A. The defendant is co-defendants of the first instance trial (in the case of a person other than the plaintiff) and each of them;

(1) 48,084,731 won and 5% per annum from March 1, 2011 to January 25, 2013 and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment;

(2) 47,184,731 won and 5% per annum from March 1, 2011 to January 25, 2013, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment;

(3) The amount calculated by applying 5% per annum from March 1, 2011 to January 25, 2013, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment, to Plaintiff 3.

under payment.

B. All remaining claims of the plaintiffs are dismissed.

2. Of the total litigation costs, 70% shall be borne by the Plaintiffs, and the remainder 30% shall be borne by the Defendant.

3. The part of paragraph 1 (a) may be provisionally executed.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 1 170,402,181 won, 167,402,181 won, 3,000 won to the plaintiff 3, and each of the above amounts, 5% per annum from March 1, 2011 to the service date of a duplicate of the application for extension of the claim of this case, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment (the plaintiff 1 and the plaintiff 2 extended the purport of the claim in the trial, and the plaintiff 3 reduced the claim in the trial).

2. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiffs

The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiffs shall be revoked. The defendant shall pay to plaintiffs 1 32,056,487 won, 31,456,487 won, 600 won to plaintiffs 3, and 600,000 won, and 5% per annum from March 22, 2011 to October 20, 201, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

B. Defendant

The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the defendant shall be revoked, and all plaintiffs' claims against the defendant corresponding to the revoked part shall be dismissed.

(1)The reasoning for this part of the court's explanation is that "(a)" in the main sentence of "1. basic facts of the judgment of the court of first instance is deleted, and "(b)(1)" is "(hereinafter "non-party 1") of the court of first instance, and "co-defendants of the court of first instance (hereinafter "co-defendants of the court of first instance (hereinafter "non-party 1")" are released from the deceased on June 23, 2010 to the front and rear 102 front of the Daegu Suwon-gu 102 front of the ○○○ 102 Gerode No. 102 entrance, and it is difficult for the deceased to see the above 8 (the first half of the judgment of the court of first instance to see the deceased's front and rear 1.0 billion won on the road prior to the above entrance," and it is hard for the deceased to see the deceased's front 1.00 billion won on the deceased's face.

2. Determination as to the plaintiffs' claims

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

The police officers belonging to the defendant found the deceased's vehicle on board the above joint defendant of the first instance trial (overboard: offboard person), and caused the death of the deceased at the wind that could not arrest the joint defendant of the first instance trial (overboard person) due to fraudulent investigation, such as blocking the anticipated escape route or neglecting inspection and search, etc. Even after finding out the vehicle of the deceased on board the above joint defendant of the first instance trial (overboard person), the police officers belonging to the defendant caused the death of the deceased. In light of the police officers' duties of protecting the life, body, etc. of the citizen, the above omission in the process of arrest of the joint defendant of the first instance trial (overboard person): the defendant's joint defendant of the first instance trial (overboard person): the defendant of the first instance court (overboard person); the defendant is liable for damages of KRW 300,000,000,000 won ; KRW 250,000,000,000 won ; KRW 4081,50,000 won 281,2501.

B. Occurrence of liability for damages

1) Relevant legal principles

In State liability, harmful acts by public officials must be in violation of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes. “Violation of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes” refers to not only violations of strict meaning but also violations of human rights, such as respect, prohibition of abuse of power, good faith and good faith, and good morals, lack of objective legitimacy (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da70180, Dec. 24, 2009). Police officers include prevention, suppression and investigation of crimes, protection of people’s lives, bodies and property, and maintenance of public peace and order as well as other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers and the Criminal Procedure Act, etc. For the smooth performance of their duties. Accordingly, police officers performing specific duties can take necessary measures by appropriately exercising their authority assigned to police officers in response to all circumstances. However, if police officers perform duties related to suppression and investigation of crimes under specific circumstances, 209Da70180, which is considerably unreasonable for a police officer to have imposed authority to police officers to take measures, such as 200, purpose or degree of loss of police officers’ capacity.

