1. The summary of the facts charged in the instant case is as follows: (a) around 16:19 on June 16, 2012, the Defendant: (b) in collusion with other participants participating in the “act of walking” during the event of the “flying-down site in the downtown on June 16 to 17, 2012 for the restoration to their original position; and (c) in collusion with other participants, the Defendant interfered with the traffic of ordinary vehicles by occupying and driving the front lane between the two-way roads under the right edge of the Seodaemun and right edge of the road.

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below reversed the judgment of the court of first instance and acquitted the defendant on the ground that it is not sufficient to recognize that the defendant's act of occupying the road, such as the defendant, etc., is an act of temporary interference with the passage of the vehicle, thereby making it impossible or making it considerably difficult to pass through the vehicle, and even if examining the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, it is insufficient to recognize that the defendant interfered with the traffic as much as the passage of the vehicle could not be possible or considerably difficult to pass through the vehicle, on the ground that it is not sufficient to recognize that the defendant's act of temporarily obstructing the passage of the vehicle, and it interfered with traffic as much as the passage of the vehicle could not be possible or considerably difficult.

3. However, it is difficult to accept the above determination by the court below for the following reasons.

A. The purpose of Article 185 of the Criminal Act is to punish all acts that make it impossible or considerably difficult to pass through by causing damage to or infusing land, etc., or interfering with traffic by other means (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Do1926, Jul. 10, 2014). Interference with general traffic constitutes an abstract dangerous crime, and thus, traffic is impossible or considerably difficult if it falls under a situation where traffic is impossible or difficult, and the result of traffic interference does not have to occur practically (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Do4662, Dec. 14, 2007).

B. The following circumstances revealed by the evidence duly adopted by the court below, i.e., the defendant's participation in the "exercise of walking", and the other participants occupy and walked along the way to the right side of the road on June 16, 2012, by the low-speed and high-speed vehicle of the Seodaemun-gu, separated from the Seodaemun-gu, sub-section 16:19 on June 16, 2012. ② The above Seodaemun-gu, high-priced road is not installed on the intersection of the railroad and the roadway, and there is a delivery separate from the roadway. ③ Nevertheless, it seems that the participants, including the defendant, are likely to obstruct the traffic of the vehicle seeking to pass on the roadway, and ④ The above movement is conducted without reporting to the chief of the police station under his jurisdiction, and it seems that the passage of the participants, such as the defendant, etc., is impossible or considerably difficult to reach the general traffic condition or significantly difficult.

Nevertheless, solely on the grounds stated in its reasoning, the lower court acquitted the Defendant of the charges on the grounds that the Defendant could not be deemed to have obstructed traffic to the extent that it makes the passage of vehicles impossible or considerably difficult. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on general traffic obstruction, thereby adversely affecting

4. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok

The Chief Justice Park Jae-young