2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The court's explanation on this part is the same as the corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, it is accepted by Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Relevant statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Form.

3. Summary of the plaintiff's assertion

A. The proviso of Article 21(3) of the Liquor Tax Act, "However, the container costs or packing costs prescribed by Presidential Decree shall not be included in the factory price (the ex-factory price which serves as the tax base for liquor tax)" is a provision which is specially inserted in order to foster the traditional liquor industry. Nevertheless, Article 21(3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Liquor Tax Act, embodying this provision, excludes only the ex-factory price from the ex-factory price limited to only the "price of a particular container manufactured for the purpose of inserting liquor," which is a provision which arbitrarily discriminates against the traditional liquor, such as "in a case where a traditional liquor is contained in a 's own disease' and "in a case where a container is contained in a glass bottle or any other container, it is unlawful against the delegation of the mother law or against the principle of tax equality. Therefore, the above provision of the Enforcement Decree should also be interpreted to exclude the container costs and packing costs from the ex-factory

B. In addition, the proviso of Article 21(3) of the Liquor Tax Act provides that the cost not included in the traditional liquor shipment price shall be excluded from the factory price even if only one of the container price and packing cost is satisfied, by specifying the cost not included in the traditional liquor shipment price as “container price or packing cost.” However, Article 21(3)1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Liquor Tax Act provides that the cost not included in the factory price shall be excluded from the factory price, and it may be interpreted as not being included in the factory price only in the factory price, by stipulating that the cost not included in the factory price is “the cost not included in the factory price” for the purpose of inserting alcoholic beverages, which is “the cost not included in the factory price.” In light of the purpose of the delegated legislation, it should be interpreted as “the

C. In addition, the packing expenses included in the traditional liquor ex-factory price should be excluded from the gift packing expenses. If otherwise interpreted, the traditional liquor manufacturer, once setting up a direct store and then sells gift packaging at a direct store, the gift packing expenses are not included in the ex-factory price, while a traditional liquor manufacturer, if the gift packing expenses are not included in the ex-factory price, and the gift packing expenses are included in the ex-factory price if the gift packaging is shipped out to the traditional liquor manufacturer without having a direct store. This is because it is contrary to the principle of tax equality because it treats the same two substantially differently.

D. In addition, Article 20 (1) 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Liquor Tax Act provides that all manufacturers of alcoholic beverages shall be the "price sold by means of ordinary wholesale quantity and transaction method" (no futures package). Thus, the method of shipping by simply combining alcoholic beverages with lids and attaching labels such as trademarks is a normal shipment method. In this respect, the cost of packing futures should be excluded from the calculation of the ex-factory price.

E. Furthermore, when calculating the ex-factory price between 15 and 15 years, the Plaintiff reported the exclusion of packing expenses, and there is no administrative guidance from the National Tax Service, as well as the Defendant’s person in charge of the payment of liquor tax, to correct the Plaintiff’s liquor tax calculation method. Nevertheless, it is against the principle of proportionality to impose liability on the Plaintiff only and at once on the Plaintiff. In particular, in light of the annual sales amount as a small-scale local traditional liquor manufacturer, the Plaintiff is excessively excessive and thus, in this respect, the instant disposition amount is in violation of the principle of proportionality.

4. Determination

A. Whether there exist grounds for unconstitutionality and illegality under Article 21(3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Liquor Tax Act

In light of the language and text of Article 21(3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Liquor Tax Act, the cost to be excluded from the ex-factory price, which is the tax base of liquor tax, is interpreted as only "the price of the packages for packing the alcoholic beverages ( regardless of whether it is a traditional liquor)". Otherwise, it should be interpreted as including the interpretation method claimed by the Plaintiff, the "defensive disease containing the traditional liquor" or "the price of the packages for packing the traditional liquor" by distinguishing the packing cost of the traditional liquor, and the argument that it should be interpreted as "the price of the magnetic disease containing the alcoholic beverages" or "the price of the packages for packing the traditional liquor" exceeds the grammatic scope of the above Enforcement Decree. In principle, the tax reduction and exemption requirements under the principle of no taxation without law shall be strictly interpreted in accordance with the legal text unless there are special circumstances, and shall not be expanded or analogical interpretation without reasonable grounds.

However, considering that the court can control specific norms, it seems that the plaintiff's assertion includes the purport that "the provisions of the former Enforcement Decree of the Liquor Tax Act are exceeded the scope of delegated legislation or are contrary to the principle of tax equality, so it may be interpreted beyond the possible scope of the language and text as part of specific norm control (which goes beyond simply excluding the application of the above Enforcement Decree)." In this respect, it can be seen that Article 21 (3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Liquor Tax Act includes the purport that "The above provision is unconstitutional and illegal as alleged by the plaintiff."

