[2] The authenticity and reversal of a seal imprint

[3] In a case where the presumption of the authenticity of a seal imprint was reversed, whether the previous Supreme Court’s ruling that “if a court makes a doubt as to the authenticity of a seal imprint with a reflective impression, the presumption of the authenticity of the seal imprints the presumption of the authenticity of the seal imprints it (negative)

[2] The presumption that the authenticity of a seal imprint is based on the intention of the holder of the title deed, i.e., the presumption of the authenticity of the seal imprint is de facto presumed. Thus, if a person who contests the authenticity of the seal imprint proves that the act of affixing the seal is based on the will of the holder of the title deed, the presumption of the authenticity of the seal imprints if he/she proves that the act of affixing the seal is

[3] The previous Supreme Court Decisions (Supreme Court Decision 87Meu707 delivered on December 22, 1987) held that "where it is found that the document is a stamp image affixed to a person who holds the title of the document, the document will be prepared with the qualification of the person who holds the title of the document, and that the document will be proved by the person who asserts that the document will be prepared with the qualification of the person who holds the title of the title of the document," and that the person who asserts the authenticity of the stamp image shall actively prove the circumstances where the presumption of the authenticity of the document can be destroyed by counter-written evidence. In such a case, the ruling subject to review held that "if the court makes a doubt as to the authenticity of the document, the presumption of the authenticity is broken if it is doubtful by counter-written evidence," and both rulings are inconsistent with the previous opinions taken by the Supreme Court, and therefore, it cannot be deemed that there is a mutually contradictory judgment.

1. The plaintiff (hereinafter only referred to as the plaintiff) asserts as follows as the grounds for retrial of this case.

First, Supreme Court Decision 87Meu707 Decided December 22, 1987 held that "in case where it is recognized that the seal of the holder of a title to the document affixed on the document is the seal affixed by the seal, unless there are special circumstances, the establishment of the seal is presumed to have been affixed by the holder of the title to the document, i.e., the signature affixed by the holder of the title to the document, and once it is presumed that the document is authentic by Article 329 of the Civil Procedure Act, and if it is presumed that the document is prepared by the holder of the title to the document, it shall be proved by the claimant actively, and the probative value of evidence proving the fact of objection is insufficient to prove it is insufficient to prove it." However, the judgment subject to review is that " even if the preparation of the document was made by the holder of the title to the document, if there is a doubt about the formation of the document, the presumption of the authenticity is broken if it is made by the court," which constitutes "Article 421-2 of the Civil Procedure Act."

Second, it is unfair to hold that the judgment of the second instance court did not err in the misapprehension of evidence judgment as to the ground of appeal that the judgment of the second instance court omitted the judgment of evidence favorable to the plaintiff.

2. As to the first ground for retrial

If the stamp image of a holder of a private document affixed on his/her private document is cut off by his/her seal, barring special circumstances, it shall be presumed that the authenticity of the stamp image is created, i.e., the act of affixing the seal is based on the will of the holder of the document. Once the authenticity of the stamp image is presumed, it shall be presumed that the entire document is established in accordance with Article 329 of the Civil Procedure Act. Such presumption is broken if it is revealed that the act of affixing the seal was made by a person other than the holder of the title deed, or that it was made without being written against the will of the holder of the title deed or without being written against the will of the holder of the title deed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 76Da1394, Jul. 27, 1976; 81Da684, Aug. 24, 1982; 85Da109, Feb. 11, 1986; 209Da34945, Apr. 19, 197, 1994

However, the presumption that the authenticity of the above seal imprints, i.e., the act of signing and sealing the seal is based on the will of the holder of the title deed, is a de facto presumption (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da41324, Jun. 30, 1995; 96Da13279, Jun. 28, 1996; 96Da13279, Jun. 28, 1996). If a person disputing the authenticity of the seal proves circumstances that the act of signing and sealing the seal is based on the will of the holder of the title deed, the presumption of the authenticity is broken (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 86Da915, Sept. 23, 1986; 93Da30129, 30136, Feb. 10, 1995; 95Da15780, Feb. 15, 1996).

The Supreme Court Decision 87Meu707 Decided December 22, 1987, which the plaintiff pointed out in the grounds for retrial, "if it is found that the document is a stamp image affixed to the document, the document will be prepared with the qualification of the holder of the title deed, and if it is made with the seal, the claimant must actively prove that the document will be prepared with the qualification of the holder of the title deed." The purport of the plaintiff who asserts the authenticity of the stamp image is that the person who asserts the authenticity of the stamp image must actively prove the circumstances, etc. that can undermine the presumption of the authenticity by means of counter-written evidence. In such a case, the ruling subject to retrial is that "if the court makes a doubt about the authenticity of the document, the presumption of the authenticity is broken if it is made with a counter-written evidence," and the two rulings are that it is difficult to view it inconsistent with the views taken by the previous Supreme Court, and therefore, it is not inconsistent with each other. Thus, the part concerning the above grounds for retrial of the plaintiff's request for retrial in this case

3. Second, as to the grounds for retrial

The remaining arguments cited by the Plaintiff as a ground for retrial do not constitute a legitimate ground for retrial by itself.

4. Therefore, the part concerning the first ground for retrial among the plaintiff's request for retrial of this case is dismissed, and the second ground for retrial is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices who reviewed the lawsuit against the plaintiff.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)