2) Determination

A) In the event a police officer performs his duties under the judgment that the best measures are taken within the scope of his/her human and material capacity in a specific situation, a report on the future results shall not be readily deemed to have been at fault in the performance of his/her duties or to be illegal. However, in the instant case, considering the following facts or circumstances acknowledged by comprehensively taking into account the result of on-site inspection conducted by the court of the first instance on the evidence as seen earlier, in light of the limitation of the Defendant’s human and material capacity, the performance of duties by a police officer conducted in the process of discovering and setting the suspected vehicles driven by a co-defendant of the first instance trial (hereinafter referred to as the “co-defendant”), where it is deemed that the failure to exercise his/her authority is considerably unreasonable due to the failure to take necessary measures, and thus, it is deemed that such failure

(1) 제1심 공동피고(대판:소외인)가 저지른 망인에 대한 인질강도 범행은 그 성격상 인질의 생명과 신체에 심각한 위해를 초래할 수 있는 고도의 위험성이 수반된 것으로, 납치신고가 이루어진 시점부터 제1심 공동피고(대판:소외인)를 발견하고 놓칠 때까지의 수사경과에 비추어 보면, 당시 제1심 공동피고(대판:소외인)가 타고 있던 모닝 승용차를 발견하고도 놓친 ▷▷경찰서 형사과 강력1팀 소속 경찰관들인 소외 2 등(이하, ‘검문 경찰관들’이라 한다)도 제1심 공동피고(대판:소외인)에 의하여 저질러진 망인에 대한 인질강도 범행의 위험성을 인지하고 있었을 뿐만 아니라, 제1심 공동피고(대판:소외인)가 망인을 모닝 승용차에 태우고 다닐 가능성 또한 예상할 수 있었을 것으로 보인다(제1심 공동피고(대판:소외인) 외에 인질강도 범행의 공범이 존재한다는 어떠한 정황도 발견되지 않았다). 이러한 경우 위 검문 경찰관들로서는, 경찰의 추적이 시작될 경우 제1심 공동피고(대판:소외인)가 수단과 방법을 가리지 않고 필사적으로 도주할 것임을 능히 예상할 수 있다.

(2) Codefendants of the first instance trial (out of the counter-board: out of the counter-board) found a valid boarding car of the co-defendants of the first instance trial (out of the counter-board) and the police officers of the first instance trial, who attempted to withdraw cash. In light of the location tracking of the co-defendants of the first instance trial (out of the counter-board: the counter-board) and the fact that the police officers discovered a valid boarding car of the co-defendants of the first instance trial, the police officers of the first instance trial were not geographically far away. The police officers of the first instance trial ordered the co-defendants of the first instance trial (out of the counter-board) to search the front boarding car of the first instance trial (out of the counter-board): the first instance trial police officers of the first instance trial (out of the counter-board): the first instance trial police officers of the first instance trial (out of the counter-board, the first instance trial police officers of the first instance trial police officers of the first instance trial) and the first instance trial police officers of the first instance trial.

(3) Meanwhile, if the co-defendants of the first instance court, who carried the deceased on a passenger car, knew that his crime was reported and that police tracking began, it is also anticipated that the risk of threatening the deceased’s life will be further increased due to fear of arrest and early aid.

(4) In light of the police officer’s duty to protect the life and body of the victim as the top priority to the safety of the victim, the seriousness of the incident that is dangerous to the life and body of the deceased, the probability that the risk may be realized, the degree of police officer’s awareness of it, and the location and time for discovering white learning cars, etc., even though the police officer’s request for assistance to other patrol vehicles conducting patrol or inspection to the police officer, the police officer of the first instance trial, who is an offender, anticipated the car day of the first instance trial co-defendant (overboard) of the first instance trial (overboard) to stop in close vicinity to the passenger car side of the Defendant co-defendant of the first instance trial (overboard) in order to ensure the safety of the victim’s life and body. Thus, it appears that it is difficult to request the police officer to take the above minimum measures, or that there is no special obstacle to the police officer’s request to take such measures (in addition to the case of the vehicle’s final vehicle model or the vehicle number of the first instance trial, it does not appear to be specific (over).).

In light of the above facts, the Defendant appears to have known that the first instance police officer’s common vehicle stopped on the road (out of time: Nonparty 1’s common vehicle): it was not likely that the first instance police officer would have been under his/her jurisdiction due to the distance between police officers and the first instance police officer’s common vehicle (out of time: the first instance police officer’s common vehicle): the police officer’s duty to take measures to prevent the occurrence of danger to the first instance police officer’s private vehicle (out of time: the first instance police officer’s common vehicle): the police officer’s duty to take measures to prevent the occurrence of danger to the first instance police officer’s private vehicle (out of time: the first instance police officer’s common vehicle): the police officer’s private vehicle’s private vehicle’s private vehicle’s private vehicle’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car’s private car.

