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(영문) 대법원 1976. 9. 28. 선고 76도2143 판결

[직무유기,직권남용(직무유기교사로변경),뇌물수수,가중뇌물수수,공갈][공1976.11.1.(547),9375]

Main Issues

(a) The relationship in which he abandons his duties with respect to the same fact, and aids and abets the abandonment of duties;

B. Whether the protocol of examination of witness conducted by the judge prior to the first trial date is admissible upon the request of the public prosecutor

Summary of Judgment

A. The crime of neglecting duties against the defendant is a crime of neglecting the duty to report the investigation affairs and investigate duties such as the number of the defendant himself/herself, and the crime of neglecting duties is not a crime of aiding and abetting the defendant to neglect his/her duty to report and investigate duties of a third person on the above facts, but a crime of aiding and abetting and abetting the defendant to report and investigate duties of a third person on the above facts.

B. As long as the prosecutor requests the examination of a witness under Article 221-2 (2) and (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the judge deems such request reasonable, the protocol of examination of witness shall be admissible as evidence if the prosecutor examines the witness before the first trial date, in accordance with Article 221-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 1 and four others

Defense Counsel

Attorney Park Jong-chul (Defendant 1) (Presiding Justice), Kim Chang-chul, and 00

original decision

Gwangju High Court Decision 76No54 delivered on June 10, 1976

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

In case of Defendant 1, one hundred days of detention prior to the imposition of sentence shall be included in the principal sentence.

Reasons

Defendant 1’s defense counsel’s grounds of appeal Nos. 1, 2, and 4 and Defendant 2’s grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 3 are also examined.

According to the judgment of the court below and the judgment of the court of first instance, Defendant 2, as the chief of the investigation station of the first police station, did not perform his/her duty to report the abandonment of a crime under Article 10 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, and Defendant 2, as the chief of the investigation officer of the first police station, conspired with the above duty to report the abandonment of a crime under Article 10 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes and the above duty to report the abandonment of a crime under Article 10 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes and Article 10 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, although he/she did not perform his/her duty to report the abandonment of a crime under Article 10 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes and Article 10 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, he/she did not request the public prosecutor of the prosecutor's office to report it to the effect that he/she did not start an investigation, without justifiable reason.

According to the records, it is reasonable that the judgment of the first instance court, which was cited by the court below, recognized the facts of Article 3.5 (A) at the time of the first instance trial against Defendant 1, based on each evidence at the time, and applied the facts of (a) as the crime of the acceptance of bribe with respect to the facts of (b) as the crime of the acceptance of bribe. There is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the crime of the abandonment of duties and the crime of the acceptance of bribe as it was acknowledged without any evidence, or contrary to the theory of lawsuit, and there

The grounds of appeal No. 6 are examined as follows.

The issue is that the preservation of evidence under Article 184 of the Criminal Procedure Act can be conducted by a judge at the request of the parties only when there are circumstances where it is difficult to use the evidence unless the evidence is preserved in advance, and thus, the procedure for preserving evidence for witnesses who do not need to be preserved in advance is illegal evidence, and there is no ability to do so, and therefore, the court below that adopted such evidence erred in finding the facts of guilt based on non-Admissibility of evidence.

However, according to the records, the prosecutor requested the examination of witness under Article 221-2 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and Article 221-2 and Article 221-2 of the above Criminal Procedure Act, in case where a person who is obviously recognized as having knowledge of facts indispensable for the investigation of a crime voluntarily makes a statement to the prosecutor or a judicial police officer, but it is likely that such statement may be different from that before the date of the first trial, and such statement is indispensable for the proof of a crime, the prosecutor may request the judge to examine the witness only before the first trial date, and the judge in receipt of such request has the same authority as the court or the presiding judge in relation to the examination of the witness. Thus, the judge in receipt of the request for examination of witness by the public prosecutor recognizes the request as reasonable, and the examination of the witness was conducted before the first trial date in accordance with Article 221-2 of the above Act, so long as the witness examination is admissible, it is without merit.

Defendant 2’s ground of appeal No. 2 and the ground of appeal No. 1 of this Article are examined together.

At around 07:00 on the date of July 1974, Defendant 2 received a bribe of KRW 50,00 from Nonindicted 5 under the pretext of honorarium for the government's wrongful release of grain, and Defendant 3 received a bribe of KRW 50,000 on the same day at around 10:0 on the date of June of the same year, by threatening Nonindicted 5 on the fact of wrongful release of grain, in light of the records, the process of evidence cooking, which was adopted by the court of first instance as cited by the court below, was examined in light of the records, and it is just in light of the records, and even if Nonindicted 5 was in a necessary co-offender relationship with Defendant 2, such as the theory of lawsuit, even if the court below accepted Nonindicted 5's statement and accepted the above original judgment against Defendant 2, and it cannot be deemed unlawful, and there were no errors in violation of the rules of evidence in the original judgment or in violation of the principle of equity like the theory of lawsuit. Therefore, all of the arguments are without merit.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below, Defendant 3 and 5 of this case are also examined as well as Defendant 5’s defense counsel, Kim Chang-chul, and Defendant 3 and 5’s ground of appeal in this white district. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below, the above Defendants conspired with Defendant 3 and 5 of the court of first instance to make an investigation report to the public prosecutor of the competent public prosecutor’s office with respect to the facts of smuggling and smuggling-related violence as stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, and even though they were obligated to investigate, they hear the horses of Defendant 1, such as wartime, without reporting it to the public prosecutor of the competent public prosecutor’s office without any justifiable reason(s) and acknowledged by the evidence of this case that they were abandoned without any investigation, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the rules of evidence or failing to exhaust all deliberations as to the facts charged against Defendant 1, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to abandonment of duty in the original judgment.

Therefore, all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed, and one hundred days of pre-trial detention prior to the imposition of judgment shall be included in the principal sentence in accordance with Article 57 of the Criminal Act against Defendant 1. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Lee Young-young (Presiding Justice)