1) Whether it is unconstitutional or unlawful to limit the exclusion criteria from the ex-factory price to "in a case where an alcoholic beverage is contained in a self-disease"

The Plaintiff’s assertion is based on the premise that the purport of the proviso of Article 21(3) of the Liquor Tax Act is to reduce liquor tax on traditional liquor manufacturers in order to foster the traditional liquor industry. However, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is difficult to deem that the foregoing provision is the same as the Plaintiff’s assertion. Rather, in light of the language, structure, amendment process, etc. of the proviso of Article 21(3) of the Liquor Tax Act, it appears to the purport that the Plaintiff is eligible for exemption from ex-factory price by Presidential Decree (within the scope of container cost or packing cost) considering various policy purposes, financial situation, etc., given the fact that the above provision is not “whether the scope of exemption from ex-factory price is a traditional manufacturer” according to the delegation of the mother’s law, and it is determined that the above provision is only to determine whether the above provision is a traditional manufacturer or not to contain alcohol in a traditional liquor against the delegation of the mother’s law. Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

2) Whether it is unconstitutional or unlawful to exclude only packing expenses for packing an active disease containing alcohol from the ex-factory price.

In addition, as seen earlier, the proviso of Article 21(3) of the Liquor Tax Act is merely deemed to comprehensively delegate to the Presidential Decree whether the goods are excluded from the shipment price within the scope of the container cost or packing cost, and there is no circumstance to interpret that the above mother law set the delegation scope, “the container cost and packing cost should be separately stipulated, as alleged by the Plaintiff.” Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

(b) Whether it is against the principle of tax equality to include the forward price in the forward price.

Although the purport of this part of the plaintiff's assertion is unclear, when comparing a traditional liquor manufacturer with a traditional liquor manufacturer who has a direct sales outlet, the packing expenses under the main sentence of Article 21 (3) of the Liquor Tax Act should be interpreted as not including futures packing expenses, or the packing expenses for packing "in order to pack" under Article 21 (3) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Liquor Tax Act should be interpreted as the packing expenses for traditional liquor (which is part of the specific norm control). Thus, it should be viewed as the following.

However, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is basically premised on the fact that a traditional liquor manufacturer who has established a direct sales store and packages futures in a direct sales store and a traditional liquor manufacturer who has packed futures in the factory without establishing a direct sales store. However, the original purpose of establishing a direct sales store is to facilitate alcoholic beverage supply at a long distance. ② In the case of establishing a direct sales store, the direct sales store is separately registered as a separate place of business and transactions between a manufactory and a direct sales outlet and a direct sales outlet, and ③ the installation and operation cost of a direct sales store are required. In light of the fact that the direct sales store and the direct sales store need to be separately established, it is judged that the direct sales store are different. Accordingly, it is difficult to see that both are treated differently, and that the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

(c) Whether any futures packing expenses are excluded from the scope of ordinary prices;

If the relevant provisions other than subparagraph 1 of Article 20(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Liquor Tax Act and the relevant Enforcement Decree are systematically interpreted, the ordinary transaction method is an opposite concept to salt sales, credit sales, and free supply, and it seems that the operator’s packaging of gift is not reasonable. In other words, if a manufacturer packages a gift, it is interpreted that the packing cost should be considered as a usual manufacturer on the premise that the gift is included in the ex-factory price and is the package of the gift. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

D. Whether the principle of proportionality is violated

Inasmuch as the Plaintiff’s separate written statement explicitly stated that the Plaintiff’s method of calculating liquor tax is lawful, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s return of liquor tax for 15 years in the liquor tax payment process, which is the method of filing a return, was in violation of the principle of proportionality solely on the grounds that the Defendant did not raise any special objection to the Plaintiff’s return of liquor tax for 15 years. Moreover, even if there were repeated practices for 15 years, such practices do not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality, insofar as such practices violate the relevant statutes. Furthermore, in light of the Plaintiff’s trust in the payer of liquor tax by properly interpreting the law, the issue of equity between such business entity and the Plaintiff, and the public interest such as the establishment of consistent tax administration, etc., even if the amount of taxation is the maximum amount compared to the Plaintiff’

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

5. Conclusion

If so, the plaintiff's claim of this case must be dismissed due to the lack of reason, so the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal shall be dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per