(5) On the other hand, when the police officer inspects the car of the co-defendant of the first instance trial, which is a vehicle for its own use, it is limited to stopping in close vicinity to the vehicle side of the co-defendant of the first instance trial (outboard:): whether the first instance trial co-defendant of the first instance trial (outboard) could prevent the police officer from departing from driving the car; on the other hand, there were many vehicles parked at both side of the road of this case at the time of inspection; on the other side of the road of this case at the time of inspection, many vehicles parked; on the front and rear side of the first instance trial co-defendant of the first instance trial (outboard: in short: in light of the vehicle of the co-defendant of the first instance trial (outboard): on the other hand, the first instance trial police officer did not stop the vehicle in close vicinity to the vehicle of the co-defendant of the first instance trial (outboard): on the other side of the first instance trial; on the other hand, it seems that the co-defendant of the first instance trial and the first instance trial police officer did not stop.

B) As above, the police officers in the first instance court’s co-defendants in the first instance court’s trial (in the second instance court’s co-defendants: the Defendant was in violation of the Act and the State Compensation Act, as the police officers did not take the minimum measures to prevent escape and stop the Defendant at a point 10 meters later than the first instance court’s co-defendants (in the second instance court’s case, the Defendant was in violation of the Act and the State Compensation Act. In full view of the following, the Defendant’s co-defendants in the first instance court’s co-defendants (in the second instance court’s case, the Defendant was in violation of the Act and subordinate statutes, and the Defendant was in violation of the Act and subordinate statutes, which became aware of the fact that the Defendant was driving away from the police. Ultimately, the Defendant was killed by the co-defendants in the first instance court’s first instance court’s co-defendants (in the second instance court’s case, the Defendant was in violation of the Act and subordinate statutes.

C. Scope of damages

The court's explanation on this part is the same as the entry of "the scope of compensation for damages" in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance. Therefore, it is acceptable to accept it in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

D. Limitation on liability

The scope of liability for damages caused by a joint tort shall be determined by evaluating all the acts of the perpetrator in relation to the victim as a whole, and each tortfeasor shall be liable for the full amount of the compensation for damages. Even if the degree of liability of the tortfeasor is minor compared to other tortfeasors, the scope of liability of the tortfeasor cannot be limited as part of the amount of compensation determined as above in relation to the victim (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da32999, Jun. 14, 2007). Accordingly, according to the above legal principle, the liability cannot be limited solely on the ground that the degree of negligence of the defendant in relation to the co-defendant of the first instance court (foreign co-defendant) who is an offender is weak.

However, in accordance with the compensation system that provides guidance for fair and reasonable burden of damages, if the failure to limit the liability of part of the joint tortfeasor constitutes cases where it is unreasonable to the extent that it is considerably acceptable in light of the general public’s legal sentiment, the limitation of liability is reasonable in accordance with the above principle. Even if public officials belonging to the defendant in this case were negligent in violating the legal obligation granted to them in this case, it is different from the cases where public officials belonging to the first instance court participated in the criminal act of the joint defendant (overboard party) or contributed to the formation of the criminal act by facilitating such crime. Although the crime of the joint defendant in the first instance court (overboard party) and the omission by police officers belonging to the defendant who did not stop such act, caused the death of the deceased by jointly action, the imposition of liability equal to the defendant who directly committed the crime on the part of the joint defendant at the first instance court (overboard party): The imposition of liability equal to the defendant's joint defendant at the same time as the result of the crime is reasonable, taking into account the situation that the victim's joint defendant did not directly engage in the crime.

E. Sub-committee

Therefore, the defendant is liable for damages under the State Compensation Act at the rate of 48,084,731 won (i.e., 160,282,438 won x 30%) and damages for delay calculated at the rate of 5% per annum from March 1, 2011 to January 25, 2013, which is deemed reasonable to dispute over the existence and scope of the defendant's obligation to pay damages for delay under the Civil Act; 47,184,731 won per annum from the following day to the date of full payment (i.e., 157,282,438 won x 30% per annum from the following day to the date of full payment); 201% per annum from March 1, 2011 to the date of full payment (i.e., 300,000 won per annum x 301.3% per annum from the following day to the date of full payment).

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of this case is justified within the above scope of recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed without merit. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair with different conclusions, it is accepted in part of the plaintiffs' appeal and it is decided that the judgment of the court of first instance, including the plaintiff 1 and 2's claim expanded in the trial, will be modified as above. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Choi Jong-sik (Presiding Judge)