2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

A. The Plaintiff, as a subsidiary of the Na○○○○ Roco World (N○○) a U.S. corporation, is in charge of marketing, sales, brand management, etc. of the products domestically or in the Republic of Korea. The Plaintiff imported and sold golf complete products that were assembled in Thailand and China using showers manufactured in the United States or Japan.

B. As to the golf loans that the Plaintiff imported from Thai countries and China (hereinafter “the golf loans of this case”), the Defendant: (a) posted the instant golf loans to Thailand or China assembly station, originating behind the instant golf loans; (b) however, under Article 33(6) of the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act and Article 58(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the Defendant posted the instant golf loans with the “Made in Hade” or “Main U.S.A.,” and displayed the net golf products originating in Japan or the U.S.; and (c) indicated the instant corrective measures with the “Sain 1” or the “SaM 1, 182” to the Plaintiff on June 30, 201, the Defendant imposed a penalty surcharge of KRW 4,182, and imposed a penalty surcharge of KRW 3,734,00,000 on the front side of the instant golf loans; and (d) indicated the instant corrective measures with the “Sain 1,”or 1, “SaM 1,” or 1,” in Korea.

[Ground of recognition] The facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 2, the purport of the entire pleadings, and the purport of the disposition imposing the penalty surcharge of this case. The plaintiff's assertion (1) is legitimate. The plaintiff's marking "Made in Japan" or "Made in U.S.A.." printed on the golf bonds of this case is directly indicated by the manufacturing company of the showline, and the plaintiff did not indicate that the country of origin should be mistaken because it was affixed with a separate boiler specifying the assembly bureau in the show box in order to clarify the place where each part was assembled.

(2) Article 33(6) of the Foreign Trade Act provides that an act of misleading the country of origin shall be subject to corrective measures and imposition of penalty surcharges on the Plaintiff, but the Defendant concurrently imposed corrective measures and penalty surcharges on the Plaintiff.

(3) The Defendant imposed an excessive penalty surcharge on the Plaintiff’s only one-time violation, and imposed the same penalty surcharge on the part where corrective measures have not been taken even on the part where the corrective measures have not been taken. The imposition of the penalty surcharge in this case is an unlawful disposition that deviates from and abused discretion in violation of the principle of proportionality

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

(1) First, we examine whether it is possible to concurrently impose the instant corrective measure and the instant penalty surcharge in accordance with the relevant statutes.

Article 33(4)1 of the Foreign Trade Act provides that no trader or distributor of goods, etc. shall use a misleading mark of origin; Article 33(6) of the same Act provides that the Minister of Knowledge Economy may order the relevant trader to take corrective measures prescribed by Presidential Decree, such as restoration to the original state, or impose a penalty surcharge not exceeding KRW 300 million on the person who violated paragraph (4). Article 52(1) of the Foreign Trade Act and Article 91(4)4 of the Enforcement Decree thereof provide that the Minister of Knowledge Economy may entrust the head of a customs office with the authority to issue corrective orders or impose penalty surcharges on the act falling under Article 33(6) of the Foreign Trade Act. In light of the language and text of the relevant Act and subordinate statutes, the head of a customs office only provides that a corrective measure and imposition

However, the fact that the Defendant imposed the instant corrective measures and the instant penalty surcharge on the Plaintiff is identical to the previous disposition, and thus, the Defendant’s imposition of the instant penalty surcharge on the instant golf loan violation constitutes an unlawful disposition in violation of Article 33(6) of the Foreign Trade Act to impose the instant penalty surcharge on the Plaintiff after the instant corrective measures were taken.

As to this, the defendant, in addition to the Foreign Trade Act, Article 230 and Article 238 of the Customs Act, and Article 245 of the Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act, provides that corrective measures may be taken in cases where the country of origin is not legitimate. According to the "Guidelines for the Operation of Sanctions against Breach of Origin Labeling", a trader or a distributor of goods, etc. shall indicate the country of origin in violation of Article 33 (4) 1 of the Foreign Trade Act, and if the amount of violation exceeds KRW 100 million, the corrective measures and penalty surcharge may be imposed concurrently in cases of the first violation. Thus, the defendant asserts that the corrective measures in this case are legitimate. However, since the statutes that the defendant used as the basis of the corrective measures in this case are not the Customs Act but Article 33 (6) of the Foreign Trade Act, the possibility of overlapping imposition with the imposition of penalty surcharge in this case cannot be discussed, and the above "Guidelines for the Operation of Measures for the Marking of Origin of Origin," which provides for the scope of imposition of penalty surcharge and penalty surcharge under Article 30 of the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act.

(2) However, given that the instant measures were carried out only 3,743 years of age from the instant golf loans 4,182, there is doubt where it is possible to impose a penalty surcharge on the remainder of 439 years of age without taking corrective measures. However, considering the following circumstances recognized by Gap 3 to 7, Eul 5, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff committed an act of misleading the origin of the instant golf loans, and thus, the instant penalty surcharge is unlawful. In this regard, the instant measures are also indicated in the direction near the instant golf loans (hereinafter referred to as the “SMA”) in the direction of street, in the case of the instant golf products manufactured by Japan, as indicated in the “Made-in-form” or the “SMAM-in-go (hereinafter referred to as the “SMA-in-go”) of the instant golf MINM-E-U.S.-U. MMA-U. MMA-U.M.M.-in-go, each of the instant golf products manufactured in the direction of the “SMARIN-out”.

○ The Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff’s marking on the shower on the front of the shower that the Plaintiff seems to be easy, i.e., a golf-backed assembly, that is, a boiler indicating the country of origin falls under a case where the Defendant affixed a shower on the rear side of the shower and made a mark leading consumers to misunderstand the country of origin. However, in a position at which a person using a golf-related product wing would look at the golf-wing, the place of origin Stack at the bottom of the shower would not be easily seen. However, when selling golf-related products, the Defendant generally stored and displayed the shower at the bottom of the shower. In this case, the place of origin display attached by the Plaintiff is located at the front of the shower, and the place of origin display at the bottom of the shower, and thus, it is a method of indicating the country of origin that is more easily recognizable from the point of purchasing golf-related products.

In many cases, golf bonds are manufactured and assembled by different companies for each part. In this case, the manufacturer marking for each part is being exported by indicating in the process of manufacturing the products in each manufacturing process, not an importer, and only part of the evidence Nos. 2 and 3 are required to make the Plaintiff mistake the origin of golf bonds, thereby making it difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff requested the shower's marking to the shower top of the instant golf loans, or that the contents of the mark have been modified, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

(3) If so, the Plaintiff’s remaining assertion that the instant penalty surcharge was imposed in excess of or abuse of discretion is unlawful without considering the Plaintiff’s remaining argument.

3. Conclusion

If so, the plaintiff's claim is reasonable and acceptable.