion, and even if the defendant company did not take more action than the above plaintiffs because it did not cause any other members who did not act more severe than the above plaintiffs, it cannot be concluded that it goes against the principle of equity or the principle of equal treatment in disciplinary action.

The issue about this is to return to the fact that there is no reason.

The grounds of appeal No. 6 are examined.

Comprehensively considering the evidence adopted by the court below in light of the records, it can be acknowledged that many members of the plaintiffs were aware of facts against the rules of evidence and that they were found to have committed maritime acts and refused the defendant company to work in the office of the editing bureau without permission at the office of the defendant company during working hours, produced and distributed without permission in violation of the rules of the defendant company, taken office after entering the president of the Korea Press Association against the rules and instructions of the defendant company, refused to produce newspapers and broadcast, and occupied the office and facilities, and refused to work in the defendant company. It cannot be said that there was any error in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence or the incomplete deliberation.

On the other hand, if the facts are different, the act of a political party as an employee was a violation of the prohibition against unfair acts, and even if the freedom of speech should be developed, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs who work for the defendant company should be subject to sanctions against the defendant company's failure to observe the rules and order of the defendant company for the first time.

In the same purport, the original adjudication that rejected the plaintiffs' assertion is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the degree of illegality or disciplinary action and abuse of disciplinary power as a ground for disciplinary action against a legitimate act or a violation of prohibited matters.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Hah- Port (Presiding Justice)