1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

A. Examining the contents of the terms and conditions of the electricity supply and the detailed rules applicable to the instant case, the penalty under the said terms and conditions of the electricity supply can be deemed as having the nature of liquidated damages and penalty (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da112032, Apr. 11, 2013). In such a case, it is reasonable to deem that the penalty may be reduced based on the total amount of penalty pursuant to Article 398(2) of the Civil Act.

However, even if a reduction is made on the basis of the total amount of penalty, the amount equivalent to the evasion electrical charge (including the electricity fund and value added tax) out of the penalty is the amount that the customer has to have been paid as a matter of course by electric charges, and thus, it is not permissible to reduce the amount less than the evasion electrical charge, barring any special circumstance.

B. The lower court determined that the penalty of this case can be reduced in its entirety, and determined, on the grounds stated in its reasoning, that the penalty to be borne by the Defendant from November 2008 to June 201, 201 is equivalent to the sum of the electric charges for evasion of reserve power and the penalty charges for penalty charges, etc., and that from the following day, it is reasonable to determine it as the amount equivalent to the electric charges for evasion of reserve power.

C. In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the legal nature of the penalty, the possibility of reducing the penalty, and the excessive amount of liquidated damages under the electricity supply terms and conditions of supply, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

A. As to the necessity of the first supply system and the grounds of appeal relating to the “Defendant’s desired intention”, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine.