2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A notice of change in income amount of KRW 1,100,000 shall be revoked.

A. The Plaintiff is a KOSDAQ-listed corporation that operates the business of developing, supplying, and consulting services for a software system for educational institutions, and deposited KRW 1,100,000,000 in the account under the name of the EEE Cultural Foundation (hereinafter referred to as the “instant Foundation”) designated by the decoration in the process of accepting DD Middle Schools located at OO (hereinafter referred to as “DDD”) in the course of accepting the said Association. < Amended by Act No. 11374, Dec. 28, 2012; Act No. 11505, Jan. 1, 2013; Act No. 11604, Jan. 1, 2013; Act No. 160

B. On January 10, 2013, the Defendant: (a) deemed that the Plaintiff deposited to the Foundation of this case on January 10, 2013 (hereinafter “instant claim amount”) as a honorarium forCC; and (b) notified the Plaintiff on August 29, 2014 of the change in the amount of income at KRW 1,100,000,000 (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

C. The Plaintiff, who was dissatisfied with the instant disposition, filed an appeal with the Tax Tribunal on November 27, 2014, but was dismissed on February 23, 2015.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 2, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Table related statutes.

3. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

(a) Facts of recognition;

1) The operating entity of the DD is not the CC or school juristic person FF (hereinafter referred to as “FFF”) that it substantially operates, but the HH (hereinafter referred to as “HH”) of the school juristic person, the president of which is the DoG.

2) At the time of carrying out the DNA acceptance, the Plaintiff knew the actual operator of the FF as the FF, and decided to select a form of donation to the hospital, church, foundation, etc. with which both parties agree in order to avoid any conflict with the Private School Act, etc.

3) The Plaintiff drafted a "Agreement on Donation" with the FF as the other party to a public interest corporation run by FF with the grant of KRW 2.1 billion (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement on Donation"), and agreed to receive KRW 2.1 billion contributed to the instant foundation from FF if the acceptance of DD becomes legally final and conclusive by the decision of rejection by the competent office of education, and theCC guaranteed the above repayment obligation.

4) The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit againstCC, etc. seeking the return of KRW 2,50,000,000,000, including the amount at issue, and argued to the effect that “CC would return KRW 2,455,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 5, 8 through 10, Eul evidence 2 through 5 (including branch numbers for those with serial numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of whole pleadings

B. As to whether the issue amount constitutes a honorarium forCC

1) The Plaintiff asserts that the amount of issue should be considered as a donation since it avoided the method of directly paying money to the chief executive officer, etc. of the school foundation in order to accept DD through legitimate means, and donated the key issues to the instant foundation. In light of the aforementioned facts and evidence, comprehensively considering the overall purport of arguments, the Plaintiff paid the key amount to the effect that the Plaintiff received DD school sites and teachers, etc. free of charge with the right to operate the school. However, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff took the form of paying donations to the instant foundation to avoid possession of violation of the Private School Act.

① Under the agreement on donation of this case, the purport of the agreement on donation of this case lies in the agreement on donation of this case.

② In order to make it impossible for the Plaintiff to receive DoD from the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff demanded the refund of the amount of the Foundation’s donation to CC and FF and prepared a letter of request for return, and filed a lawsuit against CC, GG, etc. for return.

③ The Plaintiff, as the money necessary for acquiring Doddddddds, only paid the key amount, and was anticipated to be used for the public works of the Foundation of this case, or not paid with such intent.

2) The Plaintiff is not merely a mere intermediary, and thus the person to whom the income accrues shall be entitled to DD.

The Plaintiff asserts that HHH or its chief executive officer should be GIST. In light of the aforementioned facts, as seen earlier, the Plaintiff consulted on the acquisition ofCC and DDD, paid donations to public-service corporations designated byCC, and demanded the return of donations to HH or DD, other than HH or GG, for which the receipt of DD was impossible, and the Plaintiff demanded the return of donations to HH or DD, which was not HH or GG. In light of the fact that the Plaintiff agreed to pay the price for completing the DD receipt procedure, and that the amount was paid to the instant foundation designated byCC in accordance with the agreement, and that the amount of donations was paid to the GG, etc. thereafter, did not affect its competent owner’s recognition asCC.

3) We cannot accept the Plaintiff’s assertion that the key issue amount of the instant case was paid toCC as honorariums and leaked out of the country as seen earlier, and thus, it is not subject to disposition of income as a business expense or an expected claim to be collected.

4) On the other hand, the Plaintiff asserts that it is not allowed to regard the issue amount equivalent to the amount of fraud fraud as other income because it was convicted of fraud regarding the issue amount, etc. The Plaintiff asserts that it is not allowed to regard the issue amount equivalent to the amount of fraud fraud as other income. In light of the following circumstances that can be acknowledged by comprehensively taking into account the purport of the entire arguments, namely, the fact thatCC actually paid 2 billion won out of the amount received from the Plaintiff to GGG as the purchase price of D, and that DD acquisition business was final and conclusive, but the relevant procedures, such as the establishment of school foundation, HH’s free donation agreement, etc., were in progress until that time, and the decision of non-permission by the competent Office of Education related to the acquisition of DD was based on the financial condition of HH. In light of the above facts, there is no evidence to deem that CC had been well aware of the internal situation of H.

The only written statements of the text and written indictment are insufficient to recognize thatCC, even though it did not have the intention or ability to accept DD from the beginning to obtain it from the Plaintiff, by deceiving the Plaintiff, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it (the above decisions cited by the Plaintiff are the criminal facts thatCC, after the decision of non-permission of this case, deceives the Plaintiff into 1.7 billion won out of the acquisition price, and it does not constitute the first part of the acquisition price, as alleged by the Plaintiff.)

5) Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the amount at issue is reverted toCC as “a recompense” under Article 21(1)17 of the former Income Tax Act. On a different premise, the prior Plaintiff’s assertion cannot be accepted.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.