B. Whether the defect in paragraph (1) is extinguished by ratification at the appellate court

B. In light of Article 394(2) of the Civil Procedure Act by analogy, if the parties ratified the procedure of the lower court as legitimate explicitly or implicitly after the judgment, the grounds for appeal or grounds for retrial under Article 01 of the Civil Procedure Act ought to be deemed extinguished.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

Despite the suspension of litigation proceedings due to the death of the party, the final judgment which has been rendered after the conclusion of the pleadings has been rendered by the party members (referring to the judgment to be discarded in the front).

However, since the basic principles of the Civil Procedure Act requiring the rescue of the plaintiff and the defendant from the beginning in cases where a person who was deceased and did not exist as a party to a lawsuit were disregarded, the judgment under such circumstances shall be deemed null and void. However, if a lawsuit was instituted lawfully with the structure of the counter-party and either party becomes disqualified due to the death of one of the parties during the lawsuit, the structure of the counter-party does not exist, and the lawsuit from that time to that time exists with the relation with the heir who would naturally lead to his status. However, since the heir could not proceed with the lawsuit until the time of taking over the lawsuit, which is the procedure of external appearance where the lawsuit was followed, the legal procedure shall be interrupted until the lawful transferee becomes able to participate in the lawsuit by taking over the procedure, and the judgment shall be deemed null and void, but the judgment shall not be deemed to have been null and void by Article 1601 of the Civil Procedure Act (see Article 281 of the Civil Procedure Act). 162 of the Civil Procedure Act (see Article 3601 of the Civil Procedure Act). 362 of the judgment, supra.

Therefore, as in the case of this case where the heir received a judgment after the judgment was rendered and received a request for resumption, or where the heir actually received a written appeal and submitted a written appeal, and even in the case of taking over the procedure in the final appeal, the takeover and the final appeal shall be deemed lawful, and it shall not be dismissed in view of the fact that the final appeal was made without a judgment.

In addition, in light of Article 394(2) of the Civil Procedure Act by analogy, if the parties confirm that the procedure of the court below is legitimate explicitly or implicitly after the judgment, the grounds for appeal or grounds for retrial shall be deemed extinguished (see Supreme Court Decision 63Da703 delivered on December 12, 1963).

According to the records and explanatory materials of this case, the defendants and non-party 1, who were the defendants and non-party 1, were primarily purchased the land of this case from the deceased non-party 2, who was the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, around 1942. Preliminaryly, the judgment of the court of first which dismissed all plaintiff's primary and conjunctive claims on July 16, 1993 due to the completion of prescription by occupying the land of this case in peace and public performance from 1942 to the deceased non-party 2, who was the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the plaintiff's heir of the above non-party 1, who was the plaintiff's heir of this case, and dismissed the above part of the plaintiff's appeal 1 and the plaintiff's appeal.

Thus, the lawsuit of this case between the plaintiff and the above non-party 1 was interrupted due to the death of Dong on August 30, 1993, when the court below had been pending at the court below. Thus, the court below's decision as to the non-party 1, which was declared after the conclusion of pleadings by the defendants, who are their inheritors, without proceeding such as the taking-off of the lawsuit, was erroneous in the litigation procedure representing the non-party 1. However, the defendants appointed an attorney in the above non-party 1's name, who was deceased without taking the procedure such as taking-off of the lawsuit at the court below, and appointed an attorney in the above non-party 1's name without taking the procedure such as taking-off of the lawsuit at the court below's decision, and again filed an appeal for the taking-off of the lawsuit at the court below, and it is reasonable to view that the above attorney's appeal was lawful in the court below's judgment as to the non-party 1's above procedural defects, and therefore, the appeal of this case was unlawful in accordance with Articles 394 and 58.

A party member’s final and conclusive judgment rendered during the interruption of a previous litigation proceeding is a judgment rendered to a person who has not existed due to death, etc. as a party, and thus cannot be subject to a final and conclusive appeal. As such, the final and conclusive judgment rendered during the interruption of a previous litigation proceeding is null and void, and thus, the relevant final and conclusive appeal is unlawful (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 81Da8, Dec. 28, 1982; Supreme Court Decision 92Da10661, Jun. 12, 192; Supreme Court Decision 92Da1394, Jun. 12, 1992; etc.). However, all of these precedents conflict with the judgment

2. We examine the Defendants’ grounds of appeal.

According to the records, the court below recognized the fact that the plaintiff clan appointed the non-party 2, etc. as the manager of the land of this case from around 1942 to the closing date of pleadings in the court below, and held that the prescription for the acquisition of possession was completed on December 31, 1962 after 20 years from the above occupancy date. On the other hand, the defendants who are his wife and the non-party 3, the above non-party 3, the registered titleholder of the land of this case, died on January 10, 1968 and were succeeded jointly according to the statutory inheritance share ratio (the original judgment does not contain the inheritance share of the defendant 5, but it is obvious that the inheritance share of the defendant 4 is a clerical error, which was corrected by the decision of correction of the party's trial), and there is no error of law such as violation of the rules of evidence, incomplete deliberation or misapprehension of legal principles, etc. like the theory of lawsuit.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by all participating Justices on the bench.

Chief Justice Yoon-hee (Presiding Justice) (Presiding Justice), Kim Jong-soo, Justice Kim Jong-ho, Justice Kim Jong-ho, Justice Park Jong-ho, and Justice Lee Jae-hee-hee, Justice Lee Jong-hee, Justice Lee Jae-hee, Justice Lee Jong-hee, and Justice Lee Jae-hee