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(영문) 대법원 1982. 3. 23. 선고 81도1450 판결

[특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반등][공1982.6.1.(681),480]

Main Issues

A. Whether a criminal trial is inconsistent with a final and conclusive administrative judgment (negative)

B. Party capacity of a company for which the defendant's case has been resolved or registered for termination of liquidation

Summary of Judgment

A. As long as the criminal case against a taxpayer is pending and the administrative judgment revoking the disposition of tax evasion with respect to the amount of tax evasion becomes final and conclusive, the scope of tax liability inconsistent with the administrative judgment cannot be separately determined in the criminal trial.

B. Even if a company was prosecuted for a case corresponding to the property type before the dissolution and liquidation registration, and the registration of the completion of liquidation has been completed, the liquidation affairs of the company shall not be completed until the defendant's case is completed, and the ability of the party shall continue to exist under the Criminal Procedure Act.

[Reference Provisions]

(a) Article 13 of the Administrative Litigation Act;

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 1 and three others

Defense Counsel

Attorney Kim Young-ju (Presiding over the defendants)

original decision

Seoul High Court Decision 76No2101 delivered on February 19, 1981

Text

The part of the lower judgment against Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The appeals by Defendant 3 and Defendant 4 are dismissed.

Reasons

1. We examine the second ground of appeal as to Defendant 1 and Defendant 2’s tax evasion against Defendant 2, which is, the judgment of the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the validity of administrative judgment.

When an administrative judgment revoking an administrative disposition becomes final and conclusive, the illegality of the administrative disposition becomes final and conclusive. The effect of the administrative disposition is retroactively extinguished at the time of the disposition without any separate administrative act, and its effect is the same as that of the first time that the disposition was not executed, i.e., the formation power of the revocation judgment is invalid for any third party other than the parties concerned, and the revocation judgment is binding on the parties concerned and the administrative agencies concerned as to the case (Article 13 of the Administrative Litigation Act). Thus, even if an administrative agency is not involved in the case concerned, even if it does not participate in the case, it is binding upon the administrative agency to make a new disposition that is inconsistent with the order of the judgment, and the administrative agency concerned also includes the administrative agency to take a disposition, or to take a incidental disposition related thereto, on the basis

In addition, although the judgment revoking an administrative disposition means preventing any inconsistency in the reasons that are recognized as effective, it is a special effect granted only to the administrative judgment revoking the administrative disposition in order to ensure the effective remedy of the winning plaintiff. Thus, in this case, in a case where the judgment revoking the tax imposition becomes final and conclusive as in this case, it shall be interpreted that the court which rendered a judgment on the administrative case shall also follow the judgment on the administrative case in case of other civil or criminal cases, and if the amount of the tax imposition becomes a preliminary issue in other civil or criminal cases, the court which rendered a judgment on these civil or criminal cases shall also comply with the judgment on the administrative case, and if any other judgment is inconsistent with this, it shall be interpreted that the above purport recognized as effective in the administrative judgment revoking the administrative disposition would result in

Therefore, as the criminal case of tax evasion against a taxpayer has become final and conclusive in the administrative judgment that revokes the disposition of tax evasion while the criminal case of tax evasion is pending, the scope of tax liability inconsistent with the administrative judgment cannot be determined separately in the criminal trial.

However, according to the contents of each judgment of the court below among the records of the administrative verification of this case, since the Government imposed additional tax on defendant 2 corporation as of June 10, 1976, including corporate tax of 1973 through 1975, it is recognized that the court below evaded the payment of tin export amount of 739,339,142 won (1,686,684), the amount of corporate tax and defense tax of 317,601,638,135 won which is equivalent to 87,637,638,135 won, which is 97,379, which is the Seoul High Court's 77,279, which is the 1979, which is the 197, 1979, which is the 197, 1977, which is the 197, 197, which is the 197, 1970, which is the 197, if the 97, 197, etc.

According to the above final and conclusive administrative decision, since the portion omitted in the book of mineral export among the amounts recognized by the court below as corporate income in 1973-1975 against Defendant 2 corporation is not included in the income amount in the corresponding year, and there was no tax claim in the corresponding part in the corresponding year. Accordingly, under the premise that the above tax claim is liable for tax payment in the corresponding year, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles of the validity of the administrative judgment as stated above and affected the conclusion of the judgment, and it is reasonable to discuss this point. Since the above part and the remaining facts charged by the court below against the defendants are in a substantive competition relationship, the court below's decision on the remaining grounds for appeal against the defendants should be reversed.

2. We examine the grounds of appeal against Defendant 4 corporation.

If a company is dissolved by a resolution of the general meeting of shareholders of November 2, 1977 and the liquidation procedure was completed as of December 8, 1978 after the dissolution was completed as of April 28 of the same year, the liquidation registration was completed as of April 28 of the same year, barring special circumstances, it shall be deemed that the corporation was deprived of its legal personality and lost its legal capacity and its legal capacity. Thus, it shall be deemed that the case constitutes the time when the corporation which is the defendant under Article 329 (1) 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act ceases to exist, unless special circumstances exist. However, the case where the company is prosecuted for a case falling under the category of property due to a violation on its business or property before dissolution or liquidation registration as in this case is included in the existing affairs of the liquidator (Article 254 (1) 1 of the Commercial Act even if the liquidation completion registration of the defendant company was completed, the liquidation affairs of the defendant company shall not be completed until the completion of the case, and it shall not affect the judgment of the court below.

3. We examine the grounds of appeal regarding Defendant 3’s violation of the Foreign Exchange Control Act.

According to Article 11 (1) 4 of the Foreign Exchange Control Act and the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, even if a person who stays in a foreign country with permanent sovereignty and stays in Korea for not less than three months, the defendant is considered a resident. According to the records of the Korea Certification Institute (1155), the defendant has been staying in Korea for not less than three months over several times, and the defendant has dispatched not less than one year over one year after entry into and departure from Korea since 1966, and has operated a factory of Pung Pung Industrial in Korea. According to Article 1-12 (1) 1 of the above provision, if a person who works in a domestic place of business or is engaged in business in the Republic of Korea with permanent sovereignty is deemed a foreigner, the defendant is deemed a resident, and there is no reason to oppose the decision of the court below, and there is no sufficient ground to acknowledge the facts of the judgment of the court of first instance as evidence and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to whether it is reasonable to recognize the facts of appeal or appeal.

Therefore, all appeals by Defendant 3 and Defendant 4 are without merit. Each of the judgment below is reversed, and this part is remanded to the Seoul High Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kang Young-young (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1981.2.19.선고 76노2101
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