A. In regard to the mistake of facts or misapprehension of the legal principle, the Defendant was aware that his act was used in illegal foreign exchange transactions, such as casino exchange, but was not aware that he was used in licensing.

Therefore, the Defendant cannot be deemed to have conspiredd to commit the instant fraud.

Even if the defendant is held liable for the crime of fraud following the instant Bophishing crime, since the defendant is not recognized to have functional control over the crime, only the aiding and abetting offender, who is not the joint principal offender of the crime of fraud, is established.

B. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (one year, six months of imprisonment and confiscation) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. In relation to the assertion of mistake of facts or misapprehension of legal principles, the conspiracy does not require any legal punishment, but is only a combination of two or more persons to jointly process and realize a crime. If the combination of the intent is made by successively or implicitly going through the process of the crime, the conspiracy relationship is established. As long as such solicitation was made, even those who did not directly participate in the act of execution shall be held liable as a co-principal for the other co-offenders' acts.

Therefore, it cannot be denied the public-private partnership relationship even though the public-private partnership's method of deception was different in detail from that of deception.

(2) In light of the aforementioned legal principles, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the establishment of a crime, and did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the establishment of a crime, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the establishment of a crime, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.