2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. A. A. corporation engaged in manufacturing business, such as an Obeer Co., Ltd., who was found to have received KRW 000 from the Korea Land and Housing Corporation during 2007, even though it received KRW 000 as obstacles compensation, the Plaintiff notified Obeer Co., Ltd. to pay corporate tax due to the omission of the amount of income such as the above obstacles compensation upon the due date for payment on January 31, 201. On March 16, 2011, the Plaintiff had been the representative of the said company at the time of the filing of the instant lawsuit as the secondary taxpayer of the said corporate tax. The details of delinquency in BA at the time of the filing of the instant lawsuit are as follows.

B. On March 21, 2009, the Defendant’s spouse entered into a sales contract (hereinafter “instant sales contract”) with the Seoul Yongsan-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government Housing Redevelopment and Improvement Project Association (the head of the cooperative) to purchase KRW 000 of the purchase price of KRW 48-dong 409-dong 101 (hereinafter “instant sales contract”). The down payment of KRW 000 at the time of the contract, the intermediate payment of KRW 00 at the time of the contract, and the intermediate payment of KRW 00 at the time of 4,6,100 in six installments in 2,6,000, and the remainder payment of KRW 00 at the date of designation of occupancy. Meanwhile, on December 30, 2009, the name of the instant sales right was modified from the Jung-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government to Nabu on December 30, 209, and the Defendant re-entered from 14, 2011.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1 to 3, and 5 evidence No. 1.7 11 (including branch numbers) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

BA, a debtor, transferred the instant right to sell in lots to the defendant under insolvent on April 1, 201. The evidence submitted by the defendant alone cannot be deemed as having acquired only the title of the instant right to sell in lots through a title trust agreement with PCC, as alleged by the defendant, and therefore, the transfer of the said right to sell in lots constitutes a fraudulent act subject to the obligee’s right of revocation. Even if it is recognized that a title trust relationship exists in relation to the transfer of the said right to sell in lots, the Act on the Registration of Real Estate under Actual Titleholder’s Name (hereinafter “Real Estate Explanation Act”) cannot be applied to title trust of the right to sell in lots. Furthermore, even in the application of the said Act, PCC and BA can be deemed to exist in the title trust relationship with the real right to sell in lots, so it can be deemed that BA has effectively acquired the said right to sell in lots under the proviso of Article 4(2) of the Act, and ultimately, it cannot be avoided that BA’s transfer of the right to sell in lots to the defendant.

B. Defendant’s assertion

In the process of the transfer of the ownership of the instant parcelling-out right, those who actually bear the expenses are the Defendant and the Plaintiff, and the Na is merely leasing only the name without the intention to acquire the above parcelling-out right without any cost. As such, in relation to the transfer of the ownership of the said parcelling-out right, it shall be deemed that there was a title trust agreement subject to the Real Estate Real Name Act in relation to the transfer of the ownership of the said parcelling-out right. Therefore, since the said right to sell the ownership transferred under the name of Na has no effect pursuant to Article 4(1) of the said Act, it shall not be deemed that the said right would have resulted in a decrease in the debtor’s responsible property even if the Na concluded a sales contract with the Defendant and transferred the said title.

3. Determination

A. Nature of the transfer of the sales right in this case

In relation to the plaintiff's claim of this case, the parties concerned are particularly disputing from NaA about whether the transfer of the right to sell this case to the defendant can be viewed as a fraudulent act.

Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the statements and arguments set forth in Gap evidence 3, Eul evidence 4, 6, and 10 as well as the overall purport of the arguments, it is difficult to find out a separate title trust agreement, etc. made between Jung and Eul on December 29, 2009, to conclude that it is difficult to find out a separate title trust agreement, etc. made between Jung and Eul on December 29, 2009, as well as to conclude that Jung will take over the intermediate payment loan obligation of 00 won, which is owed by Jung-CC to the preferred bank, and accordingly, the debtor of the above loan was changed to Eul. Since each of 00 won, which was expected to be paid in February 2, 6, and October 2010 pursuant to the sales contract in this case, is also an internal title trust agreement made between Jung and Eul on December 29, 200.

However, taking into account the following circumstances: (a) No. 6, No. 5, and No. 11 of the above sales agreement were issued to the above Seoul High Court for sale and purchase; (b) the Defendant’s act of purchasing and selling part of the above amount was 00 won out of the total amount of money deposited by the Bank of Korea during the process of entering into the sales and purchase agreement of March 21, 2009; (c) the intermediate payment of KRW 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00,000,000,000,00,000,00,00,00,00,00,00,00 won.

B. Whether the act of disposing of the entrusted property is acceptable

In a case where it is deemed that the regularCC, which acquired the right to sell this case from the prior district housing redevelopment and rearrangement project association, transferred the right to sell this case in the name of Na under the internal title trust agreement with Na as above, the question is whether the act of Na, who is in the position of the trustee, disposes of the above right to sell to the defendant, which is the entrusted property, becomes the object of creditor's right of revocation as a fraudulent act.

First of all, as to the validity of the right to sell land in this case transferred under the name of BA, it can be deemed that the so-called bilateral title trust relationship exists between the above parties by transferring only the above rights, such as the right to dispose of the instant right to sell land under the name of CCC to BA. However, since the above title trust relationship concerns the right to sell land belonging to the claim right and it is reasonable to view that the above right to sell real estate does not apply to the Real Estate Act subject to regulation of ownership and other real rights. Accordingly, regardless of the provisions of Article 4(1) of the Act on the Explanation of Real Estate, the above right to sell land under the name of BA is effective. Therefore, the above right to sell land under the name of BA is not valid under the premise that the above right to sell land is invalid by the Act on the Explanation, and the above disposal disposition of the right to sell land cannot be seen as a fraudulent act, but the trustee in the title trust relationship can claim against the Defendant under the above title trust agreement to the above third party, and thus, the title trustee is obliged to return the above right to the trust.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.